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Strategyproof Auctions for Balancing Social Welfare and Fairness

by Ajay Gopinathan, Zongpeng Li, Chuan Wu - in Secondary Spectrum Markets,” in Proc. IEEE INFOCOM 2011, April 2011. et al.: DESIGNING TWO-DIMENSIONAL SPECTRUM AUCTIONS FOR MOBILE SECONDARY USERS 613
"... Abstract—Secondary spectrum access is emerging as a promising approach for mitigating the spectrum scarcity in wireless networks. Coordinated spectrum access for secondary users can be achieved using periodic spectrum auctions. Recent studies on such auction design mostly neglect the repeating natur ..."
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Abstract—Secondary spectrum access is emerging as a promising approach for mitigating the spectrum scarcity in wireless networks. Coordinated spectrum access for secondary users can be achieved using periodic spectrum auctions. Recent studies on such auction design mostly neglect the repeating nature of such auctions, and focus on greedily maximizing social welfare. Such auctions can cause subsets of users to experience starvation in the long run, reducing their incentive to continue participating in the auction. It is desirable to increase the diversity of users allocated spectrum in each auction round, so that a trade-off between social welfare and fairness is maintained. We study truthful mechanisms towards this objective, for both local and global fairness criteria. For local fairness, we introduce randomization into the auction design, such that each user is guaranteed a minimum probability of being assigned spectrum. Computing an optimal, interference-free spectrum allocation is NP-Hard; we present an approximate solution, and tailor a payment scheme to guarantee truthful bidding is a dominant strategy for all secondary users. For global fairness, we adopt the classic maxmin fairness criterion. We tailor another auction by applying linear programming techniques for striking the balance between social welfare and max-min fairness, and for finding feasible channel allocations. In particular, a pair of primal and dual linear programs are utilized to guide the probabilistic selection of feasible allocations towards a desired tradeoff in expectation. I.
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To Preempt or Not: Tackling Bid and Time-based Cheating in Online Spectrum Auctions

by Lara Deek, Xia Zhou, Kevin Almeroth, Haitao Zheng
"... Abstract—Online spectrum auctions offer ample flexibility for bidders to request and obtain spectrum on-the-fly. Such flexibility, however, opens up new vulnerabilities to bidder manipulation. Aside from rigging their bids, selfish bidders can falsely report their arrival time to game the system and ..."
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Abstract—Online spectrum auctions offer ample flexibility for bidders to request and obtain spectrum on-the-fly. Such flexibility, however, opens up new vulnerabilities to bidder manipulation. Aside from rigging their bids, selfish bidders can falsely report their arrival time to game the system and obtain unfair advantage over others. Such time-based cheating is easy to perform yet produces severe damage to auction performance. We propose Topaz, a truthful online spectrum auction design that distributes spectrum efficiently while discouraging bidders from misreporting their bids or time report. Topaz makes three key contributions. First, Topaz applies a 3D bin packing mechanism to distribute spectrum across time, space and frequency, exploiting spatial and time reuse to improve allocation efficiency. Second, Topaz enforces truthfulness using a novel temporalsmoothed critical value based pricing. Capturing the temporal and spatial dependency among bidders who arrive subsequently, this pricing effectively diminishes gain from bid and/or timecheating. Finally, Topaz offers a “scalable ” winner preemption to address the uncertainty of future arrivals at each decision time, which significantly boosts auction revenue. We analytically prove Topaz’s truthfulness, which does not require any knowledge of bidder behavior, or an optimal spectrum allocation to enforce truthfulness. Using empirical arrival and bidding models, we perform simulations to demonstrate the efficiency of Topaz. We show that proper winner preemption improves auction revenue by 45-65 % at a minimum cost of spectrum utilization. I.
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A Secondary Market for Spectrum

by Hong Xu, Jin Jin, Baochun Li - Proc. of IEEE INFOCOM , 2010
"... Abstract—Dynamic spectrum trading amongst small cognitive users is fundamentally different along two axes: temporal variation, and spatial variation of user demand and channel condition. We advocate that a spectrum secondary market, analogous to the stock market, is to be established for users to dy ..."
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Abstract—Dynamic spectrum trading amongst small cognitive users is fundamentally different along two axes: temporal variation, and spatial variation of user demand and channel condition. We advocate that a spectrum secondary market, analogous to the stock market, is to be established for users to dynamically trade among themselves their channel holdings obtained in the primary market from legacy owners. We design a market mechanism based on dynamic double auctions, creating a marketplace in the air to match bandwidth demand with supply. In the analysis we prove important economic properties of the mechanism, notably its truthfulness and asymptotic efficiency in maximizing spectrum utilization. Complimentary simulation studies corroborate that spectrum utilization and user performance can be improved by establishing the spectrum secondary market. I.
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Efficient and Strategyproof Spectrum Allocations in Multichannel Wireless Networks

