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109
A formal analysis and taxonomy of task allocation in multi-robot systems
- INT’L. J. OF ROBOTICS RESEARCH
, 2004
"... Despite more than a decade of experimental work in multi-robot systems, important theoretical aspects of multi-robot coordination mechanisms have, to date, been largely untreated. To address this issue, we focus on the problem of multi-robot task allocation (MRTA). Most work on MRTA has been ad hoc ..."
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Cited by 301 (4 self)
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Despite more than a decade of experimental work in multi-robot systems, important theoretical aspects of multi-robot coordination mechanisms have, to date, been largely untreated. To address this issue, we focus on the problem of multi-robot task allocation (MRTA). Most work on MRTA has been ad hoc and empirical, with many coordination architectures having been proposed and validated in a proof-of-concept fashion, but infrequently analyzed. With the goal of bringing objective grounding to this important area of research, we present a formal study of MRTA problems. A domain-independent taxonomy of MRTA problems is given, and it is shown how many such problems can be viewed as instances of other, well-studied, optimization problems. We demonstrate how relevant theory from operations research and combinatorial optimization can be used for analysis and greater understanding of existing approaches to task allocation, and to show how the same theory can be used in the synthesis of new approaches.
Coalition Structure Generation with Worst Case Guarantees
, 1999
"... Coalition formation is a key topic in multiagent systems. One may prefer a coalition structure that maximizes the sum of the values of the coalitions, but often the number of coalition structures is too large to allow exhaustive search for the optimal one. Furthermore, finding the optimal coalition ..."
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Cited by 270 (9 self)
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Coalition formation is a key topic in multiagent systems. One may prefer a coalition structure that maximizes the sum of the values of the coalitions, but often the number of coalition structures is too large to allow exhaustive search for the optimal one. Furthermore, finding the optimal coalition structure is NP-complete. But then, can the coalition structure found via a partial search be guaranteed to be within a bound from optimum? We show that none of the previous coalition structure generation algorithms can establish any bound because they search fewer nodes than a threshold that we show necessary for establishing a bound. We present an algorithm that establishes a tight bound within this minimal amount of search, and show that any other algorithm would have to search strictly more. The fraction of nodes needed to be searched approaches zero as the number of agents grows. If additional time remains, our anytime algorithm searches further, and establishes a progressively lower tight bound. Surprisingly, just searching one more node drops the bound in half. As desired, our algorithm lowers the bound rapidly early on, and exhibits diminishing returns to computation. It also significantly outperforms its obvious contenders. Finally, we show how to distribute the desired
Coalitions Among Computationally Bounded Agents
- Artificial Intelligence
, 1997
"... This paper analyzes coalitions among self-interested agents that need to solve combinatorial optimization problems to operate e ciently in the world. By colluding (coordinating their actions by solving a joint optimization prob-lem) the agents can sometimes save costs compared to operating individua ..."
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Cited by 203 (26 self)
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This paper analyzes coalitions among self-interested agents that need to solve combinatorial optimization problems to operate e ciently in the world. By colluding (coordinating their actions by solving a joint optimization prob-lem) the agents can sometimes save costs compared to operating individually. A model of bounded rationality is adopted where computation resources are costly. It is not worthwhile solving the problems optimally: solution quality is decision-theoretically traded o against computation cost. A normative, application- and protocol-independent theory of coalitions among bounded-rational agents is devised. The optimal coalition structure and its stability are signi cantly a ected by the agents ' algorithms ' performance pro les and the cost of computation. This relationship is rst analyzed theoretically. Then a domain classi cation including rational and bounded-rational agents is in-troduced. Experimental results are presented in vehicle routing with real data from ve dispatch centers. This problem is NP-complete and the instances are so large that|with current technology|any agent's rationality is bounded by computational complexity. 1
Distributed Rational Decision Making
, 1999
"... Introduction Automated negotiation systems with self-interested agents are becoming increasingly important. One reason for this is the technology push of a growing standardized communication infrastructure---Internet, WWW, NII, EDI, KQML, FIPA, Concordia, Voyager, Odyssey, Telescript, Java, etc---o ..."
