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A survey of insider attack detection research,” in Insider Attack and Cyber Security, ser (0)

by M Salem, S Hershkop, S Stolfo
Venue:Advances in Information
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Data Loss Prevention Based on DataDriven Usage Control

by Alexander Pretschner - in Proc. 23rd IEEE Intl. Symp. on Software Reliability Engineering , 2012
"... Abstract—Inadvertent data disclosure by insiders is con-sidered as one of the biggest threats for corporate informa-tion security. Data loss prevention systems typically try to cope with this problem by monitoring access to confidential data and preventing their leakage or improper handling. Current ..."
Abstract - Cited by 9 (3 self) - Add to MetaCart
Abstract—Inadvertent data disclosure by insiders is con-sidered as one of the biggest threats for corporate informa-tion security. Data loss prevention systems typically try to cope with this problem by monitoring access to confidential data and preventing their leakage or improper handling. Current solutions in this area, however, often provide limited means to enforce more complex security policies that for instance specify temporal or cardinal constraints on the execution of events. This paper presents UC4Win, a data loss prevention solution for Microsoft Windows operating systems that is based on the concept of data-driven usage control to allow such a fine-grained policy-based protection. UC4Win is capable of detecting and controlling data-loss related events at the level of individual function calls. This is done with function call interposition techniques to intercept application calls to the Windows API in combination with methods to track the flows of confidential data through the system. Keywords-data loss prevention; usage control; microsoft windows security; dynamic data flow tracking I.
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...bserve and control the storage, movement, or handling of confidential data according to specified security policies. A common taxonomy to classify DLP systems is based on their their protection scope =-=[3]-=-: DLP solutions that protect Data-At-Rest identify sensitive data in persistent storage locations and, if a security policy specifies this, removes or encrypts them if the location is considered non-t...

Proactive Insider Threat Detection through Graph Learning and Psychological Context

by Oliver Brdiczka, Juan Liu, Bob Price, Jianqiang Shen, Akshay Patil, Richard Chow, Eugene Bart, Nicolas Ducheneaut
"... Abstract — The annual incidence of insider attacks continues to grow, and there are indications this trend will continue. While there are a number of existing tools that can accurately identify known attacks, these are reactive (as opposed to proactive) in their enforcement, and may be eluded by pre ..."
Abstract - Cited by 7 (1 self) - Add to MetaCart
Abstract — The annual incidence of insider attacks continues to grow, and there are indications this trend will continue. While there are a number of existing tools that can accurately identify known attacks, these are reactive (as opposed to proactive) in their enforcement, and may be eluded by previously unseen, adversarial behaviors. This paper proposes an approach that combines Structural Anomaly Detection (SA) from social and information networks and Psychological Profiling (PP) of individuals. SA uses technologies including graph analysis, dynamic tracking, and machine learning to detect structural anomalies in large-scale information network data, while PP constructs dynamic psychological profiles from behavioral patterns. Threats are finally identified through a fusion and ranking of outcomes from SA and PP. The proposed approach is illustrated by applying it to a large data set from a massively multi-player online game, World of Warcraft (WoW). The data set contains behavior traces from over 350,000 characters observed over a period of 6 months. SA is used to predict if and when characters quit their guild (a player association with similarities to a club or workgroup in nongaming contexts), possibly causing damage to these social groups. PP serves to estimate the five-factor personality model for all characters. Both threads show good results on the gaming data set and thus validate the proposed approach.
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...rocesses and flags deviations from the model. Some augment this basic approach by introducing decoys onto the network to entrap adversarial insiders [16], [17]. A survey of much of this work is here, =-=[18]-=-. In addition, various models of adversarial insiders have been developed. These models include physical behaviors that are indicators of adversarial intent (e.g. foreign travel, signs of wealth) [19]...

