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The modern industrial revolution, exit, and the failure of internal control systems (1993)

by M-C Jensen
Venue:Journal of Finance
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A survey of corporate governance

by Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny - JOURNAL OF FINANCE , 1997
"... ..."
Abstract - Cited by 1734 (28 self) - Add to MetaCart
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Executive Compensation

by Kevin J. Murphy , 1999
"... This paper summarizes the empirical and theoretical research on executive compensation and provides a comprehensive and up-to-date description of pay practices (and trends in pay practices) for chief executive officers (CEOs). Topics discussed include the level and structure of CEO pay (including de ..."
Abstract - Cited by 625 (17 self) - Add to MetaCart
This paper summarizes the empirical and theoretical research on executive compensation and provides a comprehensive and up-to-date description of pay practices (and trends in pay practices) for chief executive officers (CEOs). Topics discussed include the level and structure of CEO pay (including detailed analyses of annual bonus plans, executive stock options, and option valuation), international pay differences, the pay-setting process, the relation between CEO pay and firm performance (“pay-performance sensitivities”), the relation between sensitivities and subsequent firm performance, relative performance evaluation, executive turnover, and the politics of CEO pay.

Information Technology, Workplace Organization and the Demand for Skilled Labor: Firm-level Evidence

by Timothy F. Bresnahan, Erik Brynjolfsson, Lorin M. Hitt , 2000
"... ..."
Abstract - Cited by 619 (17 self) - Add to MetaCart
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Finance and growth: Theory and evidence

by Ross Levine , 2004
"... This paper reviews, appraises, and critiques theoretical and empirical research on the connections between the operation of the financial system and economic growth. While subject to ample qualifications and countervailing views, the preponderance of evidence suggests that both financial intermedia ..."
Abstract - Cited by 489 (23 self) - Add to MetaCart
This paper reviews, appraises, and critiques theoretical and empirical research on the connections between the operation of the financial system and economic growth. While subject to ample qualifications and countervailing views, the preponderance of evidence suggests that both financial intermediaries and markets matter for growth and that reverse causality alone is not driving this relationship. Furthermore, theory and evidence imply that better developed financial systems ease external financing constraints facing firms, which illuminates one mechanism through which financial development influences economic growth. The paper highlights many areas needing additional research.

Endogenously Chosen Boards of Directors and Their Monitoring of the CEO

by Benjamin E. Hermalin, Michael S. Weisbach - AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW , 1998
"... This paper develops a model in which the effectiveness of the board's monitoring of the CEO depends on the board's structure or composition. The independence of new directors is determined through a bargaining process between the existing directors and the CEO. The CEO's bargaining po ..."
Abstract - Cited by 444 (18 self) - Add to MetaCart
This paper develops a model in which the effectiveness of the board's monitoring of the CEO depends on the board's structure or composition. The independence of new directors is determined through a bargaining process between the existing directors and the CEO. The CEO's bargaining position, and thus his influence over the board-selection process, depends on an updated estimate of the CEO's ability based on his prior performance. Many empirical findings about board structure and performance arise as equilibrium phenomena in this model. We also explore the implications of this model for proposed regulations of corporate governance structures.

Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors.

by David Yermack - Journal of Financial Economics , 1996
"... Abstract I present evidence consistent with theories that small boards of directors are more effective, Using Tobin's Q as an approximation of market valuation, I find an inverse association between board size and firm value in a sample of 452 large U.S. industrial corporations between 1984 an ..."
Abstract - Cited by 416 (5 self) - Add to MetaCart
Abstract I present evidence consistent with theories that small boards of directors are more effective, Using Tobin's Q as an approximation of market valuation, I find an inverse association between board size and firm value in a sample of 452 large U.S. industrial corporations between 1984 and 1991. The result is robust to numerous controls for company size, industry membership, inside stock ownership, growth opportunities, and alternative corporate governance structures. Companies with small boards also exhibit more favorable values for financial ratios, and provide stronger CEO performance incentives from compensation and the threat of dismissal.
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Citation Context

... boardrooms are dysfunctional’, because directors rarely criticize the policies of top managers or hold candid discussions about corporate performance. Believing that these problems increase with the number of directors, Lipton and Lorsch recommend limiting the membership of boards to ten people, with a preferred size of eight or nine. The proposal amounts to a conjecture that even if boards’ capacities for monitoring increase with board size, the benefits are outweighed by such costs as slower decision-making, less-candid discussions of managerial performance, and biases against risk-taking. Jensen (1993) takes up this theme, pointing out the ‘great emphasis on politeness and courtesy at the expense of truth and frankness in boardrooms’ and stating that ‘when boards get beyond seven or eight people they are less likely to function effectively and are easier for the CEO to control’. Some evidence shows that reducing board size has become a priority for institutional investors, dissident directors, and corporate raiders seeking to improve troubled companies. Kini et al. (1995) present evidence that board size shrinks after successful tender offers for under-performing firms. At American Express,...

Internal capital markets and the competition for corporate resources

by Jeremy C. Stein , 1997
"... ..."
Abstract - Cited by 400 (10 self) - Add to MetaCart
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The Dark Side of Internal Capital Markets: Divisional Rent-Seeking and Inefficient Investment

by David S. Scharfstein, Jeremy C. Stein, Preston Mcafee, Vik N, Julio Rotemberg, René Stulz, Dimitri Vayanos - Journal of Finance , 1999
"... We develop a two-tiered agency model that shows how rent-seeking behavior on the part of division managers can subvert the workings of an internal capital market. By rent-seeking, division mangers can raise their bargaining power and extract greater overall compensation from the CEO. And because the ..."
Abstract - Cited by 331 (12 self) - Add to MetaCart
We develop a two-tiered agency model that shows how rent-seeking behavior on the part of division managers can subvert the workings of an internal capital market. By rent-seeking, division mangers can raise their bargaining power and extract greater overall compensation from the CEO. And because the CEO is herself an agent of outside investors, this extra com- pensation may take the form not of cash wages, but rather of preferential capital budgeting allocations. One interesting feature of our model is that it implies a kind of "socialism" in internal capital allocation, whereby weaker divisions get subsidized by stronger ones.

Boards of Directors as an Endogenously Determined Institution: A Survey of the Economic Literature

by Benjamin E. Hermalin, Michael S. Weisbach , 2003
"... ..."
Abstract - Cited by 323 (3 self) - Add to MetaCart
Abstract not found

Who makes acquisitions? CEO overconfidence and the market’s reaction

by Ulrike Malmendier , Geoffrey Tate , 2007
"... Does CEO overconfidence help to explain merger decisions? Overconfident CEOs overestimate their ability to generate returns. As a result, they overpay for target companies and undertake value-destroying mergers. The effects are strongest if they have access to internal financing. We test these predi ..."
Abstract - Cited by 222 (12 self) - Add to MetaCart
Does CEO overconfidence help to explain merger decisions? Overconfident CEOs overestimate their ability to generate returns. As a result, they overpay for target companies and undertake value-destroying mergers. The effects are strongest if they have access to internal financing. We test these predictions using two proxies for overconfidence: CEOs' personal overinvestment in their company and their press portrayal. We find that the odds of making an acquisition are 65 % higher if the CEO is classified as overconfident. The effect is largest if the merger is diversifying and does not require external financing. The market reaction at merger announcement (–90 basis points) is significantly more negative than for non-overconfident CEOs (–12 basis points). We consider alternative interpretations including inside information, signaling, and risk tolerance.
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