How do people know as much as they do with as little information as they get? The problem takes many forms; learning vocabulary from text is an especially dramatic and convenient case for research. A new general theory of acquired similarity and knowledge representation, latent semantic analysis (LSA), is presented and used to successfully simulate such learning and several other psycholinguistic phenomena. By inducing global knowledge indirectly from local co-occurrence data in a large body of representative text, LSA acquired knowledge about the full vocabulary of English at a comparable rate to schoolchildren. LSA uses no prior linguistic or perceptual similarity knowledge; it is based solely on a general mathematical learning method that achieves powerful inductive effects by extracting the right number of dimensions (e.g., 300) to represent objects and contexts. Relations to other theories, phenomena, and problems are sketched. Prologue "How much do we know at any time? Much more, or so I believe, than we know we know!" —Agatha Christie, The Moving Finger A typical American seventh grader knows the meaning of

It is a striking fact that in humans the greatest learnmg occurs precisely at that point in time- childhood- when the most dramatic maturational changes also occur. This report describes possible synergistic interactions between maturational change and the ability to learn a complex domain (language), as investigated in con-nectionist networks. The networks are trained to process complex sentences involving relative clauses, number agreement, and several types of verb argument structure. Training fails in the case of networks which are fully formed and ‘adultlike ’ in their capacity. Training succeeds only when networks begin with limited working memory and gradually ‘mature ’ to the adult state. This result suggests that rather than being a limitation, developmental restrictions on resources may constitute a necessary prerequisite for mastering certain complex domains. Specifically, successful learning may depend on starting small.

A neuropsychological theory is proposed that assumes category learning is a competition between separate verbal and implicit (i.e., procedural-learning-based) categorization systems. The theory assumes that the caudate nucleus is an important component of the implicit system and that the anterior cingulate and prefrontal cortices are critical to the verbal system. In addition to making predictions for normal human adults, the theory makes specific predictions for children, elderly people, and patients suffering from Parkinson's disease, Huntington's disease, major depression, amnesia, or lesions of the prefrontal cortex. Two separate formal descriptions of the theory are also provided. One describes trial-by-trial learning, and the other describes global dynamics. The theory is tested on published neuropsychological data and on category learning data with normal adults.

this article should be addressed to Robert Goldstone, Psychology Department, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana 47405. Electronic mail may be sent to rgoldsto @ ucs.indiana.edu

Previously published sets of classification and old-new recognition memory data are reanalyzed within the framework of an exemplar-based generalization model. The key assumption in the model is that, whereas classification decisions are based on the similarity of a probe to exemplars of a target category relative to exemplars of contrast categories, recognition decisions are based on overall summed similarity of a probe to all exemplars. The summed-similarity decision rule is shown to be consistent with a wide variety of recognition memory data obtained in classification learning situations and may provide a unified approach to understanding relations between categorization and recognition. Recently, there has been an upsurge of interest among categorization researchers in exploring relations between classification learning and old-new recognition memory. This interest has been fueled by the exemplar view of category representation, which holds that people base classification decisions on similarity comparisons with stored exemplars (Hintzman, 1986b; Medin & Schaffer, 1978; Nosofsky, 1986).

The authors propose and test an exemplar-based random walk model for predicting response times in tasks of speeded, multidimensional perceptual classification. The model combines elements of R.M. Nosofsky's (1986) generalized context model of categorization and G. D. Logan's (1988) instance-based model of automaticity. In the model, exemplars race among one another to be retrieved from memory, with rates determined by their similarity to test items. The retrieved exemplars provide incremental information that enters into a random walk process for making classification decisions. The model predicts correctly effects of within- and between-categories similarity, individual-object familiarity, and extended practice on classification response times. It also builds bridges between the domains of categorization and automaticity. Models of multidimensional perceptual classification have grown increasingly powerful and sophisticated in recent years, providing detailed quantitative accounts of patterns of classifi-cation learning, transfer, and generalization (e.g., Anderson,

The relationship between subjects ' identification and categorization learning of integral-dimension stimuli was studied within the framework of an exemplar-based generalization model. The model was used to predict subjects ' learning in six different categorization conditions on the basis of data obtained in a single identification learning condition. A crucial assumption in the model is that because of selective attention to component dimensions, similarity relations may change in systematic ways across different experimental contexts. The theoretical analysis provided evidence that, at least under unspeeded conditions, selective attention may play a critical role in determining the identification-categorization relationship for integral stimuli. Evidence was also provided that similarity among exemplars decreased as a function of identification learning. Various alternative classification models, including prototype, multiple-prototype, average distance, and "value-on-dimensions" models, were unable to account for the results. This article seeks to characterize performance relations between the two fundamental classification paradigms of identification and categorization. Whereas in an identification paradigm people identify stimuli as unique items (a one-to-one

Experiments were conducted in which Ss made classification, recognition, and similarity judgments for 34 schematic faces. A multidimensional scaling (MDS) solution for the faces was derived on the basis of the similarity judgments. This MDS solution was then used in conjunction with an exemplar-similarity model to accurately predict Ss ' classification and recognition judgments. Evidence was provided that Ss allocated attention to the psychological dimensions differentially for classification and recognition. The distribution of attention came close to the ideal-observer distribution for classification, and some tendencies in that direction were observed for recognition. Evidence was also provided for interactive effects of individual exemplar frequencies and similarities on classification and recognition, in accord with the predictions of the exemplar model. Unexpectedly, however, the frequency effects appeared to be larger for classification than for recognition. The purpose of this study was to provide tests of a model for relating perceptual classification performance and oldnew recognition memory. The model under investigation is the context theory of classification proposed by Medin and

structure. Perceptual classification learning experiments were conducted in which presentation frequencies of individual exemplars were manipulated. The exemplars had varying degrees of similarity to members of the target and contrast categories. Classification accuracy and typicality ratings increased for exemplars presented with high frequency and for members of the target category that were similar to the high-frequency exemplars. Typicality decreased for members of the contrast category that were similar to the high-frequency exemplars. A frequency-sensitive similarity-to-exemplars model provided a good quantitative account of the classification learning and typicality data. The interactive relations among similarity, frequency, and categorization are considered in the General Discussion. Among the most well-established findings in the categorization literature is that categories have "graded structures"

Subjects learned to classify perceptual stimuli varying along continuous, separable dimensions into rule-described categories. The categories were designed to contrast the predictions of a selective-attention exemplar model and a simple rule-based model formalizing an economy-ofdescription view. Converging evidence about categorization strategies was obtained by also collecting identification and recognition data and by manipulating strategies via instructions. In free-strategy conditions, the exemplar model generally provided an accurate quantitative account of identification, categorization, and recognition performance, and it allowed for the interrelationship of these paradigms within a unified framework. Analyses of individual subject data also provided some evidence for the use of rules, but in general, the rules seemed to have a great deal in common with exemplar storage processes. Classification and recognition performance for subjects given explicit instructions to use specific rules contrasted dramatically with performance in the free-strategy conditions and could not be predicted by the exemplar model. Markedly different theoretical approaches have been applied to account for the learning and representation of welldefined categories structured according to simple rules and more natural, ill-defined categories (Rosch, 1973; E. E. Smith & Medin, 1981). In the case of well-defined categories, it is generally assumed that people formulate and test hypotheses concerning the "rules " that determine category membership