Insider Threat Detection using Stream Mining and Graph Mining

by Pallabi Parveen, Jonathan Evans, Bhavani Thuraisingham, Kevin W. Hamlen, Latifur Khan
"... Abstract—Evidence of malicious insider activity is often buried within large data streams, such as system logs accumulated over months or years. Ensemble-based stream mining leverages multiple classification models to achieve highly accurate anomaly detection in such streams even when the stream is ..."
Abstract - Cited by 4 (2 self) - Add to MetaCart
Abstract—Evidence of malicious insider activity is often buried within large data streams, such as system logs accumulated over months or years. Ensemble-based stream mining leverages multiple classification models to achieve highly accurate anomaly detection in such streams even when the stream is unbounded, evolving, and unlabeled. This makes the approach effective for identifying insider threats who attempt to conceal their activities by varying their behaviors over time. This paper applies ensemble-based stream mining, unsupervised learning, and graph-based anomaly detection to the problem of insider threat detection, demonstrating that the ensemble-based approach is significantly more effective than traditional single-model methods. Index Terms—anomaly detection; graph-based detection; insider threat; ensemble I.
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...e with the changing characteristics of the stream and keeps the classification task tractable. A comparison of the above related works is summarized in Table I. A more complete survey is available in =-=[30]-=-. III. ENSEMBLE-BASED INSIDER THREAT DETECTION Data relevant to insider threats is typically accumulated over many years of organization and system operations, and is therefore best characterized as a...

Insiders and insider threats – an overview of definitions and mitigation techniques

by Jeffrey Hunker, Christian W. Probst - Journal of Wireless Mobile Networks, Ubiquitous Computing and Dependable Applications , 2011
"... Threats from the inside of an organization’s perimeters are a significant problem, since it is diffi-cult to distinguish them from benign activity. In this overview article we discuss defining properties of insiders and insider threats. After presenting definitions of these terms, we go on to discus ..."
Abstract - Cited by 4 (0 self) - Add to MetaCart
Threats from the inside of an organization’s perimeters are a significant problem, since it is diffi-cult to distinguish them from benign activity. In this overview article we discuss defining properties of insiders and insider threats. After presenting definitions of these terms, we go on to discuss a num-ber of approaches from the technological, the sociological, and the socio-technical domain. We draw two main conclusions. Tackling insider threats requires a combination of techniques from the tech-nical, the sociological, and the socio-technical domain, to enable qualified detection of threats, and their mitigation. Another important observation is that the distinction between insiders and outsiders seems to loose significance as IT infrastructure is used in performing insider attacks. Little real-world data is available about the insider threat [1], yet recognizing when insiders are attempting to do something they should not on a corporate or organizational (computer) system is an important problem in cyber and organizational security in general. This “insider threat ” has received considerable attention, and is cited as one of the most serious security problems [2]1. It is also considered the most difficult problem to deal with because insiders often have information and capabilities not known to external attackers, and as a consequence can cause serious harm. Yet, little real-world data is
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...s, in which study participants are placed in an organizational/computing environment and motivated to act as an insider threat – “capturing the flag” by devising ways of acquiring illicit information =-=[22]-=-. 2 Insider Threats Require Multiple Approaches A study of insider attacks in the banking and finance sector [22] summarized the characteristics of the attacks observed as follows: • Most incidents re...

Supervised learning for insider threat detection using stream mining

by Pallabi Parveen, Zackary R Weger, Bhavani Thuraisingham, Kevin Hamlen, Latifur Khan - in Proc. 23rd IEEE Int. Conf. Tools with Artificial Intelligence
"... Abstract—Insider threat detection requires the identification of rare anomalies in contexts where evolving behaviors tend to mask such anomalies. This paper proposes and tests an ensemble-based stream mining algorithm based on supervised learning that addresses this challenge by maintaining an evolv ..."
Abstract - Cited by 3 (2 self) - Add to MetaCart
Abstract—Insider threat detection requires the identification of rare anomalies in contexts where evolving behaviors tend to mask such anomalies. This paper proposes and tests an ensemble-based stream mining algorithm based on supervised learning that addresses this challenge by maintaining an evolving collection of multiple models to classify dynamic data streams of unbounded length. The result is a classifier that exhibits substantially increased classification accuracy for real insider threat streams relative to traditional supervised learning (traditional SVM and one-class SVM) and other single-model approaches. Keywords- anomaly detection, support vector machine, insider threat, ensemble I.
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...ywords- anomaly detection, support vector machine, insider threat, ensemble I. INTRODUCTION Insider threats are increasingly cited as among the most potent dangers to modern computing infrastructures =-=[40]-=-. Reliable detection of insider threats is particularly challenging because insiders mask and adapt their behaviors to resemble legitimate system and organizational activities. One approach to detecti...

