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Pretense and representation: The origins of a theory of mind
- Psychol. Rev
, 1987
"... One of the major developments of the second year of human life is the emergence of the ability to pretend. A child's knowledge of a real situation is apparently contradicted and distorted by pretense. If, as generally assumed, the child is just beginning to construct a system for internally rep ..."
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Cited by 413 (14 self)
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One of the major developments of the second year of human life is the emergence of the ability to pretend. A child's knowledge of a real situation is apparently contradicted and distorted by pretense. If, as generally assumed, the child is just beginning to construct a system for internally representing such knowledge, why is this system of representation not undermined by its use in both comprehend ing and producing pretense? In this article I present a theoretical analysis of the representational mechanism underlying this ability. This mechanism extends the power of the infant's existing capac-ity for (primary) representation, creating a capacity for metarepresentation. It is this, developing toward the end of infancy, that underlies the child's new abilities to pretend and to understand pretense in others. There is a striking isomorphism between the three fundamental forms of pretend play and three crucial logical properties of mental stale expressions in language. This isomorphism points to a common underlying form of internal representation that is here called metarepresenta-tion. A performance model, the decoupler, is outlined embodying ideas about how an infant might compute the complex function postulated to underlie pretend play. This model also reveals pretense as an early manifestation of the ability to understand mental states. Aspects of later preschool development, both normal and abnormal, are discussed in the light of the new model. This
The brain’s default network: Anatomy, function, and relevance to disease
- Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences
, 2008
"... Thirty years of brain imaging research has converged to define the brain’s default network—a novel and only recently appreciated brain system that participates in internal modes of cog-nition. Here we synthesize past observations to provide strong evidence that the default net-work is a specific, an ..."
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Cited by 316 (7 self)
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Thirty years of brain imaging research has converged to define the brain’s default network—a novel and only recently appreciated brain system that participates in internal modes of cog-nition. Here we synthesize past observations to provide strong evidence that the default net-work is a specific, anatomically defined brain system preferentially active when individuals are not focused on the external environment. Analysis of connectional anatomy in the monkey sup-ports the presence of an interconnected brain system. Providing insight into function, the default network is active when individuals are engaged in internally focused tasks including autobio-graphical memory retrieval, envisioning the future, and conceiving the perspectives of oth-ers. Probing the functional anatomy of the network in detail reveals that it is best understood as multiple interacting subsystems. The medial temporal lobe subsystem provides informa-tion from prior experiences in the form of memories and associations that are the building blocks of mental simulation. The medial prefrontal subsystem facilitates the flexible use of this information during the construction of self-relevant mental simulations. These two sub-systems converge on important nodes of integration including the posterior cingulate cortex. The implications of these functional and anatomical observations are discussed in relation to
Development and neurophysiology of mentalizing
- Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences
, 2003
"... The mentalizing (theory of mind) system of the brain is probably in operation from ca. 18 months of age, allowing implicit attribution of intentions and other mental states. Between the ages of 4 and 6 years explicit mentalizing becomes possible, and from this age children are able to explain the mi ..."
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Cited by 296 (13 self)
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The mentalizing (theory of mind) system of the brain is probably in operation from ca. 18 months of age, allowing implicit attribution of intentions and other mental states. Between the ages of 4 and 6 years explicit mentalizing becomes possible, and from this age children are able to explain the misleading reasons that have given rise to a false belief. Neuroimaging studies of mentalizing have so far only been carried out in adults. They reveal a system with three components consistently activated during both implicit and explicit mentalizing tasks: medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC), temporal poles and posterior superior temporal sulcus (STS). The functions of these components can be elucidated, to some extent, from their role in other tasks used in neuroimaging studies. Thus, the MPFC region is probably the basis of the decoupling mechanism that distinguishes mental state representations from physical state representations; the STS region is prob-ably the basis of the detection of agency, and the temporal poles might be involved in access to social knowledge in the form of scripts. The activation of these components in concert appears to be critical to mentalizing. Keywords:mentalizing; theory of mind; medial prefrontal cortex; anterior cingulated cortex; temporal poles; superior temporal sulcus
Metaanalysis of theory-of-mind development. The truth about false belief.
