The experiments address the degree to which retrieval fluency—the ease with which information is accessed from long-term memory—guides and occasionally misleads metamnemonic judgments. In each of 3 experiments, participants ' predictions of their own future recall performance were examined under conditions in which probability or speed of retrieval at one time or on one task is known to be negatively related to retrieval probability on a later task. Participants ' predictions reflected retrieval fluency on the initial task in each case, which led to striking mismatches between their predicted and actual performance on the later tasks. The results suggest that retrieval fluency is a potent but not necessarily reliable source of information for metacognitive judgments. Aspects of the results suggest that a basis on which better and poorer rememberers differ is the degree to which certain memory dynamics are understood, such as the fleeting nature of recency effects and the consequences of an initial retrieval. The results have pedagogical as well as theoretical implications, particularly with respect to the education of subjective assessments of ongoing learning. There has been a surge of interest in metamemory—the study of what people know and understand about their own memory and memorial processes. From a theoretical standpoint, there has been a particular effort to explain why certain metamnemonic measures, such as the feeling of knowing (FOR; see Hart, 1965) or judgments of learning (JOL; see Arbuckle & Cuddy, 1969), are accurate or inaccurate under various conditions (e.g., Dunlosky &

This essay describes a general approach to building perturbation-tolerant autonomous systems, based on the conviction that artificial agents should be able to notice when something is amiss, assess the anomaly, and guide a solution into place. This basic strategy of self-guided learning is termed the metacognitive loop; it involves the system monitoring, reasoning about, and, when necessary, altering its own decision-making components. This paper (a) argues that equipping agents with a metacognitive loop can help to overcome the brittleness problem, (b) details the metacognitive loop and its relation to our ongoing work on time-sensitive commonsense reasoning, (c) describes specific, implemented systems whose perturbation tolerance was improved by adding a metacognitive loop, and (d) outlines both short-term and long-term research agendas.

The authors used paired-associate learning to investigate the hypothesis that the speed of generating an interactive image (encoding fluency) influenced 2 metacognitive judgments: judgments of learning (JOLs) and quality of encoding ratings (QUEs). Results from Experiments 1 and 2 indicated that latency of a keypress indicating successful image formation was negatively related to both JOLs and QUEs even though latency was unrelated to recall. Experiment 3 demonstrated that when concrete and abstract items were mixed in a single list, latency was related to concreteness, judgments, and recall. However, item concreteness and fluency influenced judgments independently of one another. These outcomes suggest an important role of encoding fluency in the formation of metacognitive judgments about learning and future recall. Metacognition focuses on the interplay between processes of monitoring (evaluating the cognitive system) and control (selec-tion and execution of cognitive mechanisms), with the assumption that monitoring can and should be used to adjust control processes to achieve desired goals (e.g., maximizing rates of learning; see Nelson, 1996). For example, when an individual is attempting to encode new material for an upcoming test, how does she or he monitor how well the material has been learned? Effective moni-toring of learning is critical for achieving optimal control of subsequent study (Nelson & Narens, 1990; Thiede & Dunlosky, 1999). Accordingly, understanding how an individual assesses his or her own learning may provide insight into various aspects of self-regulated study, such as why self-paced study appears subop-timal under some conditions (Leonesio & Nelson, 1990; Mazzoni & Cornoldi, 1993; Thiede & Dunlosky, 1999). The present re-search empirically evaluated the hypothesis that the fluency of generating imagery mediators influences metacognitive judgments about learning, even when such fluency is not diagnostic of sub-sequent recall.

Abstract Contemporary research on meta-cognition has reintroduced conscious experience into psychological research on learning and thereby stimulated a fresh look at the works of classical experiential learning scholars who gave experience a central role in the learning processWilliam James, John Dewey, Kurt Lewin, Carl Rogers and Paulo Freire. We focus particularly on the work of William James whose contributions are foundational for both experiential learning and contemporary research on meta-cognition. This is followed by an analysis of psychological research on meta-cognition and the role it plays in the learning process. Finally, the meta-cognitive model is used to describe how fundamental concepts of ELT-a learning self-identity, the learning spiral, learning style and learning spaces-can guide the metacognitive monitoring and control of learning. Meta-cognitive strategies that individuals can use to improve their learning effectiveness are outlined. Learners can chart their path on the learning way by developing their meta-cognitive learning capacities and educators can pave the way by placing learning about learning on the agenda of their educational programs. *Not to be cited or quoted prior to publication. A revised version of this working paper will appear in the fortieth anniversary volume of Simulation & Gaming: An Interdisciplinary Journal. We are grateful to Guy Hutt, Garima Sharma and Mano Singham for their helpful comments on a previous draft of this paper. We would welcome any comments and suggestions you may have about the paper at aykolb@msn.com or dak5@msn.com . 1 The spiral of learning from experience described in experiential learning theory (ELT, Kolb 1984) can help learners "learn how to learn". By consciously following a recursive cycle of experiencing, reflecting, thinking and acting, they can increase their learning power. More fundamentally, for many, their learning ability is stifled by a "fixed" self-concept whereby they tell themselves that they can't learn. Following "the learning way" begins with embracing the idea that "I am a learner" and continues with the development of sophisticated strategies for intentional learning based on their unique talents and the different learning challenges they face. In this paper we describe the meta-cognitive experiential learning process originating in the works of foundational theorists of experiential learning-William James, John Dewey, Kurt Lewin, Carl Rogers and Paulo Freire-who placed conscious intentional action based on subjective experience at the center of the learning process. We focus particularly on the work of William James whose contributions are foundational for both experiential learning and contemporary research on meta-cognition. This is followed by an analysis of psychological research on meta-cognition and the role it plays in the learning process. Finally, the metacognitive model is used to describe how fundamental concepts of ELT-a learning self-identity, the learning spiral, learning style and learning spaces-can guide meta-cognitive monitoring and control of learning.

