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97
Corporate Governance and Firm Performance
- Journal of Corporate Finance
, 2008
"... University (Corporate Law Seminar) for helpful comments on a previous draft of this paper. ..."
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Cited by 77 (2 self)
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University (Corporate Law Seminar) for helpful comments on a previous draft of this paper.
Corporate governance, accounting outcome, and organization performance. The Accounting Review 82
, 2007
"... We would like to thank David Chun of Equilar Inc., J. Thomas Quinn of TrueCourse Inc., and Joseph Floyd and Liz Bonacci of Huron Consulting for their considerable help on this research project. The paper has benefited from comments from presentations at the ..."
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Cited by 70 (6 self)
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We would like to thank David Chun of Equilar Inc., J. Thomas Quinn of TrueCourse Inc., and Joseph Floyd and Liz Bonacci of Huron Consulting for their considerable help on this research project. The paper has benefited from comments from presentations at the
Corporate governance and firm performance
- Journal of Accounting and Public Policy
, 2006
"... Performance data were obtained from Compustat. Corporate governance data were obtained from ..."
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Cited by 22 (0 self)
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Performance data were obtained from Compustat. Corporate governance data were obtained from
Rating the ratings: how good are commercial governance ratings
- Journal of Financial Economics
, 2009
"... Proxy advisory and corporate governance rating firms (such as RiskMetrics/ISS, GovernanceMetrics International, and The Corporate Library) play an increasingly important role in U.S. public markets. They rank the quality of firm corporate governance, advise shareholders how to vote and sometimes pre ..."
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Cited by 13 (3 self)
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Proxy advisory and corporate governance rating firms (such as RiskMetrics/ISS, GovernanceMetrics International, and The Corporate Library) play an increasingly important role in U.S. public markets. They rank the quality of firm corporate governance, advise shareholders how to vote and sometimes press for governance changes. We examine whether commercially available corporate governance rankings provide useful information for shareholders. Our results suggest that they do not. Commercial ratings do not predict governancerelated outcomes with the precision or strength necessary to support the bold claims made by most of these firms. Moreover, we find little or no relation between the governance ratings provided by RiskMetrics with either their voting recommendations or the actual votes by shareholders on proxy proposals.
Credit rating agencies in capital markets: A review of research evidence on selected criticisms of the agencies
- Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance
, 2007
"... This study assesses the validity of widespread criticisms of the large, “nationally recognized ’ credit rating agencies (CRAs). The accounting scandals of 200042, in particular the highly publicized failure of Enron in December 2001, led many to question their competence and the value of their ratin ..."
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Cited by 11 (0 self)
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This study assesses the validity of widespread criticisms of the large, “nationally recognized ’ credit rating agencies (CRAs). The accounting scandals of 200042, in particular the highly publicized failure of Enron in December 2001, led many to question their competence and the value of their ratings. This paper evaluates important criticisms of the CRAs dis-cussed in a recent Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) staff report by using evidence from empirical research studies, and suggests many promising subjects for future research. The analysis given in this paper, and the results of the suggested research (when available), should be of particular interest to lawmakers and regulators who are responsible for determining whether and to what extent the credit rating industry should be subject to statutory and regulatory oversight. Although little rigorously gathered empirical evidence supports the criticisms, many issues remain unresolved. Powerful tests related to potential conflicts of interest and alleged unfair practices are exceptionally difficult to design, and the
Corporate Environmental Management and Credit Risk (December 23, 2010). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1660470 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1660470
- Product Quality Ratings in the Lehman Brothers’ Event” (2010). Sustainable Investment and Corporate Governance Working Papers; 23rd Australasian Finance and Banking Conference 2010 Paper. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1648778 or http://dx.do
, 1976
"... This study analyzes environmental management and its implications for bond investors. Poor environmental practices influence the credit standing of borrowing firms through the legal, reputational, and regulatory risks associated with environmental incidents. We devise environmental performance measu ..."
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Cited by 6 (0 self)
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This study analyzes environmental management and its implications for bond investors. Poor environmental practices influence the credit standing of borrowing firms through the legal, reputational, and regulatory risks associated with environmental incidents. We devise environmental performance measures based on information from an independent rating agency, and provide evidence that these measures explain the cross-sectional variation in credit risk for a sample of 582 U.S. public corporations between 1995 and 2006. Our findings suggest that firms with environmental concerns pay a premium on their cost of debt financing and are assigned lower credit ratings. In contrast, firms with proactive environmental engagement benefit from a lower cost of debt financing. The results are robust to numerous controls for company and bond specific characteristics, alternative model specifications, and industry membership.
Audit quality, corporate governance, and earnings management: a meta-analysis
- International Journal of Auditing
, 2010
"... Earnings management is of great concern to corporate stakeholders. While numerous studies have investigated the effects of various corporate governance and audit quality variables on earnings management, empirical evidence is rather inconsistent. This meta-analysis identifies 12 significant relation ..."
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Cited by 6 (0 self)
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Earnings management is of great concern to corporate stakeholders. While numerous studies have investigated the effects of various corporate governance and audit quality variables on earnings management, empirical evidence is rather inconsistent. This meta-analysis identifies 12 significant relationships by integrating results from 48 prior studies. For corporate governance, the independence of the board of directors and its expertise have a negative relationship with earnings management. Similar negative relationships exist between earnings management and the audit committee’s independence, its size, expertise, and the number of meetings. The audit committee’s share ownership has a positive effect on earnings management. For audit quality, auditor tenure, auditor size, and specialization have a negative relationship with earnings management. Auditor independence, as
Institutional ownership and credit spreads: An information asymmetry perspective
- Journal of Empirical Finance
"... Abstract Recent literature has documented a link between institutional equity ownership (IO) and cost of debt capital, and interpreted it as a corporate governance effect. However, institutional equity investors may also affect cost of debt through their influence on information asymmetry condition ..."
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Cited by 4 (0 self)
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Abstract Recent literature has documented a link between institutional equity ownership (IO) and cost of debt capital, and interpreted it as a corporate governance effect. However, institutional equity investors may also affect cost of debt through their influence on information asymmetry condition of firms. To distinguish between the two effects, we break down institutional investors into different groups: transient institutional investors (T RA) who are sensitive to information asymmetry but unlikely to participate in corporate governance, and the dedicated ones (DED)who act oppositely. Based on a most up-to-date and comprehensive bond data spanning the past 20 years, we find that credit spreads narrow (widen) with an increase in equity ownership by T RA (DED). The effects are most prominent among short-term bonds, bonds with lower ratings, higher leverage and higher volatilities. The results persist after controlling for potential endogeneity and other information asymmetry measures, and are unlikely due to an asset substitution effect. Overall, our findings provide strong support for the effect of information asymmetry on credit spread, and highlight the importance of distinguishing various types of institutional investors. * We are grateful to David Hirshleifer and Philippe Jorion for in-depth discussions. We also thank
Ownership Structure and Quality of Financial Reporting
, 2004
"... *This paper is based on a part of my dissertation. I would like to thank the member of my dissertation ..."
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Cited by 3 (0 self)
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*This paper is based on a part of my dissertation. I would like to thank the member of my dissertation
