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Under-Savers Anonymous: Evidence on Self-Help Groups and Peer Pressure as a Savings Commitment Device,” Working Paper
, 2011
"... While commitment devices such as defaults and direct deposits from wages have been found to be highly effective to increase savings, they are not available to the millions of people worldwide who work in the informal sector or as independent entrepreneurs, since they do not have a formal wage bill. ..."
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While commitment devices such as defaults and direct deposits from wages have been found to be highly effective to increase savings, they are not available to the millions of people worldwide who work in the informal sector or as independent entrepreneurs, since they do not have a formal wage bill. Self-help peer groups are an alternative commitment device that is widespread and highly accessible. We conducted two randomized field experiments among low-income micro-entrepreneurs in Chile to analyze their effectiveness. In the first experiment, we find that self-help peer groups are very potent at increasing savings. In contrast, a more classical measure to increase savings, a substantially increased interest rate, has no effect on the vast majority of participants. A second field experiment is designed to unbundle the key elements of peer groups as a commitment device and finds that surprisingly, the actual meetings and peer pressure do not seem to be crucial for their effectiveness.
Motivation
- HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (5TH ED., PP. 268-316). NEW YORK: WILEY. CHAPTER 8
, 2010
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Goals as Reference Points in Marathon Running: A Novel Test of Reference-Dependence.” Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/ abstract=2523510
, 2015
"... Abstract Although many empirical investigations have documented reference-dependent preferences, most studies of reference dependence have considered only status quo reference points. In a large-scale field study of marathon runners, we test whether goals, a non-status quo reference point, act simi ..."
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Abstract Although many empirical investigations have documented reference-dependent preferences, most studies of reference dependence have considered only status quo reference points. In a large-scale field study of marathon runners, we test whether goals, a non-status quo reference point, act similarly to status quo reference points. We find that satisfaction as a function of relative performance (the difference between a runner's time goal and her finishing time) exhibits loss aversion and diminishing sensitivity, consistent with the Prospect Theory value function. Unlike the Prospect Theory value function, however, we also find a discontinuity (or jump) at the reference point. We further find that loss aversion is moderated by goal importance, that multiple reference points simultaneously impact runner satisfaction, and that loss aversion is overestimated in predictions of satisfaction, but still present in actual experienced satisfaction.
Walking in the Wild – Using an Always-on Smartphone Application to Increase Physical Activity
"... Abstract. This multidisciplinary paper reports on a large-scale field trial, designed and implemented by a group of social scientists, computer scientists and statisticians, of a new smartphone-based app for the promotion of walking in everyday life. The app, bActive, is designed for a more diverse ..."
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Abstract. This multidisciplinary paper reports on a large-scale field trial, designed and implemented by a group of social scientists, computer scientists and statisticians, of a new smartphone-based app for the promotion of walking in everyday life. The app, bActive, is designed for a more diverse range of users than the typical active-lifestyle app, since it requires neither additional equipment nor a great deal of commitment to exercise. As a result, it can raise awareness of walking and promote walking amongst those with only a casual or hesitant engagement with the topic. The 6-week randomised controlled trial with 22-40 year-old male participants (N=152) indicates that bActive prompted users to increase the amount of walking they did by encouraging them to value and increase walking that is incidental to normal everyday activities. Longitudinal data analysis showed that use of the app increased walking by an average of 64 % but did not find any evidence to suggest that the inclusion of comparative social feedback improves the impact of such apps on male participants.
The director of this dissertation is:
"... University, I agree that the Library of the University shall make it available for inspection and circulation in accordance with its regulations governing materials of this type. I agree that permission to quote from, to copy from, or publish this dissertation may be granted by the author or, in his ..."
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University, I agree that the Library of the University shall make it available for inspection and circulation in accordance with its regulations governing materials of this type. I agree that permission to quote from, to copy from, or publish this dissertation may be granted by the author or, in his/her absence, the professor under whose direction it was written or, in his absence, by the Dean of the Robinson College of Business. Such quoting, copying, or publishing must be solely for the scholarly purposes and does not involve potential financial gain. It is understood that any copying from or publication of this dissertation which involves potential gain will not be allowed without written permission of the author. Jong Seok LeeNOTICE TO BORROWERS All dissertations deposited in the Georgia State University Library must be used only in accordance with the
Designing Pedagogical Interventions to Support Student Use of Learning Analytics
"... ABSTRACT This article addresses a relatively unexplored area in the emerging field of learning analytics, the design of learning analytics interventions. A learning analytics intervention is defined as the surrounding frame of activity through which analytic tools, data, and reports are taken up an ..."
