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Inter-firm R&D partnerships –an overview of pattern and trends since 1960
- Research Policy
, 2002
"... This paper explores 40 years of data on R&D partnerships. These R&D partnerships are examples of inter-firm collaboration or strategic partnering, a topic that has recently attracted attention in both the academic literature and the popular press. The paper presents an analysis of some basic ..."
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Cited by 257 (7 self)
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This paper explores 40 years of data on R&D partnerships. These R&D partnerships are examples of inter-firm collaboration or strategic partnering, a topic that has recently attracted attention in both the academic literature and the popular press. The paper presents an analysis of some basic historical trends and sectoral patterns in R&D partnering since 1960. It also provides an overview of some major international (sectoral) patterns in the forming of R&D partnerships within the Triad (North
Boards of directors and firm performance: Integrating agency and resource dependence perspectives
- Academy of Management Review
, 2003
"... Boards of directors serve two important functions for organizations: monitoring man-agement on behalf of shareholders and providing resources. Agency theorists assert that effective monitoring is a function of a board's incentives, whereas resource dependence theorists contend that the provisio ..."
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Cited by 182 (3 self)
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Boards of directors serve two important functions for organizations: monitoring man-agement on behalf of shareholders and providing resources. Agency theorists assert that effective monitoring is a function of a board's incentives, whereas resource dependence theorists contend that the provision of resources is a function of board capital. We combine the two perspectives and argue that board capital affects both board monitoring and the provision of resources and that board incentives moderate these relationships. Researchers seeking evidence of links be-tween boards of directors and firm performance commonly follow one of two distinct paths. The most dominant path is that of agency theorists who contend that a key activity for boards is monitoring management on behalf of share-holders and that effective monitoring can im-prove firm performance by reducing agency costs. These researchers have examined the re-lationship between proxies for board incentives to monitor (e.g., board dependence or equity compensation) and firm performance. Two re-cent meta-analyses of existing studies, how-ever, found no statistical support for a relation-ship between board incentives to monitor and
Firm organization, industrial structure, and technological innovation
- Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
, 1996
"... The formal and informal structures of firms and their external linkages have an important bearing on the rate and direction of innovation. This paper explores the properties of different types of firms with respect to the generation of new technology. Various archetypes are recognized and an effort ..."
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Cited by 121 (3 self)
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The formal and informal structures of firms and their external linkages have an important bearing on the rate and direction of innovation. This paper explores the properties of different types of firms with respect to the generation of new technology. Various archetypes are recognized and an effort is made to match organization structure to the type of innovation. The framework is relevant to technology and competition policy as it broadens the framework economists use to identify environments that assist innovation.
Testing Contract Theory: A Survey of Some Recent Work,”
- in Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and Application, Eighth
, 2003
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Trust and the development of health care as a social instituition
- Social Science and Medicine
, 2003
"... Health systems are inherently relational and so many of the most critical challenges for health systems are relationship and behaviour problems. Yet the disciplinary perspectives that underlie traditional health policy analysis offer only limited and partial insights into human behaviour and relatio ..."
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Cited by 106 (3 self)
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Health systems are inherently relational and so many of the most critical challenges for health systems are relationship and behaviour problems. Yet the disciplinary perspectives that underlie traditional health policy analysis offer only limited and partial insights into human behaviour and relationships. The health sector, therefore, has much to learn from the wider literature on behaviour and the factors that influence it. A central feature of recent debates, particularly, but not only, in relation to social capital, is trust and its role in facilitating collective action, that is co-operation among people to achieve common goals. The particular significance of trust is that it offers an alternative approach to the economic individualism that has driven public policy analysis in recent decades. This paper considers what the debates on trust have to offer health policy analysis by exploring the meaning, bases and outcomes of trust, and its relevance to health systems. It, first, presents a synthesis of theoretical perspectives on the notion of trust. Second, it argues both that trust underpins the co-operation within health systems that is necessary to health production, and that a trust-based health system can make an important contribution to building value in society. Finally, five conclusions are drawn for an approach to health policy analysis that takes trust seriously.
