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Cryptanalytic attacks on the multiplicative knapsack scheme and on Shamir's fast signature scheme (1984)

by A M Odlyzko
Venue:IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory
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Solving low-density subset sum problems

by J. C. Lagarias, A. M. Odlyzko - in Proceedings of 24rd Annu. Symp. Foundations of comput. Sci , 1983
"... Abstract. The subset sum problem is to decide whether or not the O-1 integer programming problem C aixi = M, Vi,x,=O or 1, i-l has a solution, where the ai and M are given positive integers. This problem is NP-complete, and the difficulty of solving it is the basis of public-key cryptosystems of kna ..."
Abstract - Cited by 124 (3 self) - Add to MetaCart
Abstract. The subset sum problem is to decide whether or not the O-1 integer programming problem C aixi = M, Vi,x,=O or 1, i-l has a solution, where the ai and M are given positive integers. This problem is NP-complete, and the difficulty of solving it is the basis of public-key cryptosystems of knapsack type. An algorithm is proposed that searches for a solution when given an instance of the subset sum problem. This algorithm always halts in polynomial time but does not always find a solution when one exists. It converts the problem to one of finding a particular short vector v in a lattice, and then uses a lattice basis reduction algorithm due to A. K. Lenstra, H. W. Lenstra, Jr., and L. Lovasz to attempt to find v. The performance of the proposed algorithm is analyzed. Let the density d of a subset sum problem be defined by d = n/log2(maxi ai). Then for “almost all ” problems of density d c 0.645, the vector v we searched for is the shortest nonzero vector in the lattice. For “almost all ” problems of density d < l/a it is proved that the lattice basis reduction algorithm locates v. Extensive computational tests of the algorithm suggest that it works for densities d < de(n), where d=(n) is a cutoff value that is substantially larger than I/n. This method gives a polynomial time attack on knapsack public-key cryptosystems that can be expected to break them if they transmit information at rates below d=(n), as n-+ 01.

The rise and fall of knapsack cryptosystems

by A. M. Odlyzko - In Cryptology and Computational Number Theory , 1990
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Abstract - Cited by 53 (0 self) - Add to MetaCart
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...of many of the systems that have been broken as well as descriptions of some of the attacks. For full details, the reader is advised to consult [6] and many of the references contained there, such as =-=[3,4,5,8,11,16,17,18,22,26]-=-. The remainder of this paper is devoted to a description of one each of the two kinds of basic attacks that have been used. Section 2 describes the attack on the singly-iterated Merkle-Hellman crypto...

A knapsack-type public key cryptosystem based on arithmetic in finite fields

by Benny Chor, Ronald L. Rivest - IEEE TRANS. INFORM. THEORY , 1988
"... A new knapsack-type public key cryptosystem is introduced. The system is based on a novel application of arithmetic in finite fields, following a construction by Bose and Chowla. By appropriately choosing the parameters, one can control the density of the resulting knapsack, which is the ratio betw ..."
Abstract - Cited by 50 (0 self) - Add to MetaCart
A new knapsack-type public key cryptosystem is introduced. The system is based on a novel application of arithmetic in finite fields, following a construction by Bose and Chowla. By appropriately choosing the parameters, one can control the density of the resulting knapsack, which is the ratio between the number of elements in the knapsack and their sue in bits. In particular, the density can be made high enough to foil “low-density ” attacks against our system. At the moment, no attacks capable of “breaking” this system in a reasonable amount of time are known.

A New Public-Key Cryptosystem

by David Naccache, Jacques Stern , 1997
"... This paper describes a new public-key cryptosystem where the ciphertext is obtained by multiplying the public-keys indexed by the message bits and the cleartext is recovered by factoring the ciphertext raised to a secret power. ..."
Abstract - Cited by 42 (5 self) - Add to MetaCart
This paper describes a new public-key cryptosystem where the ciphertext is obtained by multiplying the public-keys indexed by the message bits and the cleartext is recovered by factoring the ciphertext raised to a secret power.