- Child Development,
, 2001
"... Research on theory of mind increasingly encompasses apparently contradictory findings. In particular, in initial studies, older preschoolers consistently passed false-belief tasks-a so-called "definitive" test of mentalstate understanding-whereas younger children systematically erred. Mor ..."
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Cited by 280 (7 self)
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Research on theory of mind increasingly encompasses apparently contradictory findings. In particular, in initial studies, older preschoolers consistently passed false-belief tasks-a so-called "definitive" test of mentalstate understanding-whereas younger children systematically erred. More recent studies, however, have found evidence of false-belief understanding in 3-year-olds or have demonstrated conditions that improve children's performance. A meta-analysis was conducted ( N ϭ 178 separate studies) to address the empirical inconsistencies and theoretical controversies. When organized into a systematic set of factors that vary across studies, false-belief results cluster systematically with the exception of only a few outliers. A combined model that included age, country of origin, and four task factors (e.g., whether the task objects were transformed in order to deceive the protagonist or not) yielded a multiple R of .74 and an R 2 of .55; thus, the model accounts for 55% of the variance in false-belief performance. Moreover, false-belief performance showed a consistent developmental pattern, even across various countries and various task manipulations: preschoolers went from below-chance performance to above-chance performance. The findings are inconsistent with early competence proposals that claim that developmental changes are due to tasks artifacts, and thus disappear in simpler, revised false-belief tasks; and are, instead, consistent with theoretical accounts that propose that understanding of belief, and, relatedly, understanding of mind, exhibit genuine conceptual change in the preschool years.
Frontal lobe contributions to theory of mind
- Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience
, 1998
"... n “Theory of mind, ” the ability to make inferences about others ’ mental states, seems to be a modular cognitive capacity that underlies humans ’ ability to engage in complex social interaction. It develops in several distinct stages, which can be measured with social reasoning tests of increasing ..."
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Cited by 188 (9 self)
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n “Theory of mind, ” the ability to make inferences about others ’ mental states, seems to be a modular cognitive capacity that underlies humans ’ ability to engage in complex social interaction. It develops in several distinct stages, which can be measured with social reasoning tests of increasing dif�culty. Individuals with Asperger’s syndrome, a mild form of autism, perform well on simpler theory of mind tests but show de�cits on more developmentally advanced theory of mind tests. We tested patients with bilateral damage to orbito-frontal cortex (n = 5) and unilateral damage in left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (n = 5) on a series of theory of mind tasks varying in dif�culty. Bilateral orbito-frontal lesion patients performed similarly to individuals with Asperger’s syndrome, performing well on simpler tests and showing de�cits on tasks requiring more subtle social reasoning, such as the ability to recognize a faux pas. In contrast, no speci�c theory of mind de�cits were evident in the unilateral dorsolateral frontal lesion patients. The dorsolateral lesion patients had dif�culty only on versions of the tasks that placed demands on working memory. n
On seeing human: a threefactor theory of anthropomorphism
- Psychological Review
, 2007
"... Anthropomorphism describes the tendency to imbue the real or imagined behavior of nonhuman agents with humanlike characteristics, motivations, intentions, or emotions. Although surprisingly common, anthropomorphism is not invariant. This article describes a theory to explain when people are likely t ..."
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Cited by 108 (16 self)
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Anthropomorphism describes the tendency to imbue the real or imagined behavior of nonhuman agents with humanlike characteristics, motivations, intentions, or emotions. Although surprisingly common, anthropomorphism is not invariant. This article describes a theory to explain when people are likely to anthropomorphize and when they are not, focused on three psychological determinants—the accessibility and applicability of anthropocentric knowledge (elicited agent knowledge), the motivation to explain and understand the behavior of other agents (effectance motivation), and the desire for social contact and affiliation (sociality motivation). This theory predicts that people are more likely to anthropomorphize when anthropocentric knowledge is accessible and applicable, when motivated to be effective social agents, and when lacking a sense of social connection to other humans. These factors help to explain why anthropomorphism is so variable; organize diverse research; and offer testable predictions about dispo-sitional, situational, developmental, and cultural influences on anthropomorphism. Discussion addresses extensions of this theory into the specific psychological processes underlying anthropomorphism, applications of this theory into robotics and human–computer interaction, and the insights offered by this theory into the inverse process of dehumanization.