A new form of knowledge technology is used to diagnose psychology’s epistemological woes and provide a solution to the difficulties. The argument presented is that psychology has traditionally spanned two separate but intimately related problems: (a) the problem of animal behavior and (b) the problem of human behavior. Accordingly, the solution offered divides the field into two broad, logically consistent domains. The first domain is psychological formalism, which is defined as the science of mind, corresponds to animal behavior, and consists of the basic psychological sciences. The second domain is human psychology, which is defined as the science of human behavior at the individual level and is proposed as a hybrid that exists between psychological formalism and the social sciences.

The 3 most often-used performance measures in the cognitive and decision sciences are choice, response or decision time, and confidence. We develop a random walk/diffusion theory—2-stage dynamic signal detection (2DSD) theory—that accounts for all 3 measures using a common underlying process. The model uses a drift diffusion process to account for choice and decision time. To estimate confidence, we assume that evidence continues to accumulate after the choice. Judges then interrupt the process to categorize the accumulated evidence into a confidence rating. The model explains all known interrelationships between the 3 indices of performance. Furthermore, the model also accounts for the distributions of each variable in both a perceptual and general knowledge task. The dynamic nature of the model also reveals the moderating effects of time pressure on the accuracy of choice and confidence. Finally, the model specifies the optimal solution for giving the fastest choice and confidence rating for a given level of choice and confidence accuracy. Judges are found to act in a manner consistent with the optimal solution when making confidence judgments.

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The process of knowledge elaboration is considered from the perspective of cognitive load theory. This theory assumes that the available knowledge structures in long-term memory (LTM) are used to organize and guide cognitive processing in complex learning. Accordingly, the role of external instructional guidance in the process of knowledge elaboration could be described as providing a substitute for knowledge structures missing from LTM. Thus, the executive guidance in complex learning environments is shared between the person (based on his/her LTM knowledge structures) and another expert or instructional means. This article analyzes instructional implications of this assumption. Adaptive learning environments are suggested for tailoring knowledge elaboration processes to changing characteristics of individual learners. Means for identifying and predicting the learner’s LTM-based executive guidance are proposed so that they can be utilized in the building of adaptive learning environments.

Metacognition allows one to monitor and adaptively control cognitive processes. Reports from the last 15 years show that when given the opportunity, nonhuman animals selectively avoid taking difficult tests of memory or perception, collect more information if needed before taking tests, or “gamble ” more food reward on correct than on incorrect responses in tests of memory and perception. I review representative examples from this literature, considering the sufficiency of four classes of mechanism to account for the metacognitive performance observed. This analysis suggests that many of the demonstrations of metacognition in nonhumans can be explained in terms of associative learning or other mechanisms that do not require invoking introspection or access to private mental states. Consideration of these accounts may prompt greater appreciation of the diversity of metacognitive phenomena and may inform theoretical positions about the nature of the mental representations underlying metacognition

Previous research indicated that learners experience an illusion of competence during learning (termed foresight bias) because judgments of learning (JOLs) are made in the presence of information that will be absent at test. The authors examined the following 2 procedures for alleviating foresight bias: enhancing learners ’ sensitivity to mnemonic cues pertaining to ease of retrieval and inducing learners to resort to theory-based judgments as a basis for JOLs. Both procedures proved effective in mending metacognitive illusions—as reflected in JOLs and self-regulation of study time—but only theory-based debiasing yielded transfer to new items. The results support the notion that improved metacognition is 1 key to optimizing transfer but also that educating subjective experience does not guarantee generali-zation to new situations.