A Knapsack Type Public Key Cryptosystem Based On Arithmetic in Finite Fields

by Benny Chor, Ronald L. Rivest - IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory , 1988
"... { A new knapsack type public key cryptosystem is introduced. The system is based on a novel application of arithmetic in nite elds, following a construction by Bose and Chowla. By appropriately choosing the parameters, one can control the density of the resulting knapsack, which is the ratio between ..."
Abstract - Cited by 41 (2 self) - Add to MetaCart
{ A new knapsack type public key cryptosystem is introduced. The system is based on a novel application of arithmetic in nite elds, following a construction by Bose and Chowla. By appropriately choosing the parameters, one can control the density of the resulting knapsack, which is the ratio between the number of elements in the knapsack and their size in bits. In particular, the density can be made high enough to foil \low density" attacks against our system. At the moment, no attacks capable of \breaking" this system in a reasonable amount of time are known. Research supported by NSF grant MCS{8006938. Part of this research was done while the rst author was visiting Bell Laboratories, Murray Hill, NJ. A preliminary version of this work was presented in Crypto 84 and has appeared in [8]. 1 1.
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... a justication to this claim). The x i 's can be eciently found by applying the Lenstra-Lenstra-Lovasz basis reduction algorithm [18] to a the truncated LagariasOdlyzko lattice (see the appendix and [=-=22]-=- for a similar attack on other knapsack schemes). Raising g to both sides of the last equality, we get g P p 1 i=1 x i (a i a0 ) = 1 i.e. p 1 Y i=1 (t + i) x i = t P p 1 i=1 x i : Let m 1 = P x + is(m...

Quantum public-key cryptosystems

by Tatsuaki Okamoto, Keisuke Tanaka, Shigenori Uchiyama - in Proc. of CRYPT0 2000 , 2000
"... Abstract. This paper presents a new paradigm of cryptography, quantum public-key cryptosystems. In quantum public-key cryptosystems, all parties including senders, receivers and adversaries are modeled as quantum (probabilistic) poly-time Turing (QPT) machines and only classical channels (i.e., no q ..."
Abstract - Cited by 37 (2 self) - Add to MetaCart
Abstract. This paper presents a new paradigm of cryptography, quantum public-key cryptosystems. In quantum public-key cryptosystems, all parties including senders, receivers and adversaries are modeled as quantum (probabilistic) poly-time Turing (QPT) machines and only classical channels (i.e., no quantum channels) are employed. A quantum trapdoor one-way function, f, plays an essential role in our system, in which a QPT machine can compute f with high probability, any QPT machine can invert f with negligible probability, and a QPT machine with trapdoor data can invert f. This paper proposes a concrete scheme for quantum public-key cryptosystems: a quantum public-key encryption scheme or quantum trapdoor one-way function. The security of our schemes is based on the computational assumption (over QPT machines) that a class of subset-sum problems is intractable against any QPT machine. Our scheme is very efficient and practical if Shor’s discrete logarithm algorithm is efficiently realized on a quantum machine.
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...ack-type cryptosystem, and is closely related to the Merkle–Hellman “multiplicative” trapdoor knapsack scheme [30] 2 , and the Chor–Rivest scheme [13]. The Merkle–Hellman scheme was broken by Odlyzko =-=[33]-=- under some condition and has also been broken due to its low-density (asymptotically its density is zero). Typical realizations of the Chor–Rivest scheme were also cryptanalyzed by Schnorr–Hoerner an...

