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49
Privacy-friendly aggregation for the smart-grid. Privacy Enhancing Technologies
, 2011
"... Abstract. The widespread deployment of smart meters for electricity gas and water consumption to modernise the electricity systems, has been associated with privacy concerns. In this paper, we present protocols that can be used to privately compute aggregate meter measurements, allowing for fraud an ..."
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Cited by 46 (5 self)
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Abstract. The widespread deployment of smart meters for electricity gas and water consumption to modernise the electricity systems, has been associated with privacy concerns. In this paper, we present protocols that can be used to privately compute aggregate meter measurements, allowing for fraud and leakage detection as well as further statistical processing of meter measurements, without revealing any additional information about the individual meter readings. 1 Introduction. Smart-grid deployments are actively promoted by many governments, including the United States as well as the European Union. Yet, current smart metering technologies rely on centralizing personal consumption information, leading to privacy concerns. We address the problem of security aggregating meter readings
k-anonymous data collection
- Information Sciences
, 2009
"... S = 1.05 3108 reflections ..."
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On Small Characteristic Algebraic Tori in Pairing-Based Cryptography
, 2004
"... The output of the Tate pairing on an elliptic curve over a nite eld is an element in the multiplicative group of an extension eld modulo a particular subgroup. One ordinarily powers this element to obtain a unique representative for the output coset, and performs any further necessary arithmet ..."
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Cited by 36 (5 self)
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The output of the Tate pairing on an elliptic curve over a nite eld is an element in the multiplicative group of an extension eld modulo a particular subgroup. One ordinarily powers this element to obtain a unique representative for the output coset, and performs any further necessary arithmetic in the extension eld. Rather than an obstruction, we show to the contrary that one can exploit this quotient group to eliminate the nal powering, to speed up exponentiations and to obtain a simple compression of pairing values which is useful during interactive identity-based cryptographic protocols. Speci cally we demonstrate that methods available for fast point multiplication on elliptic curves such as mixed addition, signed digit representations and Frobenius expansions, all transfer easily to the quotient group, and provide a signi cant improvement over the arithmetic of the extension eld.
A Survey of Anonymous Communication Channels
- JOURNAL OF PRIVACY TECHNOLOGY
"... We present an overview of the field of anonymous communications, from its establishment in 1981 from David Chaum to today. Key systems are presented categorized according to their underlying principles: semi-trusted relays, mix systems, remailers, onion routing, and systems to provide robust mixing. ..."
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Cited by 27 (5 self)
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We present an overview of the field of anonymous communications, from its establishment in 1981 from David Chaum to today. Key systems are presented categorized according to their underlying principles: semi-trusted relays, mix systems, remailers, onion routing, and systems to provide robust mixing. We include extended discussions of the threat models and usage models that different schemes provide, and the trade-offs between the security properties offered and the communication characteristics different systems support.
On anonymity in an electronic society: A survey of anonymous communication systems
"... The past two decades have seen a growing interest in methods for anonymous communication on the Internet, both from the academic community and the general public. Several system designs have been proposed in the literature, of which a number have been implemented and are used by diverse groups, such ..."
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Cited by 22 (0 self)
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The past two decades have seen a growing interest in methods for anonymous communication on the Internet, both from the academic community and the general public. Several system designs have been proposed in the literature, of which a number have been implemented and are used by diverse groups, such as journalists, human rights workers, the military, and ordinary citizens, to protect their identities on the Internet. In this work, we survey the previous research done to design, develop, and deploy systems for enabling private and anonymous communication on the Internet. We identify and describe the major concepts and technologies in the field, including mixes and mix networks, onion routing, and Dining Cryptographers networks. We will also review powerful traffic analysis attacks that have motivated improvements and variations on many of these anonymity protocols made since their introduction. Finally, we will summarize some of the major open problems in anonymous communication research and discuss possible directions for future work in the field. Categories and Subject Descriptors: C.2.0 [Computer-Communication Networks]: General—Security and protection (e.g. firewalls); C.2.2 [Computer-Communication Networks]: Network Protocols—Applications
A 2-round anonymous veto protocol
- the 14th International Workshop on Security Protocols
, 2006
"... Abstract. The dining cryptographers network (or DC-net) is a seminal technique devised by Chaum to solve the dining cryptographers problem — namely, how to send a boolean-OR bit anonymously from a group of participants. In this paper, we investigate the weaknesses of DC-nets, study alternative metho ..."
