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482
IdentityBased Encryption from the Weil Pairing
, 2001
"... We propose a fully functional identitybased encryption scheme (IBE). The scheme has chosen ciphertext security in the random oracle model assuming an elliptic curve variant of the computational DiffieHellman problem. Our system is based on bilinear maps between groups. The Weil pairing on elliptic ..."
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Cited by 1748 (28 self)
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We propose a fully functional identitybased encryption scheme (IBE). The scheme has chosen ciphertext security in the random oracle model assuming an elliptic curve variant of the computational DiffieHellman problem. Our system is based on bilinear maps between groups. The Weil pairing on elliptic curves is an example of such a map. We give precise definitions for secure identity based encryption schemes and give several applications for such systems.
Random Oracles are Practical: A Paradigm for Designing Efficient Protocols
, 1995
"... We argue that the random oracle model  where all parties have access to a public random oracle  provides a bridge between cryptographic theory and cryptographic practice. In the paradigm we suggest, a practical protocol P is produced by first devising and proving correct a protocol P R for the ..."
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Cited by 1646 (70 self)
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We argue that the random oracle model  where all parties have access to a public random oracle  provides a bridge between cryptographic theory and cryptographic practice. In the paradigm we suggest, a practical protocol P is produced by first devising and proving correct a protocol P R for the random oracle model, and then replacing oracle accesses by the computation of an "appropriately chosen" function h. This paradigm yields protocols much more efficient than standard ones while retaining many of the advantages of provable security. We illustrate these gains for problems including encryption, signatures, and zeroknowledge proofs.
Universally composable security: A new paradigm for cryptographic protocols
, 2013
"... We present a general framework for representing cryptographic protocols and analyzing their security. The framework allows specifying the security requirements of practically any cryptographic task in a unified and systematic way. Furthermore, in this framework the security of protocols is preserved ..."
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Cited by 833 (37 self)
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We present a general framework for representing cryptographic protocols and analyzing their security. The framework allows specifying the security requirements of practically any cryptographic task in a unified and systematic way. Furthermore, in this framework the security of protocols is preserved under a general protocol composition operation, called universal composition. The proposed framework with its securitypreserving composition operation allows for modular design and analysis of complex cryptographic protocols from relatively simple building blocks. Moreover, within this framework, protocols are guaranteed to maintain their security in any context, even in the presence of an unbounded number of arbitrary protocol instances that run concurrently in an adversarially controlled manner. This is a useful guarantee, that allows arguing about the security of cryptographic protocols in complex and unpredictable environments such as modern communication networks.
Entity Authentication and Key Distribution
, 1993
"... Entity authentication and key distribution are central cryptographic problems in distributed computing  but up until now, they have lacked even a meaningful definition. One consequence is that incorrect and inefficient protocols have proliferated. This paper provides the first treatment of these p ..."
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Cited by 578 (13 self)
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Entity authentication and key distribution are central cryptographic problems in distributed computing  but up until now, they have lacked even a meaningful definition. One consequence is that incorrect and inefficient protocols have proliferated. This paper provides the first treatment of these problems in the complexitytheoretic framework of modern cryptography. Addressed in detail are two problems of the symmetric, twoparty setting: mutual authentication and authenticated key exchange. For each we present a definition, protocol, and proof that the protocol meets its goal, assuming the (minimal) assumption of pseudorandom function. When this assumption is appropriately instantiated, the protocols given are practical and efficient.
A practical public key cryptosystem provably secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack
 CRYPTO '98
, 1998
"... A new public key cryptosystem is proposed and analyzed. The scheme is quite practical, and is provably secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack under standard intractability assumptions. There appears to be no previous cryptosystem in the literature that enjoys both of these properties simu ..."
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Cited by 540 (17 self)
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A new public key cryptosystem is proposed and analyzed. The scheme is quite practical, and is provably secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack under standard intractability assumptions. There appears to be no previous cryptosystem in the literature that enjoys both of these properties simultaneously.
Relations among notions of security for publickey encryption schemes
, 1998
"... Abstract. We compare the relative strengths of popular notions of security for public key encryption schemes. We consider the goals of privacy and nonmalleability, each under chosen plaintext attack and two kinds of chosen ciphertext attack. For each of the resulting pairs of definitions we prove e ..."
