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510
A Study of Android Application Security.
, 2011
"... Abstract The fluidity of application markets complicate smartphone security. Although recent efforts have shed light on particular security issues, there remains little insight into broader security characteristics of smartphone applications. This paper seeks to better understand smartphone applica ..."
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Cited by 218 (10 self)
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Abstract The fluidity of application markets complicate smartphone security. Although recent efforts have shed light on particular security issues, there remains little insight into broader security characteristics of smartphone applications. This paper seeks to better understand smartphone application security by studying 1,100 popular free Android applications. We introduce the ded decompiler, which recovers Android application source code directly from its installation image. We design and execute a horizontal study of smartphone applications based on static analysis of 21 million lines of recovered code. Our analysis uncovered pervasive use/misuse of personal/phone identifiers, and deep penetration of advertising and analytics networks. However, we did not find evidence of malware or exploitable vulnerabilities in the studied applications. We conclude by considering the implications of these preliminary findings and offer directions for future analysis.
Dissecting android malware: Characterization and evolution
- In IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
, 2012
"... Abstract—The popularity and adoption of smartphones has greatly stimulated the spread of mobile malware, especially on the popular platforms such as Android. In light of their rapid growth, there is a pressing need to develop effective solutions. However, our defense capability is largely constraine ..."
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Cited by 211 (8 self)
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Abstract—The popularity and adoption of smartphones has greatly stimulated the spread of mobile malware, especially on the popular platforms such as Android. In light of their rapid growth, there is a pressing need to develop effective solutions. However, our defense capability is largely constrained by the limited understanding of these emerging mobile malware and the lack of timely access to related samples. In this paper, we focus on the Android platform and aim to systematize or characterize existing Android malware. Particularly, with more than one year effort, we have managed to collect more than 1,200 malware samples that cover the majority of existing Android malware families, ranging from their debut in August 2010 to recent ones in October 2011. In addition, we systematically characterize them from various aspects, including their installation methods, activation mech-anisms as well as the nature of carried malicious payloads. The characterization and a subsequent evolution-based study of representative families reveal that they are evolving rapidly to circumvent the detection from existing mobile anti-virus software. Based on the evaluation with four representative mobile security software, our experiments show that the best case detects 79.6 % of them while the worst case detects only 20.2 % in our dataset. These results clearly call for the need to better develop next-generation anti-mobile-malware solutions. Keywords-Android malware; smartphone security I.
These aren’t the droids you’re looking for: Retrofitting Android to protect data from imperious applications
- in Proc. 18th ACM Conference on Computer and Communication Security (CCS ’11). ACM
, 2011
"... In order to install an Android application, users are commonly re-quired to grant these application both the permission to access in-formation on the device, some of which users may consider private, as well as access the network, which could be used to leak this in-formation. We present two privacy ..."
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Cited by 173 (5 self)
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In order to install an Android application, users are commonly re-quired to grant these application both the permission to access in-formation on the device, some of which users may consider private, as well as access the network, which could be used to leak this in-formation. We present two privacy controls to empower users to protect their data from exfiltration by permission-hungry applica-tions: (1) covertly substituting shadow data in place of data that the user wants to keep private, and (2) blocking network transmissions that contain data the user made available to the application for on-device use only. We retrofit the Android operating system to implement these two controls for use with unmodified applications. A key challenge of imposing shadowing and exfiltration blocking on existing applica-tions is that these controls could cause side effects that interfere with user-desired functionality. To measure the impact of side ef-fects we develop an automated testing methodology that records the visual output of application executions both with and without pri-vacy controls, then automatically highlights the visual differences between the different executions. We evaluate our privacy con-trols on 50 applications from the Android marketplace, selected from those that were both popular and permission-hungry. We find that our privacy controls can successfully reduce the effective per-missions of the application without causing side effects for 66% of the tested applications. The remaining 34 % of applications im-plemented user-desired functionality that required violating the pri-vacy requirements our controls were designed to enforce; there was an unavoidable choice between privacy and user-desired function-ality. 1.
