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47
Proof of security of quantum key distribution with twoway classical communications
, 2002
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Decoy state quantum key distribution
, 2005
"... Decoy states have recently been proposed as a useful method for substantially improving the performance of quantum key distribution. Here, we present a general theory of the decoy state protocol based on only two decoy states and one signal state. We perform optimization on the choice of intensities ..."
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Cited by 54 (10 self)
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Decoy states have recently been proposed as a useful method for substantially improving the performance of quantum key distribution. Here, we present a general theory of the decoy state protocol based on only two decoy states and one signal state. We perform optimization on the choice of intensities of the two decoy states and the signal state. Our result shows that a decoy state protocol with only two types of decoy states—the vacuum and a weak decoy state—asymptotically approaches the theoretical limit of the most general type of decoy state protocols (with an infinite number of decoy states). Moreover, we provide estimations on the effects of statistical fluctuations and suggest that, even for long distance (larger than 100km) QKD, our twodecoystate protocol can be implemented with only a few hours of experimental data. In conclusion, decoy state quantum key distribution is highly practical. 1
Reliability of CalderbankShorSteane codes and security of quantum key distribution
 J. Phys. A: Math. Gen
, 2004
"... Abstract. After Mayers (1996, 2001) gave a proof of the security of the Bennett ..."
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Cited by 17 (7 self)
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Abstract. After Mayers (1996, 2001) gave a proof of the security of the Bennett
Secure identification and QKD in the boundedquantumstorage model
 In Advances in Cryptology— CRYPTO ’07
, 2007
"... Abstract. We consider the problem of secure identification: user U proves to server S that he knows an agreed (possibly lowentropy) password w, while giving away as little information on w as possible, namely the adversary can exclude at most one possible password for each execution of the scheme. ..."
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Cited by 14 (8 self)
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Abstract. We consider the problem of secure identification: user U proves to server S that he knows an agreed (possibly lowentropy) password w, while giving away as little information on w as possible, namely the adversary can exclude at most one possible password for each execution of the scheme. We propose a solution in the boundedquantumstorage model, where U and S may exchange qubits, and a dishonest party is assumed to have limited quantum memory. No other restriction is posed upon the adversary. An improved version of the proposed identification scheme is also secure against a maninthemiddle attack, but requires U and S to additionally share a highentropy key k. However, security is still guaranteed if one party loses k to the attacker but notices the loss. In both versions of the scheme, the honest participants need no quantum memory, and noise and imperfect quantum sources can be tolerated. The schemes compose sequentially, and w and k can securely be reused. A small modification to the identification scheme results in a quantumkeydistribution (QKD) scheme, secure in the boundedquantumstorage model, with the same reusability properties of the keys, and without assuming authenticated channels. This is in sharp contrast to known QKD schemes (with unbounded adversary) without authenticated channels, where authentication keys must be updated, and unsuccessful executions can cause the parties to run out of keys. 1
Tight finitekey analysis for quantum cryptography
, 2011
"... Despite enormous theoretical and experimental progress in quantum cryptography, the security of most current implementations of quantum key distribution is still not rigorously established. one significant problem is that the security of the final key strongly depends on the number, M, of signals ex ..."
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Cited by 12 (3 self)
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Despite enormous theoretical and experimental progress in quantum cryptography, the security of most current implementations of quantum key distribution is still not rigorously established. one significant problem is that the security of the final key strongly depends on the number, M, of signals exchanged between the legitimate parties. Yet, existing security proofs are often only valid asymptotically, for unrealistically large values of M. Another challenge is that most security proofs are very sensitive to small differences between the physical devices used by the protocol and the theoretical model used to describe them. Here we show that these gaps between theory and experiment can be simultaneously overcome by using a recently developed proof technique based on the uncertainty relation for smooth entropies.
Noise Tolerance of the BB84 Protocol with Random Privacy Amplification
, 2008
"... We prove that BB84 protocol with random privacy amplification is secure with a higher key rate than Mayers’ estimate with the same error rate. Consequently, the tolerable error rate of this protocol is increased from 7.5 % to 11 %. We also extend this method to the case of estimating error rates sep ..."
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Cited by 10 (4 self)
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We prove that BB84 protocol with random privacy amplification is secure with a higher key rate than Mayers’ estimate with the same error rate. Consequently, the tolerable error rate of this protocol is increased from 7.5 % to 11 %. We also extend this method to the case of estimating error rates separately in each basis, which enables us to securely share a longer key.
Bahraminasab; Quantum Key distribution for dlevel systems with generalized Bell states; quantph/0111091
"... a ∗ b † ..."
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Method for decoupling error correction from privacy amplification
 New Journal of Physics
, 2003
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Uncloneable Encryption
 Quantum Information & Computation
, 2003
"... Quantum states cannot be cloned. I show how to extend this property to classical messages encoded using quantum states, a task I call “uncloneable encryption. ” An uncloneable encryption scheme has the property that an eavesdropper Eve not only cannot read the encrypted message, but she cannot copy ..."
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Cited by 4 (0 self)
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Quantum states cannot be cloned. I show how to extend this property to classical messages encoded using quantum states, a task I call “uncloneable encryption. ” An uncloneable encryption scheme has the property that an eavesdropper Eve not only cannot read the encrypted message, but she cannot copy it down for later decoding. She could steal it, but then the receiver Bob would not receive the message, and would thus be alerted that something was amiss. I prove that any authentication scheme for quantum states acts as a secure uncloneable encryption scheme. Uncloneable encryption is also closely related to quantum key distribution (QKD), demonstrating a close connection between cryptographic tasks for quantum states and for classical messages. Thus, studying uncloneable encryption and quantum authentication allows for some modest improvements in QKD protocols. While the main results apply to a onetime key with unconditional security, I also show uncloneable encryption remains secure with a pseudorandom key. In this case, to defeat the scheme, Eve must break the computational assumption behind the pseudorandom sequence before Bob receives the message, or her opportunity is lost. This means uncloneable encryption can be used in a noninteractive setting, where QKD is not available, allowing Alice and Bob to convert a temporary computational assumption into a permanently secure message. 1