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...mined by the changes in property rights and changes in inequality brought about by externally driven enclosure and conversion. The prerequisites for common property management to be successful (e.g., =-=Ostrom, 1990-=-) include a reliance on the resource involved within the livelihood system and a relatively homogeneous distribution of benefits within the user group. Thus resilient common property management is enh...

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...s of cultures and societies. Economists and political scientists see norms as institutional means to solving public goods problems, such as “the tragedy of the commons” (Fukuyama, 1995; Hardin, 1968; =-=Ostrom, 1990-=-). The general idea is that, to solve problems of rational choice inherent in balancing individual and collective needs, individuals must be made to forsake a measure of self-interest and to sacrifice...

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...but numerous examples show that both community and individual harvesting, or territorial rights — coupled with decision-making responsibilities — improve management (Ostrom et al. 1994; Shotton 2001; =-=Dietz et al. 2003-=-; Hannesson 2004). For instance, purse seine fishers recently established a cooperative in Alaska’s Chignik salmon fishery and in a 2002 survey of its members, 67% claim it has made them financially b...

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... sustainable resource stewardship suggest that several social, administrative, and economic conditions are needed, with effective management often requiring long-term collaboration that builds trust (=-=Dietz et al. 2003-=-, Ostrom 2009). In forestry, good management hinges on flexible practices that can respond to different onsite conditions. Forest practices restricted with set prescriptions do not allow this flexibil...

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...utinized price and output decisions (Cyert and March 1963). Learning in organizations seemed to be a slow, evolutionary, conflictual process (Sabbatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993; Lounmaa and March 1985; =-=Ostrom 1990-=-) rather than an instantaneous adjustment process that rational organization theory would imply. Participants identified with the rules of the organization, adhering to them even in the face of eviden...

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...am Douglas Henry‡§ *Environmental Science and Policy Program, 273 Giltner Hall, Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI 48864; ‡Sustainability Science Program, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138; and §Institute of Transportation Studies, University of California, Davis, CA 95616 D espite the grim view of resource overexploitation and the collapse famously described in Hardin’s (1) much-cited ‘‘Tragedy of the Commons,’’ we now know that local governance institutions have the potential to overcome common pool resource dilemmas. A growing literature (2, 3), including Chhatre and Agrawal’s analysis of forest commons (4) in this issue of PNAS, demonstrates the conditions of successful commons governance. This body of research augurs well for our ability to design decision-making processes that facilitate both environmental and economic sustainability and thus is of immense practical importance. Why Commons Matter The issue of forest commons is an excellent illustration of the practical importance of commons research. Managing forest commons poses a major challenge for sustainability in the twenty-first century. In addition to the ecosystem servic...

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...ntives to free-ridesare nevertheless strong. CPR and public goods problems both require careful design ofscontracts—often relying on institutions to help lower the cost of contracting, monitoring,s19 =-=Ostrom 1990-=-.s11sand enforcement—because deep cooperation requires overcoming incentives to free ridesthat arise whenever goods are not excludablesSome climate change problems involve re-aligning incentives when ...