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Approximation algorithms for combinatorial auctions with complementfree bidders
 In Proceedings of the 37th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC
, 2005
"... We exhibit three approximation algorithms for the allocation problem in combinatorial auctions with complement free bidders. The running time of these algorithms is polynomial in the number of items m and in the number of bidders n, even though the “input size ” is exponential in m. The first algori ..."
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Cited by 133 (25 self)
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algorithm provides an O(log m) approximation. The second algorithm provides an O ( √ m) approximation in the weaker model of value oracles. This algorithm is also incentive compatible. The third algorithm provides an improved 2approximation for the more restricted case of “XOS bidders”, a class which
DOI 10.1287/moor.xxxx.xxxx c○20xx INFORMS Approximation Algorithms for Combinatorial Auctions with ComplementFree Bidders
"... In a combinatorial auction m heterogenous indivisible items are sold to n bidders. This paper considers settings in which the valuation functions of the bidders are known to be complementfree (a.k.a. subadditive). We provide several approximation algorithms for the socialwelfare maximization probl ..."
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In a combinatorial auction m heterogenous indivisible items are sold to n bidders. This paper considers settings in which the valuation functions of the bidders are known to be complementfree (a.k.a. subadditive). We provide several approximation algorithms for the socialwelfare maximization
Tight bounds for the price of anarchy of simultaneous first price auctions. arXiv:1312.2371
, 2013
"... We study the Price of Anarchy of simultaneous FirstPrice auctions for buyers with submodular and subadditive valuations. The current best upper bounds for the Bayesian Price of Anarchy of these auctions are e/(e − 1) [34] and 2 [16], respectively. We provide matching lower bounds for both cases ev ..."
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Cited by 2 (0 self)
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to the theoretical discussion of upper bounding the Price of Anarchy in Bayesian Auctions settings. We suggest an alternative way to bid against price distributions. Using our approach we were able to reprovide the upper bounds of e/(e − 1) [34] for XOS bidders. An advantage of our approach, is that it reveals a
On the Complexity of Computing an Equilibrium in Combinatorial Auctions
, 2015
"... We study combinatorial auctions where each item is sold separately but simultaneously via a second price auction. We ask whether it is possible to efficiently compute in this game a pure Nash equilibrium with social welfare close to the optimal one. We show that when the valuations of the bidders ar ..."
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Cited by 1 (0 self)
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We study combinatorial auctions where each item is sold separately but simultaneously via a second price auction. We ask whether it is possible to efficiently compute in this game a pure Nash equilibrium with social welfare close to the optimal one. We show that when the valuations of the bidders
Sketching Valuation Functions
, 2011
"... Motivated by the problem of querying and communicating bidders ’ valuations in combinatorial auctions, we study how well different classes of set functions can be sketched. More formally, let f be a function mapping subsets of some ground set [n] to the nonnegative real numbers. We say that f ′ is ..."
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Cited by 23 (2 self)
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Motivated by the problem of querying and communicating bidders ’ valuations in combinatorial auctions, we study how well different classes of set functions can be sketched. More formally, let f be a function mapping subsets of some ground set [n] to the nonnegative real numbers. We say that f
1 Subadditive Valuations 1.1 The Setup
, 2014
"... In this lecture we study a scenario that generalizes almost all of the ones that we’ve studied in the course. Scenario #9: • A set U of m nonidentical items. • Each bidder i has a private valuation vi: 2U → R+ that is subadditive, meaning that for every pair of sets S, T ⊆ U, vi(S ∪ T) ≤ vi(S) + v ..."
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In this lecture we study a scenario that generalizes almost all of the ones that we’ve studied in the course. Scenario #9: • A set U of m nonidentical items. • Each bidder i has a private valuation vi: 2U → R+ that is subadditive, meaning that for every pair of sets S, T ⊆ U, vi(S ∪ T) ≤ vi