Contractual Commitments, Bargaining Power, and Governance Inseparability: Incorporating History into Transaction Cost Theory
- Academy of Management Review
, 1999
"... *Argyres is the corresponding author for this paper; he can be reached at nargyres@marshall.usc.edu or at (213) 740-5552. The authors ' names are listed in alphabetical order; they contributed equally to the writing of this paper. We thank three anonymous referees for many useful comments and s ..."
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Cited by 93 (1 self)
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*Argyres is the corresponding author for this paper; he can be reached at nargyres@marshall.usc.edu or at (213) 740-5552. The authors ' names are listed in alphabetical order; they contributed equally to the writing of this paper. We thank three anonymous referees for many useful comments and suggestions. Transaction cost economics (TCE) is becoming a predominant economic theory of the firm. In this theory, transactions with particular characteristics are said to be efficiently governed by particular organizational arrangements, and not others. Thus, firms are said to be formed around transactions characterized by uncertainty and by economic spillovers, especially those resulting
The theory of the firm as governance structure: From choice to contract
- JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES
, 2002
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Transaction Cost Economics: How it Works; Where it is Headed
- DE ECONOMIST
, 1998
"... The transaction cost economics program that is described herein is the product of two recent and complementary fields of economic research. The first one is the New Institutional Economics; the second one has been described as the ‘new economics of organization’ ~Moe ~1984, 1990!!. A key conceptual ..."
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Cited by 88 (0 self)
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The transaction cost economics program that is described herein is the product of two recent and complementary fields of economic research. The first one is the New Institutional Economics; the second one has been described as the ‘new economics of organization’ ~Moe ~1984, 1990!!. A key conceptual move for both was to push beyond the theory of the firm as a production function ~which is a technological construction! into a theory of the firm as a governance structure ~which is an organizational construction!. Work in both of these areas began to take shape in a concerted way in the 1970s and has grown exponentially since. The economics of organization is the more theoretical of the two and more closely relates to public policy issues traditionally associated with the field of industrial organization. The New Institu-tional Economics is more interdisciplinary and has applications to the contiguous social sciences. Although transaction cost economics has a broad reach – any issue that arises as or can be reformulated as a contracting problem is usefully examined through
Fundamentals of service science
- J Acad Market Sci
"... Abstract This paper is a first exploration of the relationship between service science and Grid com-puting. Service science is the study of value co-creation interactions among entities, known as service systems. Within the emerging service science com-munity, service is often defined as the applica ..."
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Cited by 86 (3 self)
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Abstract This paper is a first exploration of the relationship between service science and Grid com-puting. Service science is the study of value co-creation interactions among entities, known as service systems. Within the emerging service science com-munity, service is often defined as the application of competences (resources) for the benefit of another. Grid computing is the study of resource sharing among entities, known as virtual organizations, which solve complex business, societal, scientific, and engineering problems. Within the Grid computing community, service is sometimes defined as protocols plus behavior. Both Grid computing and service science are connecting academic, industry, govern-ment, and volunteer sector collaborators on a range of projects including eScience, healthcare, environmen-tal sustainability, and more. This paper compares and contrasts the notions of resource, entity, service, interaction, and success criteria for the two areas of study. In conclusion, new areas for collaborative inquiry are proposed.
The Determinants of Board Structure at the Initial Public Offering
- Journal of Law and Economics
"... This paper describes board size and composition and investigates the role of venture capital in a sample of 1,116 IPO firms. First, venture capital-backed firms have fewer insider and instrumental directors and more independent outsiders. Second, we consider board composition as the outcome of a bar ..."
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Cited by 71 (1 self)
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This paper describes board size and composition and investigates the role of venture capital in a sample of 1,116 IPO firms. First, venture capital-backed firms have fewer insider and instrumental directors and more independent outsiders. Second, we consider board composition as the outcome of a bargain between the CEO and outside shareholders. Representation of independent outsiders on the board decreases with the power of the CEO- tenure and voting control- and increases with the power of outside investors- venture capital backing and venture firm reputation. Third, within the sample of venture financed firms and also consistent with a bargaining model, the probability that a founder remains as CEO is decreasing in venture firm reputation. Finally, we examine the influence of venture capital backing and board structure on firm outcomes in the ten years after the IPO.
