This paper proposes a framework for representing the meaning of phrases and sentences in vector space. Central to our approach is vector composition which we operationalize in terms of additive and multiplicative functions. Under this framework, we introduce a wide range of composition models which we evaluate empirically on a sentence similarity task. Experimental results demonstrate that the multiplicative models are superior to the additive alternatives when compared against human judgments.

living and nonliving things

Abstract not found

The authors present a computational model that builds a holographic lexicon representing both word meaning and word order from unsupervised experience with natural language. The model uses simple convolution and superposition mechanisms (cf. B. B. Murdock, 1982) to learn distributed holographic representations for words. The structure of the resulting lexicon can account for empirical data from classic experiments studying semantic typicality, categorization, priming, and semantic constraint in sentence completions. Furthermore, order information can be retrieved from the holographic representations, allowing the model to account for limited word transitions without the need for built-in transition rules. The model demonstrates that a broad range of psychological data can be accounted for directly from the structure of lexical representations learned in this way, without the need for complexity to be built into either the processing mechanisms or the representations. The holographic representations are an appropriate knowledge representation to be used by higher order models of language comprehension, relieving the complexity required at the higher level.

In the novel noun generalization task, 2 1/2-year-old children display generalized expectations about how solid and nonsolid things are named, extending names for never-before-encountered solids by shape and for never-before-encountered nonsolids by material.This distinction between solids and nonsolids has been interpreted in terms of an ontological distinction between objects and substances.Nine simulations and behavioral experiments tested the hypothesis that these expectations arise from the correlations characterizing early learned noun categories.In the simulation studies, connectionist networks were trained on noun vocabularies modeled after those of children.These networks formed generalized expectations about solids and nonsolids that match children’s performances in the novel noun generalization task in the very different languages of English and Japanese.The simulations also generate new predictions supported by new experiments with children.Implications are discussed in terms of children’s development of distinctions between kinds of categories and in terms of the nature of this knowledge. Concepts are hypothetical constructs, theoretical devices hypothesized to explain data, what people do, and what people say. The question of whether a particular theory can explain children’s concepts is therefore semantically strange because strictly speaking this question asks about an explanation of an explanation.We begin with this reminder because the goal of the research reported here is to understand the role of associative processes in children’s systematic attention to the shape of solid things and to the material of nonsolid things in the task of forming new lexical categories. These attentional biases have been interpreted in terms of children’s concepts about the ontological kinds of object and substance

the properties of distributed network models, and support this account by demonstrating that an implemented simulation closely approximates the empirical findings despite the absence of expectancy-based processes and postlexical semantic matching. The results suggest that distributed network models can provide a viable single-mechanism account of lexical processing. Introduction It is well-established that people are faster and more accurate to read a word (e.g., BUTTER) when it is preceded by a related word (e.g., BREAD) compared with when it is preceded by an unrelated word (e.g., DOCTOR; The research was supported by an NIMH FIRST award (MH55628) to the first author and by NIMH Training Grant 5T32MH19102 and NICHD Grant 80258. The computational simulation was run using customized software written within the Xerion simulator (version 3.1) developed by Drew van Camp, Tony Plate, and Geoff Hinton at the Univers

Many theorists assume that the cognitive system is composed of a collection of encapsulated processing components or modules, each dedicated to performing a particular cognitive function. On this view, selective impairments of cognitive tasks following brain damage, as evidenced by double dissociations, are naturally interpreted in terms of the loss of particular processing components. By contrast, the current investigation examines in detail a double dissociation between concrete and abstract word reading after damage to a connectionist network that pronounces words via meaning and yet has no separable components (Plaut & Shallice, 1993). The functional specialization in the network that gives rise to the double dissociation is not transparently related to the network's structure, as modular theories assume. Furthermore, a consideration of the distribution of effects across quantitatively equivalent individual lesions in the network raises specific concerns about the interpretation of...

How do we know what properties a thing has, and which of its properties should be generalized to other objects? How is the knowledge underlying these abilities acquired, and how is it affected by brain disorder? Our approach to these issues is based on the idea that cognitive processes arise from the interactions of neurons via synaptic connections. The knowledge in such parallel distributed processing systems is stored in the strengths of the connections and is acquired gradually through the course of life experience. Degredation of semantic knowledge occurs through degredation of the patterns of neural activity that probe the knowledge stored in the connections. Simulation models based on these ideas capture semantic cognitive processes and their development and disintegration, encompassing domain-specific patterns of generalization in young children and the restructuring of conceptual knowledge as a function of experience. How do we know that Socrates is mortal? Aristotle answered this question by suggesting that we use two propositions: (2) Socrates is a man. (2) All men are mortal. This classical sylogism forms the

4 National Hospital for Neurology and Neurosurgery

Abstract not found