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Cited by 191 (0 self)
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Introduction Automated negotiation systems with self-interested agents are becoming increasingly important. One reason for this is the technology push of a growing standardized communication infrastructure---Internet, WWW, NII, EDI, KQML, FIPA, Concordia, Voyager, Odyssey, Telescript, Java, etc---over which separately designed agents belonging to different organizations can interact in an open environment in realtime and safely carry out transactions. The second reason is strong application pull for computer support for negotiation at the operative decision making level. For example, we are witnessing the advent of small transaction electronic commerce on the Internet for purchasing goods, information, and communication bandwidth [29]. There is also an industrial trend toward virtual enterprises: dynamic alliances of small, agile enterprises which together can take advantage of economies of scale when available (e.g., respond to mor
eMediator: A Next Generation Electronic Commerce Server
- Computational Intelligence
, 2002
"... This paper presents eMediator, an electronic commerce server prototype that demonstrates ways in which algorithmic support and game-theoretic incentive engineering can jointly improve the efficiency of ecommerce. eAuctionHouse, the configurable auction server, includes a variety of generalized combi ..."
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Cited by 123 (32 self)
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This paper presents eMediator, an electronic commerce server prototype that demonstrates ways in which algorithmic support and game-theoretic incentive engineering can jointly improve the efficiency of ecommerce. eAuctionHouse, the configurable auction server, includes a variety of generalized combinatorial auctions and exchanges, pricing schemes, bidding languages, mobile agents, and user support for choosing an auction type. We introduce two new logical bidding languages for combinatorial markets: the XOR bidding language and the OR-of-XORs bidding language. Unlike the traditional OR bidding language, these are fully expressive. They therefore enable the use of the Clarke-Groves pricing mechanism for motivating the bidders to bid truthfully. eAuctionHouse also supports supply/demand curve bidding. eCommitter, the leveled commitment contract optimizer, determines the optimal contract price and decommitting penalties for a variety of leveled commitment contracting mechanisms, taking into account that rational agents will decommit strategically in Nash equilibrium. It also determines the optimal decommitting strategies for any given leveled commitment contract. eExchangeHouse, the safe exchange planner, enables unenforced anonymous exchanges by dividing the exchange into chunks and sequencing those chunks to be delivered safely in alternation between the buyer and the seller.
Dialogues for Negotiation: Agent Varieties and Dialogue Sequences
, 2001
"... This work presents a formal, logic-based approach to one-to-one agent negotiation, in the context of goal achievement in systems of agents with limited resource availability. The proposed solution is based on agent dialogues as a way, e.g., to request resources and propose resource exchanges. It ..."
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Cited by 77 (29 self)
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This work presents a formal, logic-based approach to one-to-one agent negotiation, in the context of goal achievement in systems of agents with limited resource availability. The proposed solution is based on agent dialogues as a way, e.g., to request resources and propose resource exchanges. It relies upon agents agreeing solely upon a language for negotiation, while possibly adopting different negotiation policies, each corresponding to an agent variety. Agent dialogues can be connected within sequences, all aimed at achieving an individual agent's goal. Sets of sequences aim at allowing all agents in the system to achieve their goals, and can be used, e.g., to solve the resource reallocation problem. We model dialogues via logic-based dialogue constraints, and propose an execution model to be adopted for the automatic generation of dialogues. We also propose an agent dialogue cycle for the automatic generation of sequences of dialogues. Finally, we identify some desirable properties of dialogues, dialogue sequences and sets of such sequences, and prove/disprove these properties for concrete agent varieties. 1
Issues in computational Vickrey auction
- INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ELECTRONIC COMMERCE
, 2000
"... The Vickrey auction has been widely advocated for multiagent systems. First we review its limitations so as to guide practitioners in their decision of when to use that protocol. These limitations include lower revenue than alternative protocols, lying in non-private-value auctions, bidder collus ..."