by Ping Xu, Xiang-yang Li, Senior Member, Shaojie Tang, Jizhong Zhao, Ieee Computer Society
"... Abstract—In this paper, we study the spectrum assignment problem for wireless access networks. We assume that each secondary user will bid a certain value for exclusive usage of some spectrum channels for a certain time period or for a certain time duration. A secondary user may also require the exc ..."
Abstract - Cited by 15 (4 self) - Add to MetaCart
Abstract—In this paper, we study the spectrum assignment problem for wireless access networks. We assume that each secondary user will bid a certain value for exclusive usage of some spectrum channels for a certain time period or for a certain time duration. A secondary user may also require the exclusive usage of a subset of channels, or require the exclusive usage of a certain number of channels. Thus, several versions of problems are formulated under various different assumptions. For the majority of problems, we design PTAS or efficient constant-approximation algorithms such that overall profit is maximized. Here, the profit is defined as the total bids of all satisfied secondary users. As a side product of our algorithms, we are able to show that a previously studied Scheduling Split Interval Problem (SSIP) [2], in which each job is composed of t intervals, cannot be approximated within Oðt1 Þ for any small>0 unless NP ZPP. Opportunistic spectrum usage, although a promising technology, could suffer from the selfish behavior of secondary users. In order to improve opportunistic spectrum usage, we then propose to combine the game theory with wireless modeling. We show how to design a truthful mechanism based on all of these algorithms such that the best strategy of each secondary user to maximize its own profit is to truthfully report its actual bid.
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District: Embracing Local Markets in Truthful Spectrum Double Auctions

by Wei Wang, Baochun Li, Ben Liang
"... Abstract—Market-driven spectrum auctions offer an efficient way to improve spectrum utilization by transferring unused or under-used spectrum from its primary license holder to spectrum-deficient secondary users. Such a spectrum market exhibits strong locality in two aspects: 1) that spectrum is a l ..."
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Abstract—Market-driven spectrum auctions offer an efficient way to improve spectrum utilization by transferring unused or under-used spectrum from its primary license holder to spectrum-deficient secondary users. Such a spectrum market exhibits strong locality in two aspects: 1) that spectrum is a local resource and can only be traded to users within the license area, and 2) that holders can partition the entire license areas and sell any pieces in the market. We design a spectrum double auction that incorporates such locality in spectrum markets, while keeping the auction economically robust and computationally efficient. Our designs in District are tailored to cases with and without knowledge of bid distributions. An auctioneer can start from one design without any a priori information, and then switch to the other alternative after accumulating sufficient distribution knowledge. Complementary simulation studies show that spectrum utilization can be significantly improved when distribution information is available. I.
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Investment and pricing with spectrum uncertainty: a cognitive operator’s perspective

by Lingjie Duan, Student Member, Jianwei Huang, Biying Shou - IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing , 2011
"... ar ..."
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COGNITIVE RADIOS FOR DYNAMIC SPECTRUM ACCESS: FROM CONCEPT TO REALITY

by Kang G. Shin, Hyoil Kim, Alexander W. Min, Ashwini Kumar , 2010
"... The authors provide a comprehensive survey of cognitive radio technology, focusing on its application to dynamic spectrum access, especially from the perspective of realizing consumer-oriented CR networks. This article provides a comprehensive survey of cognitive radio technology, focusing on its ap ..."
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The authors provide a comprehensive survey of cognitive radio technology, focusing on its application to dynamic spectrum access, especially from the perspective of realizing consumer-oriented CR networks. This article provides a comprehensive survey of cognitive radio technology, focusing on its application to dynamic spectrum access, especially from the perspective of realizing consumer-oriented CR networks. We first overview the state of the art in CR technology and identify its key functions across the protocol stack, such as spectrum sensing, resource allocation, CR MAC protocol, spectrum-aware opportunistic routing, CR transport protocol, QoS awareness, spectrum trading, and security. We also review the various schemes proposed for each of these functions and discuss the suitability, advantages, and limitations of their usage in the future CR market. Finally, we introduce the activities in CR research communities and industry in terms of development of real-life applications, such as IEEE 802.22, Ecma 392, and IEEE 802.11af (also known as Wi-Fi 2.0 or White-Fi), and then identify necessary steps for future CR applications.