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Cited by 517 (69 self)
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Abstract. We compare the relative strengths of popular notions of security for public key encryption schemes. We consider the goals of privacy and nonmalleability, each under chosen plaintext attack and two kinds of chosen ciphertext attack. For each of the resulting pairs of definitions we prove either an implication (every scheme meeting one notion must meet the other) or a separation (there is a scheme meeting one notion but not the other, assuming the first notion can be met at all). We similarly treat plaintext awareness, a notion of security in the random oracle model. An additional contribution of this paper is a new definition of nonmalleability which we believe is simpler than the previous one.
Security and Composition of Multiparty Cryptographic Protocols
 JOURNAL OF CRYPTOLOGY
, 1998
"... We present general definitions of security for multiparty cryptographic protocols, with focus on the task of evaluating a probabilistic function of the parties' inputs. We show that, with respect to these definitions, security is preserved under a natural composition operation. The definiti ..."
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Cited by 463 (19 self)
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We present general definitions of security for multiparty cryptographic protocols, with focus on the task of evaluating a probabilistic function of the parties' inputs. We show that, with respect to these definitions, security is preserved under a natural composition operation. The definitions follow the general paradigm of known definitions; yet some substantial modifications and simplifications are introduced. The composition operation is the natural `subroutine substitution' operation, formalized by Micali and Rogaway. We consider several standard settings for multiparty protocols, including the cases of eavesdropping, Byzantine, nonadaptive and adaptive adversaries, as well as the informationtheoretic and the computational models. In particular, in the computational model we provide the first definition of security of protocols that is shown to be preserved under composition.
A Concrete Security Treatment of Symmetric Encryption
 Proceedings of the 38th Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, IEEE
, 1997
"... We study notions and schemes for symmetric (ie. private key) encryption in a concrete security framework. We give four di erent notions of security against chosen plaintext attack and analyze the concrete complexity ofreductions among them, providing both upper and lower bounds, and obtaining tight ..."
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Cited by 421 (65 self)
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We study notions and schemes for symmetric (ie. private key) encryption in a concrete security framework. We give four di erent notions of security against chosen plaintext attack and analyze the concrete complexity ofreductions among them, providing both upper and lower bounds, and obtaining tight relations. In this way we classify notions (even though polynomially reducible to each other) as stronger or weaker in terms of concrete security. Next we provide concrete security analyses of methods to encrypt using a block cipher, including the most popular encryption method, CBC. We establish tight bounds (meaning
On the (im)possibility of obfuscating programs
 Lecture Notes in Computer Science
, 2001
"... Informally, an obfuscator O is an (efficient, probabilistic) “compiler ” that takes as input a program (or circuit) P and produces a new program O(P) that has the same functionality as P yet is “unintelligible ” in some sense. Obfuscators, if they exist, would have a wide variety of cryptographic an ..."
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Cited by 348 (24 self)
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Informally, an obfuscator O is an (efficient, probabilistic) “compiler ” that takes as input a program (or circuit) P and produces a new program O(P) that has the same functionality as P yet is “unintelligible ” in some sense. Obfuscators, if they exist, would have a wide variety of cryptographic and complexitytheoretic applications, ranging from software protection to homomorphic encryption to complexitytheoretic analogues of Rice’s theorem. Most of these applications are based on an interpretation of the “unintelligibility ” condition in obfuscation as meaning that O(P) is a “virtual black box, ” in the sense that anything one can efficiently compute given O(P), one could also efficiently compute given oracle access to P. In this work, we initiate a theoretical investigation of obfuscation. Our main result is that, even under very weak formalizations of the above intuition, obfuscation is impossible. We prove this by constructing a family of efficient programs P that are unobfuscatable in the sense that (a) given any efficient program P ′ that computes the same function as a program P ∈ P, the “source code ” P can be efficiently reconstructed, yet (b) given oracle access to a (randomly selected) program P ∈ P, no efficient algorithm can reconstruct P (or even distinguish a certain bit in the code from random) except with negligible probability. We extend our impossibility result in a number of ways, including even obfuscators that (a) are not necessarily computable in polynomial time, (b) only approximately preserve the functionality, and (c) only need to work for very restricted models of computation (TC 0). We also rule out several potential applications of obfuscators, by constructing “unobfuscatable” signature schemes, encryption schemes, and pseudorandom function families.