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335
How to leak a secret
 PROCEEDINGS OF THE 7TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE THEORY AND APPLICATION OF CRYPTOLOGY AND INFORMATION SECURITY: ADVANCES IN CRYPTOLOGY
, 2001
"... In this paper we formalize the notion of a ring signature, which makes it possible to specify a set of possible signers without revealing which member actually produced the signature. Unlike group signatures, ring signatures have no group managers, no setup procedures, no revocation procedures, and ..."
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Cited by 2580 (4 self)
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In this paper we formalize the notion of a ring signature, which makes it possible to specify a set of possible signers without revealing which member actually produced the signature. Unlike group signatures, ring signatures have no group managers, no setup procedures, no revocation procedures, and no coordination: any user can choose any set of possible signers that includes himself, and sign any message by using his secret key and the others ’ public keys, without getting their approval or assistance. Ring signatures provide an elegant way to leak authoritative secrets in an anonymous way, to sign casual email in a way which can only be verified by its intended recipient, and to solve other problems in multiparty computations. The main contribution of this paper is a new construction of such signatures which is unconditionally signerambiguous, provably secure in the random oracle model, and exceptionally efficient: adding each ring member increases the cost of signing or verifying by a single modular multiplication and a single symmetric encryption.
A Secure and Optimally Efficient MultiAuthority Election Scheme
, 1997
"... Abstract. In this paper we present a new multiauthority secretballot election scheme that guarantees privacy, universal verifiability, and robustness. It is the first scheme for which the performance is optimal in the sense that time and communication complexity is minimal both for the individual ..."
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Cited by 308 (6 self)
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Abstract. In this paper we present a new multiauthority secretballot election scheme that guarantees privacy, universal verifiability, and robustness. It is the first scheme for which the performance is optimal in the sense that time and communication complexity is minimal both for the individual voters and the authorities. An interesting property of the scheme is that the time and communication complexity for the voter is independent of the number of authorities. A voter simply posts a single encrypted message accompanied by a compact proof that it contains a valid vote. Our result is complementary to the result by Cramer, Franklin, Schoenmakers, and Yung in the sense that in their scheme the work for voters is linear in the number of authorities but can be instantiated to yield informationtheoretic privacy, while in our scheme the voter’s effort is independent of the number of authorities but always provides computational privacyprotection. We will also point out that the majority of proposed voting schemes provide computational privacy only (often without even considering the lack of informationtheoretic privacy), and that our new scheme is by far superior to those schemes. 1
Privacy Preserving Auctions and Mechanism Design
, 1999
"... We suggest an architecture for executing protocols for auctions and, more generally, mechanism design. Our goal is to preserve the privacy of the inputs of the participants (so that no nonessential information about them is divulged, even a posteriori) while maintaining communication and computation ..."
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Cited by 247 (13 self)
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We suggest an architecture for executing protocols for auctions and, more generally, mechanism design. Our goal is to preserve the privacy of the inputs of the participants (so that no nonessential information about them is divulged, even a posteriori) while maintaining communication and computational efficiency. We achieve this goal by adding another party  the auction issuer  that generates the programs for computing the auctions but does not take an active part in the protocol. The auction issuer is not a trusted party, but is assumed not to collude with the auctioneer. In the case of auctions, barring collusion between the auctioneer and the auction issuer, neither party gains any information about the bids, even after the auction is over. Moreover, bidders can verify that the auction was performed correctly. The protocols do not require any communication between the bidders and the auction issuer and the computational efficiency is very reasonable. This architecture can be used to implement any mechanism design where the important factor is the complexity of the decision procedure.
A verifiable secret shuffle and its application to EVoting
, 2001
"... We present a mathematical construct which provides a cryptographic protocol to verifiably shuffle a sequence of k modular integers, and discuss its application to secure, universally verifiable, multiauthority election schemes. The output of the shuffle operation is another sequence of k modular in ..."
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Cited by 217 (0 self)
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We present a mathematical construct which provides a cryptographic protocol to verifiably shuffle a sequence of k modular integers, and discuss its application to secure, universally verifiable, multiauthority election schemes. The output of the shuffle operation is another sequence of k modular integers, each of which is the same secret power of a corresponding input element, but the order of elements in the output is kept secret. Though it is a trivial matter for the “shuffler ” (who chooses the permutation of the elements to be applied) to compute the output from the input, the construction is important because it provides a linear size proof of correctness for the output sequence (i.e. a proof that it is of the form claimed) that can be checked by an arbitrary verifiers. The complexity of the protocol improves on that of FurukawaSako[16] both measured by number of exponentiations and by overall size. The protocol is shown to be honestverifier zeroknowledge in a special case, and is computational zeroknowledge in general. On the way to the final result, we also construct a generalization of the well known ChaumPedersen protocol for knowledge of discrete logarithm equality ([10], [7]). In fact, the generalization specializes exactly to the ChaumPedersen protocol in the case k = 2. This result may be of interest on its own. An application to electronic voting is given that matches the features of the best current protocols with significant efficiency improvements. An alternative application to electronic voting is also given that introduces an entirely new paradigm for achieving Universally Verifiable elections.
Practical Verifiable Encryption and Decryption of Discrete Logarithms
, 2003
"... This paper addresses the problem of designing practical protocols for proving properties about encrypted data. To this end, it presents a variant of the new public key encryption of Cramer and Shoup based on Paillier’s decision composite residuosity assumption, along with efficient protocols for ve ..."