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Cited by 65 (28 self)
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The Vickrey auction has been widely advocated for multiagent systems. First we review its limitations so as to guide practitioners in their decision of when to use that protocol. These limitations include lower revenue than alternative protocols, lying in non-private-value auctions, bidder collusion, a lying auctioneer, and undesirable revelation of sensitive information. We discuss the special characteristics of Internet auctions: third party auction servers, cryptography, and how proxy agents relate to the revelation principle and fail to promote truth-telling.
A Market Architecture for Multi-Agent Contracting
- In Proc. of the Second Int'l Conf. on Autonomous Agents
, 1997
"... We present a generalized market architecture that provides support for a variety of types of transactions, from simple buying and selling of goods and services to complex multi-agent contract negotiations. This architecture is organized around three basic components: the exchange, the market, and th ..."
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Cited by 63 (19 self)
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We present a generalized market architecture that provides support for a variety of types of transactions, from simple buying and selling of goods and services to complex multi-agent contract negotiations. This architecture is organized around three basic components: the exchange, the market, and the session. We also present a negotiation protocol for planning by contracting that takes advantage of the services of the market. We show how the existence of an appropriate market infrastructure can add value to a multi-agent contracting protocol by controlling fraud and discouraging counterspeculation.
Agents in electronic commerce: component technologies for automated negotiation and coalition formation
- AUTONOMOUS AGENTS AND MULTI-AGENT SYSTEMS
, 2000
"... Automated negotiation and coalition formation among self-interested agents are playing an increasingly important role in electronic commerce. Such agents cannot be coordinated by externally imposing their strategies. Instead the interaction protocols have to be designed so that each agent is motiva ..."
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Cited by 57 (1 self)
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Automated negotiation and coalition formation among self-interested agents are playing an increasingly important role in electronic commerce. Such agents cannot be coordinated by externally imposing their strategies. Instead the interaction protocols have to be designed so that each agent is motivated to follow the strategy that the protocol designer wants it to follow. This paper reviews six component technologies that we have developed for making such interactions less manipulable and more efficient in terms of the computational processes and the outcomes: 1. OCSM-contracts in marginal cost based contracting, 2. leveled commitment contracts, 3. anytime coalition structure generation with worst case guarantees, 4. trading off computation cost against optimization quality within each coalition, 5. distributing search among insincere agents, and 6. unenforced contract execution. Each of these technologies represents a different way of battling self-interest and combinatorial complexity simultaneously. This is a key battle when multi-agent systems move into large-scale open settings.
Leveled Commitment Contracts with Myopic and Strategic Agents
- JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC DYNAMICS AND CONTROL
, 1998
"... In automated negotiation systems consisting of selfinterested agents, contracts have traditionally been binding, i.e., impossible to breach. Such contracts do not allow the agents to efficiently deal with future events. This deficiency can be tackled by using a leveled commitment contracting protoco ..."
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Cited by 54 (5 self)
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In automated negotiation systems consisting of selfinterested agents, contracts have traditionally been binding, i.e., impossible to breach. Such contracts do not allow the agents to efficiently deal with future events. This deficiency can be tackled by using a leveled commitment contracting protocol which allows the agents to decommit from contracts by paying a monetary penalty to the contracting partner. The efficiency of such protocols depends heavily on how the penalties are decided. In this paper, different leveled commitment protocols and their parameterizations are empirically compared to each other and to several full commitment protocols. In the different experiments, the agents are of different types: self-interested or cooperative, and they can perform different levels of lookahead. Surprisingly, self-interested myopic agents reach a higher social welfare quicker than cooperative myopic agents when decommitment penalties are low. The social welfare in settings with agents t...