Analyzing Inter-Application Communication in Android
"... Modern smartphone operating systems support the development of third-party applications with open system APIs. In addition to an open API, the Android operating system also provides a rich inter-application message passing system. This encourages inter-application collaboration and reduces developer ..."
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Cited by 145 (8 self)
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Modern smartphone operating systems support the development of third-party applications with open system APIs. In addition to an open API, the Android operating system also provides a rich inter-application message passing system. This encourages inter-application collaboration and reduces developer burden by facilitating component reuse. Unfortunately, message passing is also an application attack surface. The content of messages can be sniffed, modified, stolen, or replaced, which can compromise user privacy. Also, a malicious application can inject forged or otherwise malicious messages, which can lead to breaches of user data and violate application security policies. We examine Android application interaction and identify security risks in application components. We provide a tool, ComDroid, that detects application communication vulnerabilities. ComDroid can be used by developers to analyze their own applications before release, by application reviewers to analyze applications in the Android Market, and by end users. We analyzed 20 applications with the help of ComDroid and found 34 exploitable vulnerabilities; 12 of the 20 applications have at least one vulnerability.
PiOS: Detecting Privacy Leaks in iOS Applications
"... With the introduction of Apple’s iOS and Google’s Android operating systems, the sales of smartphones have exploded. These smartphones have become powerful devices that are basically miniature versions of personal computers. However, the growing popularity and sophistication of smartphones have also ..."
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Cited by 127 (3 self)
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With the introduction of Apple’s iOS and Google’s Android operating systems, the sales of smartphones have exploded. These smartphones have become powerful devices that are basically miniature versions of personal computers. However, the growing popularity and sophistication of smartphones have also increased concerns about the privacy of users who operate these devices. These concerns have been exacerbated by the fact that it has become increasingly easy for users to install and execute third-party applications. To protect its users from malicious applications, Apple has introduced a vetting process. This vetting process should ensure that all applications conform to Apple’s (privacy) rules before they can be offered via the App Store. Unfortunately, this vetting process is not welldocumented, and there have been cases where malicious applications had to be removed from the App Store after user complaints. In this paper, we study the privacy threats that applications, written for Apple’s iOS, pose to users. To this end, we present a novel approach and a tool, PiOS, that allow us to analyze programs for possible leaks of sensitive information from a mobile device to third parties. PiOS uses static analysis to detect data flows in Mach-0 binaries, compiled from Objective-C code. This is a challenging task due to the way in which Objective-C method calls are implemented. We have analyzed more than 1,400 iPhone applications. Our experiments show that, with the exception of a few bad apples, most applications respect personal identifiable information stored on user’s devices. This is even true for applications that are hosted on an unofficial repository (Cydia) and that only run on jailbroken phones. However, we found that more than half of the applications surreptitiously leak the unique ID of the device they are running on. This allows third-parties to create detailed profiles of users’ application preferences and usage patterns. 1
Permission re-delegation: Attacks and defenses
- In 20th Usenix Security Symposium
, 2011
"... Modern browsers and smartphone operating systems treat applications as mutually untrusting, potentially malicious principals. Applications are (1) isolated except for explicit IPC or inter-application communication channels and (2) unprivileged by default, requiring user permission for additional pr ..."
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Cited by 127 (7 self)
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Modern browsers and smartphone operating systems treat applications as mutually untrusting, potentially malicious principals. Applications are (1) isolated except for explicit IPC or inter-application communication channels and (2) unprivileged by default, requiring user permission for additional privileges. Although inter-application communication supports useful collaboration, it also introduces the risk of permission redelegation. Permission re-delegation occurs when an application with permissions performs a privileged task for an application without permissions. This undermines the requirement that the user approve each application’s access to privileged devices and data. We discuss permission re-delegation and demonstrate its risk by launching real-world attacks on Android system applications; several of the vulnerabilities have been confirmed as bugs. We discuss possible ways to address permission redelegation and present IPC Inspection, a new OS mechanism for defending against permission re-delegation. IPC Inspection prevents opportunities for permission redelegation by reducing an application’s permissions after it receives communication from a less privileged application. We have implemented IPC Inspection for a browser and Android, and we show that it prevents the attacks we found in the Android system applications. 1
QUIRE: Lightweight Provenance for Smart Phone Operating Systems
"... Smartphone apps often run with full privileges to access the network and sensitive local resources, making it difficult for remote systems to have any trust in the provenance of network connections they receive. Even within the phone, different apps with different privileges can communicate with one ..."
