We examine the separation of ownership and control for 2,980 corporations in nine East Asian countries. In all countries, voting rights frequently exceed cash-#ow rights via pyramid structures and cross-holdings. The separation of ownership and control is most pronounced among family-controlled "rms and small "rms. More than two-thirds of "rms are controlled by a single shareholder. Managers of closely held "rms tend to be relatives of the controlling shareholder's family. Older "rms are generally family-controlled, dispelling the notion that ownership becomes dispersed over time. Finally, signi"cant corporate wealth in East Asia is concentrated among a few families. � 2000 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved. JEL classixcation: G32; L22

Much of the literature on the role and function of the modern firm is based on the assumption of the prevalence of widely dispersed ownership. The dispersion of ownership has resulted in the notion that “the owner of industrial wealth is left a mere symbol of ownership ” (Berle and Means, 1932, p.68), as the control over companies is

abstract: Business groups are a prominent enterprise system in most East Asian and emerging economies. This article addresses an important but understudied issue – ownership and control of these large conglomerates. Studying the ownership structure of the top 100 Taiwanese business groups sheds light on the debate between the culturalists and the institutionalists. Culturalists claim family domination even in institutional changes while institutionalists suggest more dispersed and open shareholding after economic liberalization. The longitudinal analysis of group ownership across three time periods reveals a mixed structure. Although the family still controls most of the old, core group members, new firms and joint ventures that are owned by multiple family groups rose significantly during the institutional transition of 1987–93. The evidence shows that