Recognition of faux pas by normally developing children and children with Asperger Syndrome or highfunctioning autism
- Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders
, 1999
"... Most theory of mind (ToM) tests are designed for subjects with a mental age of 4-6 years. There are very few ToM tests for subjects who are older or more able than this. We report a new test of ToM, designed for children 7-11 years old. The task involves recognizing faux pas. Study 1 tested 7-9, and ..."
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Cited by 104 (10 self)
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Most theory of mind (ToM) tests are designed for subjects with a mental age of 4-6 years. There are very few ToM tests for subjects who are older or more able than this. We report a new test of ToM, designed for children 7-11 years old. The task involves recognizing faux pas. Study 1 tested 7-9, and 11-year-old normal children. Results showed that the ability to detect faux pas developed with age and that there was a differential developmental profile between the two sexes (female superiority). Study 2 tested children with Asperger syndrome (AS) or high-functioning autism (HFA), selected for being able to pass traditional 4- to 6-year level (first- and second-order) false belief tests. Results showed that whereas normal 9- to 11-year-old children were skilled at detect-ing faux pas, children with AS or HFA were impaired on this task. Study 3 reports a refinement in the test, employing control stimuli. This replicated the results from Study 2. Some patients with AS or HFA were able to recognize faux pas but still produced them. Future research should as-sess faux pas production. KEY WORDS: Theory of mind; faux pas recognition; Asperger syndrome; high-functioning autism.
The Modified Checklist for Autism in Toddlers: An initial study investigating the early detection of autism and pervasive developmental disorders
- Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders
, 1999
"... Autism, a severe disorder of development, is difficult to detect in very young children. How-ever, children who receive early intervention have improved long-term prognoses. The Mod-ified Checklist for Autism in Toddlers (M-CHAT), consisting of 23 yes/no items, was used to screen 1,293 children. Of ..."
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Cited by 95 (2 self)
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Autism, a severe disorder of development, is difficult to detect in very young children. How-ever, children who receive early intervention have improved long-term prognoses. The Mod-ified Checklist for Autism in Toddlers (M-CHAT), consisting of 23 yes/no items, was used to screen 1,293 children. Of the 58 children given a diagnostic/developmental evaluation, 39 were diagnosed with a disorder on the autism spectrum. Six items pertaining to social relat-edness and communication were found to have the best discriminability between children di-agnosed with and without autism/PDD. Cutoff scores were created for the best items and the total checklist. Results indicate that the M-CHAT is a promising instrument for the early de-tection of autism. KEY WORDS: Autism; modified checklist; toddlers.
Action anticipation through attribution of false belief by 2-year-olds
- Psychological Science
, 2007
"... Two-year-olds engage in many behaviors that ostensibly require the attribution of mental states to others. Despite this, the overwhelming consensus has been that they are unable to attribute false-beliefs at this age. In the current study, we have used an eye-tracker to record infant's looking ..."
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Cited by 87 (3 self)
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Two-year-olds engage in many behaviors that ostensibly require the attribution of mental states to others. Despite this, the overwhelming consensus has been that they are unable to attribute false-beliefs at this age. In the current study, we have used an eye-tracker to record infant's looking behaviour while they watched actions on a computer monitor. Our data demonstrate that 25-month-old infants show correct anticipation of an actor’s actions that could only be predicted if they had attributed a false belief to the actor. Two-year-old children engage in a host of behaviors that ostensibly entail the attribution of mental states to others. They readily deceive and lie (Chandler, Fritz &