A Linear Algebraic Attack on the AAFG1 Braid Group Cryptosystem

by James Hughes - In 7th Australasian Conference on Information Security and Privacy, ACISP’02, Lecture Notes in Computer Science , 2002
"... Our purpose is to describe a promising linear algebraic attack on the AAFG1 braid group cryptosystem proposed in [2] employing parameters suggested by the authors. Our method employs the well known Burau matrix representation of the braid group and techniques from computational linear algebra and pr ..."
Abstract - Cited by 21 (1 self) - Add to MetaCart
Our purpose is to describe a promising linear algebraic attack on the AAFG1 braid group cryptosystem proposed in [2] employing parameters suggested by the authors. Our method employs the well known Burau matrix representation of the braid group and techniques from computational linear algebra and provide evidence which shows that at least a certain class of keys are weak. We argue that if AAFG1 is to be viable the parameters must be fashioned to defend against this attack. 1
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... be suitable for a cryptosystem. Several Knapsack and Groebner Bases Cryptosystems have been proposed, each using a proven hard problem which turned out not to be difficult enough, enough of the time =-=[30, 25, 6]-=-. Even after these cryptosystems failed, the hard problems on which they were based are still hard. For the braid group itself, little work has been accomplished on the lower and average bounds of the...

Knapsack public key cryptosystems and diophantine approximation

by J. C. Lagarias - In CRYPTO , 1983
"... This paper presents and analyzes cryptanalytic attacks on knapsack public key cryptosystems that are based on ideas from Diophantine approximation. Shamir’s attack on the basic Merkle-Hellman knapsack cryptosystem is shown to depend on the existence of ‘‘unusually good’ ’ simultaneous Diophantine ap ..."
Abstract - Cited by 18 (3 self) - Add to MetaCart
This paper presents and analyzes cryptanalytic attacks on knapsack public key cryptosystems that are based on ideas from Diophantine approximation. Shamir’s attack on the basic Merkle-Hellman knapsack cryptosystem is shown to depend on the existence of ‘‘unusually good’ ’ simultaneous Diophantine approximations to a vector constructed from the public key. This aspect of Shamir’s attack carries over to multiply iterated knapsack cryptosystems: there are ‘‘unusually good’ ’ simultaneous Diophantine approximations to an analogous vector constructed from the public key. These ‘‘unusually good’ ’ simultaneous Diophantine approximations can be used to break multiply iterated knapsack cryptosystems provided one can solve a certain nonlinear Diophantine approximation problem. This nonlinear problem is solved in the simplest case and then used to give a new cryptanalytic attack on doubly iterated knapsack cryptosystems. 1.
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... Brickell [3] and Lagarias-Odlyzko [11] on low-density knapsack cryptosystems, Adleman’s attack on the Graham-Shamir knapsack cryptosystem [2], and Odlyzko’s attack on multiplicative knapsack schemes =-=[15]-=-. Diophantine approximation methods can also be used to rigorously analyze the performance of Shamir’s attack ([9],[10]). See also the survey [6]. This extended abstract states results without proof. ...

Cryptanalysis of a Fast Public Key Cryptosystem Presented at SAC '97

by Phong Nguyen, Jacques Stern , 1998
"... At SAC '97, Itoh, Okamoto and Mambo presented a fast public key cryptosystem. After analyzing several attacks including latticereduction attacks, they claimed that its security was high, although the cryptosystem had some resemblances with the former knapsack cryptosystems, since decryption cou ..."
Abstract - Cited by 11 (5 self) - Add to MetaCart
At SAC '97, Itoh, Okamoto and Mambo presented a fast public key cryptosystem. After analyzing several attacks including latticereduction attacks, they claimed that its security was high, although the cryptosystem had some resemblances with the former knapsack cryptosystems, since decryption could be viewed as a multiplicative knapsack problem. In this paper, we show how to recover the private key from a fraction of the public key in less than 10 minutes for the suggested choice of parameters. The attack is based on a systematic use of the notion of the orthogonal lattice which we introduced as a cryptographic tool at Crypto '97. This notion allows us to attack the linearity hidden in the scheme.

Public-Key Cryptography

by James Nechvatal , 1991
"... ..."
Abstract - Cited by 8 (0 self) - Add to MetaCart
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