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ABSTRACT This article addresses a relatively unexplored area in the emerging field of learning analytics, the design of learning analytics interventions. A learning analytics intervention is defined as the surrounding frame of activity through which analytic tools, data, and reports are taken up and used. It is a soft technology that involves the orchestration of the human process of engaging with the analytics as part of the larger teaching and learning activity. This paper first makes the case for the overall importance of intervention design, situating it within the larger landscape of the learning analytics field, and then considers the specific issues of intervention design for student use of learning analytics. Four principles of pedagogical learning analytics intervention design that can be used by teachers and course developers to support the productive use of learning analytics by students are introduced: Integration, Agency, Reference Frame and Dialogue. In addition three core processes in which to engage students are described: Grounding, Goal-Setting and Reflection. These principles and processes are united in a preliminary model of pedagogical learning analytics intervention design for students, presented as a starting point for further inquiry.
A self-regulation perspective on hidden-profile problems: if–then planning to review information improves group decisions
"... In hidden-profile (HP) problems, groups squander their potential to make superior decisions because members fail to capitalize on each other’s unique knowledge (unshared information). A new self-regulation perspective suggests that hindrances in goal striving (e.g., failing to seize action opportuni ..."
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In hidden-profile (HP) problems, groups squander their potential to make superior decisions because members fail to capitalize on each other’s unique knowledge (unshared information). A new self-regulation perspective suggests that hindrances in goal striving (e.g., failing to seize action opportunities) contribute to this problem. Implementation intentions (if–then plans) are known to help deal with hindrances in goal striving; therefore, supporting decision goals with if–then plans should improve the impact of unshared information on group decisions. Indeed, in line with past research, control participants in two experiments rarely identified the best alternative despite monetary incentives and setting decision goals. In contrast, simply adding if–then plans to review advantages of the non-preferred alternatives before making the final decision significantly increased solution rates. Process manipulations (Experiment 1) and measures (Experiment 2) indicate that conceptualizing HP problems as a self-regulation challenge provides explanatory power beyond existing accounts. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. key words decision making; self-regulation; implementation intentions; hidden-profile paradigm; group performance Suboptimal decisions are costly as they squander perfor-mance potential. Improving decision making is thus a key interest to researchers and practitioners (Milkman, Chugh, & Bazerman, 2009). Groups can make more informed decisions than individuals when group members bring their unique knowledge to the table and consider it jointly. However, research from the past 25 years suggests that groups frequently fail to realize this potential (review and
Review The Socio-Demographic and Psychological Predictors of Residential Energy Consumption: A Comprehensive Review
"... www.mdpi.com/journal/energies ..."
Goals (th)at Work? Goals, Monetary Incentives, and Workers’ Performance∗
, 2013
"... In a randomized field experiment, we investigate the interplay between work goals, monetary incentives, and work performance. Employees are observed in a natural work environment where they have to do a simple, effort-intense task. Output is perfectly observable and workers are paid for performance. ..."
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In a randomized field experiment, we investigate the interplay between work goals, monetary incentives, and work performance. Employees are observed in a natural work environment where they have to do a simple, effort-intense task. Output is perfectly observable and workers are paid for performance. While a regular piece-rate contract serves as a benchmark, in some treatments workers are paid a bonus conditional on reaching a pre-specified goal. We observe that the use of personal work goals leads to a significant output increase. This is found if goals are self-chosen by the workers, as well as if goals are set exogenously by the principal – although in the latter case, the exact size of the goal plays a crucial role. Strikingly, the positive effect of self-chosen goals persists even if the goal is not backed up by monetary incentives. Our results suggest that work contracts where – through the choice of a personal work goal – workers themselves determine the risk and the size of their bonus payment at the same time can be a powerful incentive device.
Small Cues Change Savings Choices
, 2012
"... Abstract: In randomized field experiments, we embedded one- to two-sentence anchoring, goal-setting, or savings threshold cues in emails to employees about their 401(k) savings plan. We find that anchors increase or decrease 401(k) contribution rates by up to 1.4 % of income. A high savings goal exa ..."
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Abstract: In randomized field experiments, we embedded one- to two-sentence anchoring, goal-setting, or savings threshold cues in emails to employees about their 401(k) savings plan. We find that anchors increase or decrease 401(k) contribution rates by up to 1.4 % of income. A high savings goal example raises contribution rates by up to 2.2 % of income. Highlighting a higher savings threshold in the match incentive structure raises contributions by up to 1.5 % of income relative to highlighting the lower threshold. Highlighting the maximum possible contribution rate raises contribution rates by up to 2.9 % of income among low savers.