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Cited by 110 (1 self)
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Smartphone apps often run with full privileges to access the network and sensitive local resources, making it difficult for remote systems to have any trust in the provenance of network connections they receive. Even within the phone, different apps with different privileges can communicate with one another, allowing one app to trick another into improperly exercising its privileges (a Confused Deputy attack). In QUIRE, we engineered two new security mechanisms into Android to address these issues. First, we track the call chain of IPCs, allowing an app the choice of operating with the diminished privileges of its callers or to act explicitly on its own behalf. Second, a lightweight signature scheme allows any app to create a signed statement that can be verified anywhere inside the phone. Both of these mechanisms are reflected in network RPCs, allowing remote systems visibility into the state of the phone when an RPC is made. We demonstrate the usefulness of QUIRE with two example applications. We built an advertising service, running distinctly from the app which wants to display ads, which can validate clicks passed to it from its host. We also built a payment service, allowing an app to issue a request which the payment service validates with the user. An app cannot not forge a payment request by directly connecting to the remote server, nor can the local payment service tamper with the request. 1
Android Permissions: User Attention, Comprehension, and Behavior
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The Effectiveness of Application Permissions
- In Proc. of the USENIX Conference on Web Application Development
, 2011
"... Traditional user-based permission systems assign the user’s full privileges to all applications. Modern platforms are transitioning to a new model, in which each application has a different set of permissions based on its requirements. Application permissions offer several advantages over traditiona ..."
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Cited by 87 (13 self)
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Traditional user-based permission systems assign the user’s full privileges to all applications. Modern platforms are transitioning to a new model, in which each application has a different set of permissions based on its requirements. Application permissions offer several advantages over traditional user-based permissions, but these benefits rely on the assumption that applications generally require less than full privileges. We explore whether that assumption is realistic, which provides insight into the value of application permissions. We perform case studies on two platforms with application permissions, the Google Chrome extension system and the Android OS. We collect the permission requirements of a large set of Google Chrome extensions and Android applications. From this data, we evaluate whether application permissions are effective at protecting users. Our results indicate that application permissions can have a positive impact on system security when applications ’ permission requirements are declared upfront by the developer, but can be improved. 1
Aurasium: Practical policy enforcement for android applications
"... The increasing popularity of Google’s mobile platform Android makes it the prime target of the latest surge in mobile malware. Most research on enhancing the platform’s security and privacy controls requires extensive modification to the operating system, which has significant usability issues and h ..."
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Cited by 84 (0 self)
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The increasing popularity of Google’s mobile platform Android makes it the prime target of the latest surge in mobile malware. Most research on enhancing the platform’s security and privacy controls requires extensive modification to the operating system, which has significant usability issues and hinders efforts for widespread adoption. We develop a novel solution called Aurasium that bypasses the need to modify the Android OS while providing much of the security and privacy that users desire. We automatically repackage arbitrary applications to attach user-level sandboxing and policy enforcement code, which closely watches the application’s behavior for security and privacy violations such as attempts to retrieve a user’s sensitive information, send SMS covertly to premium numbers, or access malicious IP addresses. Aurasium can also detect and prevent cases of privilege escalation attacks. Experiments show that we can apply this solution to a large sample of benign and malicious applications with a near 100 percent success rate, without significant performance and space overhead. Aurasium has been tested on three versions of the Android OS, and is freely available. 1
