to stimulate the next wave of research on organization learning. It provides a conceptual framework for research on the differences and similarities of learning by individuals, groups, and organizations.

Abstract not found

Abstract not found

There has been much discussion recently about the scope and limits of purely symbolic models of the mind and about the proper role of connectionism in cognitive modeling. This paper describes the "symbol grounding problem": How can the semantic interpretation of a formal symbol system be made intrinsic to the system, rather than just parasitic on the meanings in our heads? How can the meanings of the meaningless symbol tokens, manipulated solely on the basis of their (arbitrary) shapes, be grounded in anything but other meaningless symbols? The problem is analogous to trying to learn Chinese from a Chinese/Chinese dictionary alone. A candidate solution is sketched: Symbolic representations must be grounded bottom-up in nonsymbolic representations of two kinds: (1) "iconic representations" , which are analogs of the proximal sensory projections of distal objects and events, and (2) "categorical representations" , which are learned and innate feature-detectors that pick out the invariant features of object and event categories from their sensory projections. Elementary symbols are the names of these object and event categories, assigned on the basis of their (nonsymbolic) categorical representations. Higher-order (3) "symbolic representations" , grounded in these elementary symbols, consist of symbol strings describing category membership relations (e.g., "An X is a Y that is Z"). Connectionism is one natural candidate for the mechanism that learns the invariant features underlying categorical representations, thereby connecting names to the proximal projections of the distal objects they stand for. In this way connectionism can be seen as a complementary component in a hybrid nonsymbolic/symbolic model of the mind, rather than a rival to purely symbolic modeling. Such ...

Virtual reality (VR) is typically defined in terms of technological hardware. This paper attempts to cast a new, variable-based definition of virtual reality that can be used to classify virtual reality in relation to other media. The defintion of virtual reality is based on concepts of "presence" and "telepresence," which refer to the sense of being in an environment, generated by natural or mediated means, respectively. Two technological dimensions that contribute to telepresence, vividness and interactivity, are discussed. A variety of media are classified according to these dimensions. Suggestions are made for the application of the new definition of virtual reality within the field of communication research.

A computer vision system has been implemented that can recognize threedimensional objects from unknown viewpoints in single gray-scale images. Unlike most other approaches, the recognition is accomplished without any attempt to reconstruct depth information bottom-up from the visual input. Instead, three other mechanisms are used that can bridge the gap between the two-dimensional image and knowledge of three-dimensional objects. First, a process of perceptual organization is used to form groupings and structures in the image that are likely to be invariant over a wide range of viewpoints. Second, a probabilistic ranking method is used to reduce the size of the search space during model based matching. Finally, a process of spatial correspondence brings the projections of three-dimensional models into direct correspondence with the image by solving for unknown viewpoint and model parameters. A high level of robustness in the presence of occlusion and missing data can be achieved through full application of a viewpoint consistency constraint. It is argued that similar mechanisms and constraints form the basis for recognition in human vision. This paper has been published in Artificial Intelligence, 31, 3 (March 1987), pp. 355–395. 1 1

To survive in a world where knowledge is limited, time is pressing, and deep thought is often an unattainable luxury, decision-makers must use bounded rationality. In this precis of Simple heuristics that make us smart, we explore fast and frugal heuristics—simple rules for making decisions with realistic mental resources. These heuristics enable smart choices to be made quickly and with a minimum of information by exploiting the way that information is structured in particular environments. Despite limiting information search and processing, simple heuristics perform comparably to more complex algorithms, particularly when generalizing to new data—simplicity leads to robustness.

I examine the phenomenon of implicit learning, the process by which knowledge about the rale-governed complexities of the stimulus environment is acquired independently of conscious attempts to do so. Our research with the two, seemingly disparate experimental paradigms of synthetic grammar learning and probability learning is reviewed and integrated with other approaches to the general problem of unconscious cognition. The conclusions reached are as follows: (a) Implicit learning produces a tacit knowledge base that is abstract and representative of the structure of the environment; (b) such knowledge is optimally acquired independently of conscious efforts to learn; and (c) it can be used implicitly to solve problems and make accurate decisions about novel stimulus circumstances. Various epistemological issues and related prob-1 lems such as intuition, neuroclinical disorders of learning and memory, and the relationship of evolutionary processes to cognitive science are also discussed. Some two decades ago the term implicit learning was first used to characterize how one develops intuitive knowledge about the underlying structure of a complex stimulus envi-

Abstract—Technical developments in computer hardware and software now make it possible to introduce automation into virtually all aspects of human-machine systems. Given these technical capabilities, which system functions should be automated and to what extent? We outline a model for types and levels of automation that provides a framework and an objective basis for making such choices. Appropriate selection is important because automation does not merely supplant but changes human activity and can impose new coordination demands on the human operator. We propose that automation can be applied to four broad classes of functions: 1) information acquisition; 2) information analysis; 3) decision and action selection; and 4) action implementation. Within each of these types, automation can be applied across a continuum of levels from low to high, i.e., from fully manual to fully automatic. A particular system can involve automation of all four types at different levels. The human performance consequences of particular types and levels of automation constitute primary evaluative criteria for automation design using our model. Secondary evaluative criteria include automation reliability and the costs of decision/action consequences, among others. Examples of recommended types and levels of automation are provided to illustrate the application of the model to automation design. Index Terms—Automation, cognitive engineering, function allocation, human-computer interaction, human factors, human-machine systems, interface design. I.

Let’s start from scratch in thinking about what memory is for, and consequently, how it works. Suppose that memory and conceptualization work in the service of perception and action. In this case, conceptualization is the encoding of patterns of possible physical interaction with a three-dimensional world. These patterns are constrained by the structure of the environment, the structure of our bodies, and memory. Thus, how we perceive and conceive of the environment is determined by the types of bodies we have. Such a memory would not have associations. Instead, how concepts become related (and what it means to be related) is determined by how separate patterns of actions can be combined given the constraints of our bodies. I call this combination “mesh. ” To avoid hallucination, conceptualization would normally be driven by the environment, and patterns of action from memory would play a supporting, but automatic, role. A significant human skill is learning to suppress the overriding contribution of the environment to conceptualization, thereby allowing memory to guide conceptualization. The effort used in suppressing input from the environment pays off by allowing prediction, recollective memory, and language comprehension. I review theoretical work in cognitive science and empirical work in memory and language comprehension that suggest that it may be possible to investigate connections between topics as disparate as infantile amnesia and mental-model theory.