Truthful Spectrum Auction Design for Secondary Networks

by Yuefei Zhu, Baochun Li, Zongpeng Li
"... Abstract—Opportunistic wireless channel access by nonlicensed users has emerged as a promising solution for addressing the bandwidth scarcity challenge. Auctions represent a natural mechanism for allocating the spectrum, generating an economic incentive for the licensed user to relinquish channels. ..."
Abstract - Cited by 10 (6 self) - Add to MetaCart
Abstract—Opportunistic wireless channel access by nonlicensed users has emerged as a promising solution for addressing the bandwidth scarcity challenge. Auctions represent a natural mechanism for allocating the spectrum, generating an economic incentive for the licensed user to relinquish channels. A severe limitation of existing spectrum auction designs lies in the oversimplifying assumption that every non-licensed user is a singlenode or single-link secondary user. While such an assumption makes the auction design easier, it does not capture practical scenarios where users have multihop routing demands. For the first time in the literature, we propose to model non-licensed users as secondary networks (SNs), each of which comprises of a multihop network with end-to-end routing demands. We aim to design truthful auctions for allocating channels to SNs in a coordinated fashion that maximizes social welfare of the system. We use simple examples to show that such auctions among SNs differ drastically from simple auctions among single-hop users, and previous solutions suffer severely from local, per-hop decision making. We first design a simple, heuristic auction that takes inter-SN interference into consideration, and is truthful. We then design a randomized auction based on primal-dual linear optimization, with a proven performance guarantee for approaching optimal social welfare. A key technique in our solution is to decompose a linear program (LP) solution for channel assignment into a set of integer program (IP) solutions, then applying a pair of tailored primal and dual LPs for computing probabilities of choosing each IP solution. We prove the truthfulness and performance bound of our solution, and verify its effectiveness through simulation studies.
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A prior-free revenue maximizing auction for secondary spectrum access

by Ajay Gopinathan, Zongpeng Li - In Proc. of IEEE INFOCOM , 2011
"... Abstract—Dynamic spectrum allocation has proven promising for mitigating the spectrum scarcity problem. In this model, primary users lease chunks of under-utilized spectrum to secondary users, on a short-term basis. Primary users may need financial motivations to share spectrum, since they assume co ..."
Abstract - Cited by 9 (2 self) - Add to MetaCart
Abstract—Dynamic spectrum allocation has proven promising for mitigating the spectrum scarcity problem. In this model, primary users lease chunks of under-utilized spectrum to secondary users, on a short-term basis. Primary users may need financial motivations to share spectrum, since they assume costs in obtaining spectrum licenses. Auctions are a natural revenue generating mechanism to apply. Recent design on spectrum auctions make the strong assumption that the primary user knows the probability distribution of user valuations. We study revenue-maximizing spectrum auctions in the more realistic priorfree setting, when information on user valuations is unavailable. A two-phase auction framework is constructed. In phase one, we design a strategyproof mechanism that computes a subset of users with an interference-free spectrum allocation, such that the potential revenue in the second phase is maximized. A tailored payment scheme ensures truthful bidding at this stage. The selected users then participate in phase two, where we design a randomized competitive auction and prove its strategyproofness through the argument of bid independence. Our solution applies iterative bidder partitioning on judiciously selected bidder subsets. Employing probabilistic techniques, we prove that our auction generates a revenue that is at least 1 3 of the optimal revenue, improving the best known ratio of 1 4 proven for similar settings. I.
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Truthful Greedy Mechanisms for Dynamic Virtual Machine Provisioning and Allocation in Clouds

by Mahyar Movahed Nejad, Student Member, Lena Mashayekhy, Student Member, Daniel Grosu, Senior Member
"... Abstract—A major challenging problem for cloud providers is designing efficient mechanisms for Virtual Machine (VM) provisioning and allocation. Such mechanisms enable the cloud providers to effectively utilize their available resources and obtain higher profits. Recently, cloud providers have intro ..."
Abstract - Cited by 8 (7 self) - Add to MetaCart
Abstract—A major challenging problem for cloud providers is designing efficient mechanisms for Virtual Machine (VM) provisioning and allocation. Such mechanisms enable the cloud providers to effectively utilize their available resources and obtain higher profits. Recently, cloud providers have introduced auction-based models for VM provisioning and allocation which allow users to submit bids for their requested VMs. We formulate the dynamic VM provisioning and allocation problem for the auction-based model as an integer program considering multiple types of resources. We then design truthful greedy and optimal mechanisms for the problem such that the cloud provider provisions VMs based on the requests of the winning users and determines their payments. We show that the proposed mechanisms are truthful, that is, the users do not have incentives to manipulate the system by lying about their requested bundles of VM instances and their valuations. We perform extensive experiments using real workload traces in order to investigate the performance of the proposed mechanisms. Our proposed mechanisms achieve promising results in terms of revenue for the cloud provider. Index Terms—cloud computing; truthful mechanism; virtual machine provisioning; dynamic resource allocation; greedy heuristics. 1
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