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...sed (see [4] for a survey). These protocols are either based on repudiation models (such as [21, 5, 6, 23, 24]), where nodes are punished for non-cooperation, or based on monetary incentives (such as =-=[7, 9, 3, 35, 19]-=-), where nodes are awarded payments for forwarding messages. In payment-based models, the question arises how much a node should be paid for forwarding messages. An obvious answer would be the cost it...

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...ritizing a member of the collusion negative feeback – both as a deterrrent and as a way to reduce the credibility of the feedback the honest user gave. An even more recent contribution, called Sprite =-=[27]-=-, takes a similar approach to what we do in our paper in that it considers an ad hoc network and assumes the presence of a backbone. On the other hand, it does not address the case of multihop cellula...

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...ong to different users, they may not have incentives to forward each other’s traffic. To stimulate nodes to forward each other’s traffic, many methods have recently been proposed and evaluated (e.g., =-=[4, 5, 6, 7, 24, 27, 33, 34, 3, 41, 48]-=-). Given the complexity and the subtlety of the incentive issues, researchers start to formally apply game-theoretic techniques to analyze and design protocols in wireless ad-hoc networks, by modeling...

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... hoc networks and proposed several solutions to give nodes incentive to contribute to common network services. These solutions are based on a reputation system [3], [15] or on a virtual currency [5], =-=[27]-=-. All of these solutions are heuristics to provide a reliable cooperation enforcement scheme. However, it has never been formally proven that these techniques are really needed. Recently, some researc...

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...asure reputation of a node, and a secure mechanism to propagate reputation, with the aim of resolving the drawbacks of the existing reputation-based incentive schemes. Pricing-based schemes [2], [4], =-=[12]-=- treat packet forwarding as a service that can be priced, and introduce some form of virtual currency to regulate the packet-forwarding relationships among different nodes. However, these schemes requ...

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...ding from the context of incentive techniques. In this case, rational nodes attempt to maximize their benefit (e.g., their bitrate) of using the network; an example is SPRITE, by Zhong, Chen and Yang =-=[36]-=-. As such, these nodes do not aim at perpetrating DoS attacks. All research efforts mentioned so far are focused on the network layer. The only study of Denial of Service at the MAC layer of ad hoc ne...

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...revelation in dominant strategy). [Feigenbaum et al., 2002] propose a strategyproof mechanism (of the VCG family) for shortest paths in BGP routing that induces truthful revelation of transit costs. [=-=Zhong et al., 2003-=-] design a payment mechanism for packet forwarding in mobile ad-hoc networks in which the payment to intermediate nodes who carry the packets is based on reports sent by the nodes to a central center....

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...forwarding service than it provides. These solutions suffer from two serious drawbacks. They require infrastructure that seems unlikely to come about in practice, e.g., centralized clearance services =-=[44, 34]-=- or trusted hardware [11]. And they impose overly restrictive requirements on the system, e.g., uniform traffic rates among all node pairs [39]. Our goal is to combine the strengths of these two appro...