this paper we investigate the claim that complex causal interactions cause trouble for the notion of inner representational vehicles. We review some of the cases supposed to put pressure on a representational-vehicle based understanding and conclude that the threat, even in these ongoing, interactive cases, is more apparent than real. The main contribution of the present paper, however, is to go beyond this negative thesis

In this paper we outline a theory of the nature of self-directed agents. On our account what is distinctive about self-directed agents is that they are able to anticipate interaction processes and evaluate their performance. This allows self-directed agents to modify their behaviour context sensitively so as to improve the achievement of goals, and in certain instances construct new goals. We contrast self-directedness with reactive action processes that are not modifiable by the agent, though they may be modified by supra-agent processes such as populational adaptation or external design. Self-directedness lies at the nexus of a set of issues concerning the evolution and nature of intentionality, intelligence and agency. It provides the core of a biologically grounded account of intentional agency. 1

Abstract: A naturalistic scheme of primitive conceptual representations is proposed using the statistical measure of mutual information. It is argued that a concept represents, not the class of objects that caused its tokening, but the class of objects that is most likely to have caused it (had it been tokened), as specified by the statistical measure of mutual information. This solves the problem of misrepresentation which plagues causal accounts, by taking the representation relation to be determined via ordinal relationships between conditional probabilities. The scheme can deal with statistical biases and does not rely on arbitrary criteria. Implications for the theory of meaning and semantic content are addressed. 1.

Abstract: I present an account of mental representation based upon the ‘SINBAD’ theory of the cerebral cortex. If the SINBAD theory is correct, then networks of pyramidal cells in the cerebral cortex are appropriately described as representing, or more specifically, as modelling the world. I propose that SINBAD representation reveals the nature of the kind of mental representation found in human and animal minds, since the cortex is heavily implicated in these kinds of minds. Finally, I show how SINBAD neurosemantics can provide accounts of misrepresentation, equivocal representation, twin cases, and Frege cases. 1.

Behavior is often described as the computation of a response to a stimulus. This description is incomplete in an important way because it only examines what occurs between the reception of stimulus information and the generation of an action. Behavior is more correctly described as a control process where actions are performed in order to affect perceptions. This closed-loop nature of behavior is de-emphasized in modern discussions of brain function, leading to a number of artificial mysteries. A notable example is the “symbol grounding problem”. When behavior is viewed as a control process, it is natural to explain how internal representations, even symbols, can have meaning for an organism, and how actions can be motivated by organic needs.

Running Head: The origin of epistemic structures Abstract: Organisms across species use the strategy of generating structures in their environment to lower cognitive complexity. Examples include pheromones, markers, colour codes, etc. Distributed Cognition theory has argued that studying such ‘epistemic structures ’ can provide insights into the development and nature of internal representations, and cognition itself. We develop this claim by providing a model of the origin of such structures, and present a simulation where organisms with only reactive behaviour learn, within their lifetime, to add such structures systematically to their world to lower cognitive load. This implementation is then extended to show that the same underlying process could generate traces of the world in an ‘internal environment ’ to lower cognitive load. We then examine two implications of this internal trace model. First, it provides a novel account of the origin of internal representations. Further, as both external and internal traces lower cognitive load and are generated using the same mechanism, the location of the structure becomes opportunistic, and a matter of utility. This supports the ‘extended mind ’ hypothesis. Second, the stored internal traces develop entirely out of actions. They thus encapsulate action components and could activate actions. This feature explains the origin of enactable and action-oriented mental content.

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Normic laws have the form "if A, then normally B". This paper attempts to show that if a philosophical analysis of normic laws (§ § 1, 4) is combined with certain developments in nonmono-tonic logic (§§2, 3), the following problems in philosophy of science can be seen in a new pers-pective which, at least in many cases, allows to improve their received analysis: explanation and individual case understanding in the humanities (§§1, 2), an evolution-theoretic foundation of normic laws which explains their omnipresence and establishes a the connection between prototypi-cal and statstical normality, (§4), ceteris paribus laws (§5), differences between physical versus non-physical sciences (§6) and finally, theory-protection through auxiliary hypotheses (§7).

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