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The protection of information in computer systems (1975)

by J H SALTZER, M D SCHROEDER
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Language-Based Information-Flow Security

by Andrei Sabelfeld , Andrew C. Myers - IEEE JOURNAL ON SELECTED AREAS IN COMMUNICATIONS , 2003
"... Current standard security practices do not provide substantial assurance that the end-to-end behavior of a computing system satisfies important security policies such as confidentiality. An end-to-end confidentiality policy might assert that secret input data cannot be inferred by an attacker throug ..."
Abstract - Cited by 827 (57 self) - Add to MetaCart
Current standard security practices do not provide substantial assurance that the end-to-end behavior of a computing system satisfies important security policies such as confidentiality. An end-to-end confidentiality policy might assert that secret input data cannot be inferred by an attacker through the attacker's observations of system output; this policy regulates information flow.

Data Security

by Dorothy E. Denning, Peter J. Denning , 1979
"... The rising abuse of computers and increasing threat to personal privacy through data banks have stimulated much interest m the techmcal safeguards for data. There are four kinds of safeguards, each related to but distract from the others. Access controls regulate which users may enter the system and ..."
Abstract - Cited by 615 (3 self) - Add to MetaCart
The rising abuse of computers and increasing threat to personal privacy through data banks have stimulated much interest m the techmcal safeguards for data. There are four kinds of safeguards, each related to but distract from the others. Access controls regulate which users may enter the system and subsequently whmh data sets an active user may read or wrote. Flow controls regulate the dissemination of values among the data sets accessible to a user. Inference controls protect statistical databases by preventing questioners from deducing confidential information by posing carefully designed sequences of statistical queries and correlating the responses. Statlstmal data banks are much less secure than most people beheve. Data encryption attempts to prevent unauthorized disclosure of confidential information in transit or m storage. This paper describes the general nature of controls of each type, the kinds of problems they can and cannot solve, and their inherent limitations and weaknesses. The paper is intended for a general audience with little background in the area.

Enforceable Security Policies

by Fred B. Schneider
"... ..."
Abstract - Cited by 605 (11 self) - Add to MetaCart
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Distributed Computing in Practice: The Condor Experience

by Douglas Thain, Todd Tannenbaum, Miron Livny , 2005
"... Since 1984, the Condor project has enabled ordinary users to do extraordinary computing. Today, the project continues to explore the social and technical problems of cooperative computing on scales ranging from the desktop to the world-wide computational Grid. In this paper, we provide the history a ..."
Abstract - Cited by 551 (8 self) - Add to MetaCart
Since 1984, the Condor project has enabled ordinary users to do extraordinary computing. Today, the project continues to explore the social and technical problems of cooperative computing on scales ranging from the desktop to the world-wide computational Grid. In this paper, we provide the history and philosophy of the Condor project and describe how it has interacted with other projects and evolved along with the field of distributed computing. We outline the core components of the Condor system and describe how the technology of computing must correspond to social structures. Throughout, we reflect on the lessons of experience and chart the course travelled by research ideas as they grow into production

A Calculus for Access Control in Distributed Systems

by M. Abadi, M. Burrows, B. Lampson, G. Plotkin , 1991
"... We study some of the concepts, protocols, and algorithms for access control in distributed systems, from a logical perspective. We account for how a principal may come to believe that another principal is making a request, either on his own or on someone else's behalf. We also provide a logical ..."
Abstract - Cited by 432 (13 self) - Add to MetaCart
We study some of the concepts, protocols, and algorithms for access control in distributed systems, from a logical perspective. We account for how a principal may come to believe that another principal is making a request, either on his own or on someone else's behalf. We also provide a logical language for access control lists, and theories for deciding whether requests should be granted.