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Cited by 169 (24 self)
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This paper addresses the problem of designing practical protocols for proving properties about encrypted data. To this end, it presents a variant of the new public key encryption of Cramer and Shoup based on Paillier’s decision composite residuosity assumption, along with efficient protocols for verifiable encryption and decryption of discrete logarithms (and more generally, of representations with respect to multiple bases). This is the first verifiable encryption system that provides chosen ciphertext security and avoids inefficient cutandchoose proofs. The presented protocols have numerous applications, including key escrow, optimistic fair exchange, publicly verifiable secret and signature sharing, universally composable commitments, group signatures, and confirmer signatures.
Multiparty Computation from Threshold Homomorphic Encryption
, 2001
"... Abstract. We introduce a new approach to multiparty computation (MPC) basing it on homomorphic threshold cryptosystems. We show that given keys for any sufficiently efficient system of this type, general MPC protocols for n parties can be devised which are secure against an active adversary that co ..."
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Cited by 166 (14 self)
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Abstract. We introduce a new approach to multiparty computation (MPC) basing it on homomorphic threshold cryptosystems. We show that given keys for any sufficiently efficient system of this type, general MPC protocols for n parties can be devised which are secure against an active adversary that corrupts any minority of the parties. The total number of bits broadcast is O(nkC), where k is the security parameter and C  is the size of a (Boolean) circuit computing the function to be securely evaluated. An earlier proposal by Franklin and Haber with the same complexity was only secure for passive adversaries, while all earlier protocols with active security had complexity at least quadratic in n. We give two examples of threshold cryptosystems that can support our construction and lead to the claimed complexities. 1
Efficient receiptfree voting based on homomorphic encryption
, 2000
"... Abstract. Voting schemes that provide receiptfreeness prevent voters from proving their cast vote, and hence thwart votebuying and coercion. We analyze the security of the multiauthority voting protocol of Benaloh and Tuinstra and demonstrate that this protocol is not receiptfree, opposed to what ..."
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Cited by 161 (0 self)
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Abstract. Voting schemes that provide receiptfreeness prevent voters from proving their cast vote, and hence thwart votebuying and coercion. We analyze the security of the multiauthority voting protocol of Benaloh and Tuinstra and demonstrate that this protocol is not receiptfree, opposed to what was claimed in the paper and was believed before. Furthermore, we propose the first practicable receiptfree voting scheme. Its only physical assumption is the existence of secret oneway communication channels from the authorities to the voters, and due to the public verifiability of the tally, voters only join a single stage of the protocol, realizing the “voteandgo ” concept. The protocol combines the advantages of the receiptfree protocol of Sako and Kilian and of the very efficient protocol of Cramer, Gennaro, and Schoenmakers, with help of designatedverifier proofs of Jakobsson, Sako, and Impagliazzo. Compared to the receiptfree protocol of Sako and Kilian for security parameter ℓ (the number of repetitions in the noninteractive cutandchoose proofs), the protocol described in this paper realizes an improvement of the total bit complexity by a factor ℓ.
CoercionResistant Electronic Elections
 In WPES ’05
, 2002
"... We introduce a model for electronic election schemes that involves a more powerful adversary than in previous work. In particular, we allow the adversary to demand of coerced voters that they vote in a particular manner, abstain from voting, or even disclose their secret keys. We define a scheme ..."
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Cited by 155 (0 self)
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We introduce a model for electronic election schemes that involves a more powerful adversary than in previous work. In particular, we allow the adversary to demand of coerced voters that they vote in a particular manner, abstain from voting, or even disclose their secret keys. We define a scheme to be coercion resistant if it is impossible for the adversary to determine whether a coerced voter complies with the demands. Furthermore, we relax the requirements made in some previous proposals from an untappable channel to only requiring the existence of an anonymous channel.
Proving in ZeroKnowledge that a Number is the Product of Two Safe Primes
, 1998
"... This paper presents the first efficient statistical zeroknowledge protocols to prove statements such as: A committed number is a pseudoprime. ..."
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Cited by 138 (15 self)
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This paper presents the first efficient statistical zeroknowledge protocols to prove statements such as: A committed number is a pseudoprime.
Compact ecash
 In EUROCRYPT, volume 3494 of LNCS
, 2005
"... Abstract. This paper presents efficient offline anonymous ecash schemes where a user can withdraw a wallet containing 2 ℓ coins each of which she can spend unlinkably. Our first result is a scheme, secure under the strong RSA and the yDDHI assumptions, where the complexity of the withdrawal and s ..."
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Cited by 122 (17 self)
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Abstract. This paper presents efficient offline anonymous ecash schemes where a user can withdraw a wallet containing 2 ℓ coins each of which she can spend unlinkably. Our first result is a scheme, secure under the strong RSA and the yDDHI assumptions, where the complexity of the withdrawal and spend operations is O(ℓ + k) andtheuser’s wallet can be stored using O(ℓ + k) bits,wherek is a security parameter. The best previously known schemes require at least one of these complexities to be O(2 ℓ · k). In fact, compared to previous ecash schemes, our whole wallet of 2 ℓ coins has about the same size as one coin in these schemes. Our scheme also offers exculpability of users, that is, the bank can prove to third parties that a user has doublespent. We then extend our scheme to our second result, the first ecash scheme that provides traceable coins without a trusted third party. That is, once a user has double spent one of the 2 ℓ coins in her wallet, all her spendings of these coins can be traced. However, the price for this is that the complexity of the spending and of the withdrawal protocols becomes O(ℓ · k) and O(ℓ · k + k 2) bits, respectively, and wallets take O(ℓ · k) bitsofstorage. All our schemes are secure in the random oracle model.