Abstract We study the effects of a credit crunch on consumer spending in a heterogeneousagent incomplete-market model. After an unexpected permanent tightening in consumers' borrowing capacity, some consumers are forced to deleverage and others increase their precautionary savings. This depresses interest rates, especially in the short run, and generates an output drop, even with flexible prices. The output drop is larger with nominal rigidities, if the zero lower bound prevents the interest rate from adjusting downwards. Adding durable goods to the model, households take larger debt positions and the output response may be larger.

The zero lower bound on nominal interest rates has constrained the Federal Reserve’s setting of the federal funds rate since December 2008. According to many macroeconomic models, this should have greatly reduced the effectiveness of monetary policy and increased the efficacy of fiscal policy. However, standard macroeconomic theory also implies that private-sector decisions depend on the entire path of expected future short-term interest rates, not just the current level of the overnight rate. Thus, interest rates with a year or more to maturity are arguably more relevant for the economy, and it is unclear to what extent the zero bound has constrained those yields. In this paper, we propose a novel approach to measure the effects of the zero lower bound on interest rates of any maturity. We compare the sensitivity of interest rates of various maturities to macroeconomic news during periods when short-term interest rates were very low to that during normal times. We find that yields on Treasury securities with a year or more to maturity were surprisingly responsive to news throughout 2008–10, suggesting that monetary and fiscal policy were likely to have been about as effective as usual during this period. Since mid-2011, the zero lower bound has been a greater constraint. We offer two explanations for these findings: First,

Abstract The global economy has a chronic shortage of safe assets which lies behind many recent macroeconomic imbalances. This paper provides a simple model of the Safe Asset Mechanism (SAM), its recessionary safety traps, and its policy antidotes. Public debt plays a central role in SAM as long as the government has spare fiscal capacity to back safe asset production. We show that Quantitative Easing type policies have positive effects on spreads and output. In contrast, Operation Twist type policies, where the duration of public debt held by the public is reduced, can be counterproductive. Monetary policy commitments work if they support future bad states of nature. All these policies depend on fiscal capacity. Once the latter runs out, short term cyclical policy becomes ineffective. In contrast, credible long run fiscal consolidation relaxes the fiscal capacity constraint and enhances the effectiveness of short term policy. An economy that is near its fiscal limits is susceptible to runs on its public debt and to destabilizing feedback loops.

This paper exploits a detailed new dataset with comprehensive monthly financial information on millions of households to investigate the interaction between household balance sheets, income, and consumption during the Great Recession. In particular, I test whether consumption among households with higher levels of debt is more sensitive to a given change in income. I match households to their employers and use employer shocks to derive persistent and unanticipated changes in household income. I find that highly-indebted households are more sensitive to income fluctuations and that a one standard deviation increase in debt-to-asset ratios increases the elasticity of consumption by approximately 20%. I employ household savings and credit availability data to show that these results are driven largely by borrowing and liquidity constraints. These estimates suggest that the drop in consumption during the 2007-2009 recession was approximately 25 % greater than what would have been seen with the household balance sheet positions in 1983.

Financial deregulation can help rationalize the negative correlation between house prices and current account balance observed in the United States and in several other countries that have experienced the highest degree of turmoil during the recent financial crisis. Lower collateral requirements facilitate access to external funding and increase the demand for consumption and housing. As a consequence, house prices increase and the current account turns negative because households borrow on net from the rest of the world. At the same time, however, the world real interest rate counterfactually raises. Expansionary monetary policy shocks in the United States, amplified by exchange rate pegs to the dollar in emerging economies, keep the world real interest rate low but play virtually no role for house prices and the current account.

We review recent evidence on price rigidity from the macroeconomics literature, and discuss how this evidence is used to inform macroeconomic modeling. Sluggish price adjustment is a leading explanation for large effects of demand shocks on output and, in particular, the effects of monetary policy on output. A recent influx of data on individual prices has greatly deepened macroeconomists ’ understanding of individual price dynamics. However, the analysis of these new data raise a host of new empirical issues that have not traditionally been confronted by parsimonious macroeconomic models of price-setting. Simple statistics such as the frequency of price change may be misleading guides to the flexibility of the aggregate price level in a setting where temporary sales, product-churning, cross-sectional heterogeneity, and large idiosyncratic price movements play an important role. We discuss empirical evidence on these and other important features of micro price adjustment and ask how they affect the sluggishness of aggregate price adjustment and the economy’s response to demand shocks.

Structural reforms that increase competition in product and labor markets are often indicated as the main policy option available for peripheral Europe to regain competi-tiveness and boost output. We show that, in a crisis that pushes the nominal interest rate to its lower bound, these reforms do not support economic activity in the short run, and may well be contractionary. Absent the appropriate monetary stimulus, reforms fuel expectations of prolonged deflation, increase the real interest rate, and depress aggregate demand. Our findings carry important implications for the current debate on the timing and the design of structural reforms in Europe.

Abstract A salient feature of the recent U.S. recession is that output and employment have declined more in regions (states, counties) where household leverage had increased more during the credit boom. This pattern is difficult to explain with standard models of financing frictions. We propose a theory that can account for these cross-sectional facts. We study a cash-in-advance economy in which home equity borrowing, alongside public money, is used to conduct transactions. A decline in home equity borrowing tightens the cash-in-advance constraint, thus triggering a recession. We show that the evidence on house prices, leverage and employment across US regions identifies the key parameters of the model. Models estimated with cross-sectional evidence display high sensitivity of real activity to nominal credit shocks. Since home equity borrowing and public money are, in the model, perfect substitutes, our counter-factual experiments suggest that monetary policy actions have significantly reduced the severity of the recent recession.

We present evidence that high concentration in local mortgage lending reduces the sensitivity of mortgage rates and refinancing activity to mortgage-backed security (MBS) yields. A decrease in MBS yields is typically associated with greater refinancing activity and lower rates on new mortgages. However, this effect is dampened in counties with concentrated mortgage markets. We isolate the direct effect of mortgage market concentration and rule out alternative explanations based on borrower, loan, and collateral characteristics in two ways. First, we use a matching procedure to compare high- and low-concentration counties that are very similar on observable characteristics and find similar results. Second, we examine counties where concentration in mortgage lending is increased by bank mergers. We show that within a given county, sensitivities to MBS yields decrease after a concentration-increasing merger. Our results suggest that the strength of the housing channel of monetary policy transmission varies in both the time series and the cross section. In the cross section, increasing concentration by one standard deviation reduces the overall impact of a decline in MBS yields by approximately 50%. In the time series, a decrease in MBS yields today has a 40 % smaller effect on the average

Abstract Two separate narratives have emerged in the wake of the Global Financial Crisis. One speaks of private financial excess and the key role of the banking system in leveraging and deleveraging the economy. The other emphasizes the public sector balance sheet over the private and worries about the risks of lax fiscal policies. This paper studies the co-evolution of public and private sector debt in advanced countries since 1870. We find that in advanced economies financial stability risks have come from private sector credit booms and not from the expansion of public debt. However, we find evidence that high levels of public debt have tended to exacerbate the effects of private sector deleveraging after crises, leading to more prolonged periods of economic depression. Fiscal space appears to be a constraint in the aftermath of a crisis, then and now.