Improving Host Security with System Call Policies

by Niels Provos - In Proceedings of the 12th Usenix Security Symposium , 2002
"... We introduce a system that eliminates the need to run programs in privileged process contexts. Using our system, programs run unprivileged but may execute certain operations with elevated privileges as determined by a configurable policy eliminating the need for suid or sgid binaries. We present the ..."
Abstract - Cited by 330 (0 self) - Add to MetaCart
We introduce a system that eliminates the need to run programs in privileged process contexts. Using our system, programs run unprivileged but may execute certain operations with elevated privileges as determined by a configurable policy eliminating the need for suid or sgid binaries. We present the design and analysis of the "Systrace" facility which supports fine grained process confinement, intrusion detection, auditing and privilege elevation. It also facilitates the often difficult process of policy generation. With Systrace, it is possible to generate policies automatically in a training session or generate them interactively during program execution. The policies describe the desired behavior of services or user applications on a system call level and are enforced to prevent operations that are not explicitly permitted. We show that Systrace is efficient and does not impose significant performance penalties.

Architectural Support for Copy and Tamper Resistant Software

by David Lie, Chandramohan Thekkath, Mark Mitchell, Patrick Lincoln, Dan Boneh, John Mitchell, Mark Horowitz , 2000
"... ..."
Abstract - Cited by 279 (5 self) - Add to MetaCart
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...ral feature, XOM, for eXecute Only Memory [?]. To support a secure execution environment, we use the concept of a compartment , which is a logical "box" that provides isolation between the p=-=rincipals [12]-=-. The compartment is built from a session key , used to encipher data. The key acts as the walls of the compartment: those who know the session key are inside the compartment and can decrypt data hidd...

Scale and performance in the Denali isolation kernel

by Andrew Whitaker, Marianne Shaw, Steven D. Gribble , 2002
"... Rights to individual papers remain with the author or the author's employer. Permission is granted for noncommercial reproduction of the work for educational or research purposes. This copyright notice must be included in the reproduced paper. USENIX acknowledges all trademarks herein. ..."
Abstract - Cited by 257 (3 self) - Add to MetaCart
Rights to individual papers remain with the author or the author's employer. Permission is granted for noncommercial reproduction of the work for educational or research purposes. This copyright notice must be included in the reproduced paper. USENIX acknowledges all trademarks herein.
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...w-level resources such as disk blocks and network packets. High-level abstractions entail signicant complexity and typically have a wide API, violating the security principle of economy of mechanism [=-=29]. The-=-y also invite \layer below" attacks, in which an attacker gains unauthorized access to a resource by requesting it below the layer of enforcement [18]. An isolation kernel exposes hardware-level ...

Dynamic Software Updating

by Michael Hicks , 2001
"... ..."
Abstract - Cited by 232 (34 self) - Add to MetaCart
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Condor and the Grid

by Douglas Thain, Todd Tannenbaum, Miron Livny
"... Since 1984, the Condor project has helped ordinary users to do extraordinary computing. Today, the project continues to explore the social and technical problems of cooperative computing on scales ranging from the desktop to the world-wide computational grid. In this chapter, we provide the history ..."
Abstract - Cited by 227 (37 self) - Add to MetaCart
Since 1984, the Condor project has helped ordinary users to do extraordinary computing. Today, the project continues to explore the social and technical problems of cooperative computing on scales ranging from the desktop to the world-wide computational grid. In this chapter, we provide the history and philosophy of the Condor project and describe how it has interacted with other projects and evolved along with the field of distributed computing. We outline the core components of the Condor system and describe how the technology of computing must reflect the sociology of communities. Throughout, we reflect on the lessons of experience and chart the course travelled by research ideas as they grow into production systems.
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Citation Context

... job feel at home by providing everything that it needs to run correctly. The box must protect the resource from any harm that a malicious job might cause. The box has already received much attention =-=[69, 70, 71, 72]-=-, so we will focus here on describing the sand. 1 Condor provides several universes that create a specific job environment. A universe is defined by a matched sandbox and shadow, so the development of...

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