A cloud intrusion detection dataset for cloud computing and masquerade attacks, new generations

by Hisham A. Kholidy, Fabrizio Baiardi - in proc. Ninth International Conference on Information Technology- New Generations, 2012
"... Masquerade attacks pose a serious threat for cloud system due to the massive amount of resource of these systems. Lack of datasets for cloud computing hinders the building of efficient intrusion detection of these attacks. Current dataset cannot be used due to the heterogeneity of user requirements, ..."
Abstract - Cited by 3 (0 self) - Add to MetaCart
Masquerade attacks pose a serious threat for cloud system due to the massive amount of resource of these systems. Lack of datasets for cloud computing hinders the building of efficient intrusion detection of these attacks. Current dataset cannot be used due to the heterogeneity of user requirements, the distinct operating systems installed in the VMs, and the data size of Cloud systems. This paper presents a Cloud Intrusion Detection Dataset (CIDD)that is the first one for cloud systems and that consists of both knowledge and behavior based audit data collected from both UNIX and Windows users. With respect to current datasets, CIDD has real instances of host and network based attacks and masquerades, and provides complete diverse audit parameters to build efficient detection techniques. The final statistic tables for each user are built by Log Analyzer and Correlator System (LACS) that parses and analyzes user’s binary log files, and correlates audits data according to user IP address(es) and audit time. We describe in details the components and the architecture of LACS and CIDD, and the attacks distribution in CIDD.
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...n a pair of episodes is encoded as the disjunctionsof interval relations [20]. Any new subsequence should besconsistent with at least one user network.s3. Current masquerade datasetssIn the following =-=[10, 11]-=- we briefly describe the foursdatasets currently used to evaluate masquerade detectionstechniques: SEA, Greenberg, Purdue, and RUU [5-8].sSEA dataset: Most papers about masquerader detectionsuse this ...

Reporting Insider Threats via Covert Channels

by David N. Muchene, Klevis Luli, Craig A. Shue
"... Abstract—Trusted insiders that betray an organization can inflict substantial harm. In addition to having privileged access to organization resources and information, these users may be familiar with the defenses surrounding valuable assets. Computers systems at the organization need a mechanism for ..."
Abstract - Cited by 2 (0 self) - Add to MetaCart
Abstract—Trusted insiders that betray an organization can inflict substantial harm. In addition to having privileged access to organization resources and information, these users may be familiar with the defenses surrounding valuable assets. Computers systems at the organization need a mechanism for communicating suspicious activity that is difficult for a malicious insider (or even an outsider) to detect or block. In this work, we propose a covert channel in the Ethernet frame that allows a computer system to report activity inside other, unrelated network communication. The covert channel leverages the differences in the framing approaches used by Ethernet and IP packets to append hidden information to IP packet and transmit it to an organization’s administrator. This stealthy communication is difficult for even advanced attackers and is challenging to block since it opportunistically uses unrelated communication. Further, since the transmission is tied to the Ethernet frame, the communication cannot traverse network routers, preventing security information from leaving the organization. We introduce the covert channel, incorporate it into a working prototype, and combine it with an intrusion detection system to show its promise for security event reporting. I.
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...n strategies for all types of organizations [5]. Insider threat research in the computer security community has used diverse approaches, ranging from system log and system call analysis to honey pots =-=[6]-=-. While these mechanisms may be effective at detecting insider threats, they general ignore how these threats are reported to security officials. The most obvious reporting mechanisms are also the eas...

