2007): “Management of Knowledge Workers (0)

by H Hvide, E Kristiansen
Venue:CEPR Discussion Paper
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Optimal Incentive Contracts under Moral Hazard When the Agent is Free to Leave∗

by Universität Mannheim, Freie Universität, Berlin Humboldt-universität, Berlin Ludwig-maximilians-universität München, Rheinische Friedrich-wilhelms-universität, Bonn Zentrum, Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung Mannheim, Florian Englmaier, Gerd Muehlheusser, Florian Englmaier, Gerd Muehlheusser , 2010
"... Financial support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft through SFB/TR 15 is gratefully acknowledged. ..."
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Financial support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft through SFB/TR 15 is gratefully acknowledged.

Optimal Incentive Contracts under Moral Hazard When the Agent Is Free to Leave

by Florian Englmaier, Gerd Muehlheusser, Andreas Roider, Florian Englmaier, Gerd Muehlheusser, Andreas Roider , 2010
"... IZA is an independent nonprofit ..."
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IZA is an independent nonprofit