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Cited by 18 (5 self)
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Abstract. The dining cryptographers network (or DC-net) is a seminal technique devised by Chaum to solve the dining cryptographers problem — namely, how to send a boolean-OR bit anonymously from a group of participants. In this paper, we investigate the weaknesses of DC-nets, study alternative methods and propose a new way to tackle this problem. Our protocol, Anonymous Veto Network (or AV-net), overcomes all the major limitations of DC-nets, including the complex key setup, message collisions and susceptibility to disruptions. While DC-nets are unconditionally secure, AV-nets are computationally secure under the Decision Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption. An AV-net is more efficient than other techniques based on the same public-key primitives. It requires only two rounds of broadcast and the least computational load and bandwidth usage per participant. Furthermore, it provides the strongest protection against collusion — only full collusion can breach the anonymity of message senders. 1
ABSTRACT Achieving Privacy in Mesh Networks
"... Mesh network is vulnerable to privacy attacks because of the open medium property of wireless channel, the fixed topology, and the limited network size. Traditional anonymous routing algorithm cannot be directly applied to Mesh network, because they do not defend global attackers. In this paper we d ..."
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Cited by 12 (0 self)
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Mesh network is vulnerable to privacy attacks because of the open medium property of wireless channel, the fixed topology, and the limited network size. Traditional anonymous routing algorithm cannot be directly applied to Mesh network, because they do not defend global attackers. In this paper we design private routing algorithm that used “Onion”, i.e., layered encryption, to hide routing information. In addition, we explore special ring topology that fits the investigated network scenario, to preserve a certain level of privacy against a global adversary.
Hang With Your Buddies to Resist Intersection Attacks
"... Some anonymity schemes might in principle protect users from pervasive network surveillance—but only if all mes-sages are independent and unlinkable. Users in practice often need pseudonymity—sending messages intentionally linkable to each other but not to the sender—but pseudonymity in dynamic netw ..."
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Cited by 7 (3 self)
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Some anonymity schemes might in principle protect users from pervasive network surveillance—but only if all mes-sages are independent and unlinkable. Users in practice often need pseudonymity—sending messages intentionally linkable to each other but not to the sender—but pseudonymity in dynamic networks exposes users to intersection attacks. We present Buddies, the first systematic design for intersec-tion attack resistance in practical anonymity systems. Bud-dies groups users dynamically into buddy sets, controlling message transmission to make buddies within a set behav-iorally indistinguishable under traffic analysis. To manage the inevitable tradeoffs between anonymity guarantees and communication responsiveness, Buddies enables users to se-lect independent attack mitigation policies for each pseu-donym. Using trace-based simulations and a working pro-totype, we find that Buddies can guarantee non-trivial an-onymity set sizes in realistic chat/microblogging scenarios, for both short-lived and long-lived pseudonyms.
Selectively traceable anonymity
- Privacy Enhancing Technologies, volume 4258 of LNCS
, 2006
"... Abstract. Anonymous communication can, by its very nature, facilitate socially unacceptable behavior; such abuse of anonymity is a serious impediment to its widespread deployment. This paper studies two notions related to the prevention of abuse. The first is selective traceability, the property tha ..."
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Cited by 6 (0 self)
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Abstract. Anonymous communication can, by its very nature, facilitate socially unacceptable behavior; such abuse of anonymity is a serious impediment to its widespread deployment. This paper studies two notions related to the prevention of abuse. The first is selective traceability, the property that a message’s sender can be traced with the help of an explicitly stated set of parties. The second is noncoercibility, the property that no party can convince an adversary (using technical means) that he was not the sender of a message. We show that, in principal, almost any anonymity scheme can be made selectively traceable, and that a particular anonymity scheme can be modified to be noncoercible. 1
