We present a theory of financial intermediary leverage cycles within a dynamic model of the macroeconomy. Intermediaries face risk based funding constraints that give rise to procyclical leverage and a procyclical share of intermediated credit. The pricing of risk varies as a function of intermediary leverage, and asset return exposure to intermediary leverage shocks earns a positive risk premium. Relative to an economy with constant leverage, financial intermediaries generate higher consumption growth and lower consumption volatility in normal times, at the cost of endogenous systemic financial risk. The severity of systemic crisis depends on intermediaries ’ leverage and net worth. Regulations that tighten funding constraints affect the systemic risk-return trade-off by lowering the likelihood of systemic crises at the cost of higher pricing of risk.

We propose a rational theory of momentum and reversal based on delegated portfolio management. A competitive investor can invest through an index fund or an active fund run by a manager with unknown ability. Following a negative cashflow shock to assets held by the active fund, the investor updates negatively about the manager’s ability and migrates to the index fund. While prices of assets held by the active fund drop in anticipation of the investor’s outflows, the drop is expected to continue, leading to momentum. Because outflows push prices below fundamental values, expected returns eventually rise, leading to reversal. Fund flows generate comovement and lead-lag effects, with predictability being stronger for assets with high idiosyncratic risk. We derive explicit solutions for asset prices, within a continuous-time normal-linear equilibrium.

Abstract We reconsider the role of financial intermediaries in monetary economics. We explore the hypothesis that financial intermediaries drive the business cycle by way of their role in determining the price of risk. In this framework, balance sheet quantities emerge as a key indicator of risk appetite and hence of the "risk-taking channel" of monetary policy. We document evidence that the balance sheets of financial intermediaries reflect the transmission of monetary policy through capital market conditions. Our findings suggest that the traditional focus on the money stock for the conduct of monetary policy may have more modern counterparts, and we suggest the importance of tracking balance sheet quantities for the conduct of monetary policy.

This chapter surveys the literature on bubbles, financial crises, and systemic risk. The first part of the chapter provides a brief historical account of bubbles and financial crisis. The second part of the chapter gives a structured overview of the literature on financial bubbles. The third part of the chapter discusses the literatures on financial crises and systemic risk, with particular emphasis on amplification and propagation mechanisms during financial crises, and the measurement of systemic risk. Finally, we point toward some questions for future

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This paper argues that the capacity of financial markets to aggregate information is diminished in times of distress, resulting in countercyclical economic uncertainty. I build upon a rational expectations equilibrium model that delivers this result from the combination of (i) countercyclical funding constraints faced by informed financial intermediaries, and (ii) the dispersed nature of information in the economy. During downturns, informed traders become increasingly exposed to non-fundamental price fluctuations (noise trading risk), which reduces information-based trading and the informativeness of asset prices. Uncertainty can spike quite dramatically as conditions deteriorate due to amplification mechanisms that arise from the dispersed nature of information, and the presence of information externalities in a dynamic environment.I show that heightened uncertainty leads to increased risk premia, Sharpe ratios, and stock price volatility even when attitude towards risk and the unconditional volatility of fundamentals remain constant. I also trace the implications for real investment decisions when firms learn about productivity from the observation of stock prices: uncertainty affects welfare by reducing the accuracy of investment and also reduces its level as a precautionary response of firms. The mechanism outlined suggests that the success of public liquidity provision in stabilizing markets depends crucially on the distribution of liquidity across agents.

This paper provides a theory of money, whose value depends on the functioning of the intermediary sector, and a unified framework for analyzing the interaction between price and financial stability. Households that happen to be productive in this period finance their capital purchases with credit from intermediaries and from their own savings. Less productive household save by holding deposits with intermediaries (inside money) or outside money. Intermediation involves risk-taking, and intermediaries’ ability to lend is compromised when they suffer losses. After an adverse productivity shock, credit and inside money shrink, and the value of (outside) money increases, causing deflation that hurts borrowers even further. An accommodating monetary policy in downturns can mitigate these destabilizing adverse feedback effects. Lowering short-term interest rates increases the value of long-term bonds, recapitalizes the intermediaries by redistributes wealth. While this policy helps the economy ex-post, ex-ante it can lead to excessive risk-taking by the intermediary sector. Preliminary and Incomplete. We are grateful to comments by seminar participants at Princeton, Bank

We propose a dynamic theory of financial intermediaries as collateralization specialists that are better able to collateralize claims than households. Intermediaries require capital as they can borrow against their loans only to the extent that households themselves can collateralize the assets backing the loans. The net worth of financial intermediaries and the corporate sector are both state variables affecting the spread between intermediated and direct finance and the dynamics of real economic activity, such as investment, and financing. The accumulation of net worth of intermediaries is slow relative to that of the corporate sector. A credit crunch has persistent real effects and can result in a delayed or stalled recovery. We provide sufficient conditions for the comovement of the marginal value of firm and intermediary capital.

I develop a dynamic equilibrium model that incorporates incorrect beliefs about crash risk and use it to explain the available empirical evidence on financial booms and busts. In the model, if a long period of time goes by without a crash, some investors ’ perceived crash risk falls below the true crash risk, inducing them to take on excessive leverage. Following a drop in fundamentals, these investors de-lever substantially, both because of their high pre-crash leverage and because they now believe future crashes to be more likely. Together, these two channels generate a crash in the risky asset price that is much larger than the drop in fundamentals. The lower perceived crash risk after years with no crashes also means that the average excess return on the risky asset is low at precisely the moment when any crash that occurs would be especially large in size; moreover, it means that, in the event of a crash, some investors may default and banks may sustain large unexpected losses. Finally, the model shows how pre-crash warning signs can generate financial fragility. By reducing investors ’ optimism, warning signs also increase investors ’ uncertainty about their beliefs and thereby make them more likely to overreact to future bad news. ∗I am indebted to Nicholas Barberis and Jonathan Ingersoll for guidance and encouragement. I also thank George

We study the joint determination of fund managers ’ contracts and equilibrium asset prices. Because of agency frictions, investors make managers ’ fees more sensitive to performance and benchmark performance against a market index. This makes managers unwilling to deviate from the index and exacerbates price distortions. Because trading against overvaluation ex-poses managers to greater risk of deviating from the index than trading against undervaluation, agency frictions bias the aggregate market upwards. They can also generate a negative rela-tionship between risk and return because they raise the volatility of overvalued assets. Socially optimal contracts provide steeper performance incentives and cause larger pricing distortions than privately optimal contracts.