Multi-Domain Information Fusion for Insider Threat Detection

by Hoda Eldardiry, Evgeniy Bart, Juan Liu, John Hanley, Bob Price, Oliver Brdiczka
"... Abstract—Malicious insiders pose significant threats to infor-mation security, and yet the capability of detecting malicious insiders is very limited. Insider threat detection is known to be a difficult problem, presenting many research challenges. In this paper we report our effort on detecting mal ..."
Abstract - Cited by 2 (0 self) - Add to MetaCart
Abstract—Malicious insiders pose significant threats to infor-mation security, and yet the capability of detecting malicious insiders is very limited. Insider threat detection is known to be a difficult problem, presenting many research challenges. In this paper we report our effort on detecting malicious insiders from large amounts of work practice data. We propose novel approaches to detect two types of insider activities: (1) blend-in anomalies, where malicious insiders try to behave similar to a group they do not belong to, and (2) unusual change anomalies, where malicious insiders exhibit changes in their behavior that are dissimilar to their peers ’ behavioral changes. Our first contribution focuses on detecting blend-in malicious insiders. We propose a novel approach by examining various activity domains, and detecting behavioral inconsistencies across these domains. Our second contribution is a method for detecting insiders with unusual changes in behavior. The key strength of this proposed approach is that it avoids flagging common changes that can be mistakenly detected by typical temporal anomaly detection mechanisms. Our third contribution is a method that combines anomaly indicators from multiple sources of information. Keywords—Insider threat detection; anomaly detection; infor-mation fusion I.
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...nts in recent years in the United States. In attempt to augment this basic rule-based approach, some works have introduced decoys onto the network to entrap adversarial insiders[14], [15]. Please see =-=[16]-=- for a survey of this work. In addition, various models of adversarial insiders have been developed. These models include physical behaviors that are indicators of adversarial intent (e.g. foreign tra...

S.: Automated Mining of Software Component Interactions for Self-Adaptation

by Eric Yuan, Naeem Esfahani, Sam Malek - In: Proc. of SEAMS ’14 , 2014
"... A self-adaptive software system should be able to monitor and analyze its runtime behavior and make adaptation deci-sions accordingly to meet certain desirable objectives. Tra-ditional software adaptation techniques and recent “mod- ..."
Abstract - Cited by 1 (0 self) - Add to MetaCart
A self-adaptive software system should be able to monitor and analyze its runtime behavior and make adaptation deci-sions accordingly to meet certain desirable objectives. Tra-ditional software adaptation techniques and recent “mod-
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...Furthermore, these approaches typically can do very little to address the growing concern of insider threats, where attackers use the system with legitimate credentials instead of external intrusions =-=[26]-=-. In contrast, our research has focused on developing a threat detection approach based on software component interactions as opposed to mining data collected from network traffic or source code. Our ...

IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON COMPUTATIONAL SOCIAL SYSTEMS 1 Behavioral Analysis of Insider Threat: A Survey and Bootstrapped Prediction in Imbalanced

by Amos Azaria, Ariella Richardson, Sarit Kraus, V. S. Subrahmanian
"... Abstract—The problem of insider threat is receiving increasing attention both within the computer science community as well as government and industry. This paper starts by presenting a broad, multidisciplinary survey of insider threat capturing contributions from computer scientists, psychologists, ..."
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Abstract—The problem of insider threat is receiving increasing attention both within the computer science community as well as government and industry. This paper starts by presenting a broad, multidisciplinary survey of insider threat capturing contributions from computer scientists, psychologists, criminologists, and security practitioners. Subsequently, we present the BAIT (Behavioral Analysis of Insider Threat) framework, in which we conduct a detailed experiment involving 795 subjects on Amazon Mechanical Turk in order to gauge the behaviors that real human subjects follow when attempting to exfiltrate data from within an organization. In the real world, the number of actual insiders found is very small, so supervised machine learning methods encounter a challenge. Unlike past works, we develop bootstrapping algorithms that learn from highly imbalanced data, mostly unlabeled, and almost no history of user behavior from an insider threat perspective. We develop and evaluate 7 algorithms using BAIT and show that they can produce a realistic (and acceptable) balance of precision and recall. Index Terms—computer security, behavioral models, insider threat F 1
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