: the bargainers ' time preference and the risk of breakdown of negotiation. Each of the models has a unique perfect equilibrium. When the motivation to reach agreement is made negligible, in each model the unique perfect equilibrium outcome approaches the Nash bargaining solution, with utilities that reflect

Abstract not found

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The sphere of modern financial economics encompases finance, micro investment theory and much of the economics of uncertainty. As is evident from its influence on other branches of economics including public finance, industrial organization and monetary theory, the boundaries of this sphere are both permeable and flexible. The complex interactions of time and uncertainty guarantee intellectual challenge and intrinsic excitement to the study of financial economics. Indeed, the mathematics of the subject contain some of the most interesting applications of probability and optimization theory. But for all its mathematical refinement, the research has nevertheless had a direct and significant influence on practice. It was not always thus. Thirty years ago, finance theory was little more than a collection of anecdotes, rules of thumb, and manipulations of accounting data with an almost exclusive focus on corporate financial management. There is no need in this meeting of the guild to recount the subsequent evolution from this conceptual potpourri to a rigorous economic

that wages are determined by Nash bargaining. ∗ This is a major revision of ‘Equilibrium Unemployment Fluctuations’. I thank Daron Acemoglu, Olivier

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at

We consider a general model of the non-cooperative provision of a public good. Under very weak assumptions there will always exist a unique Nash equilibrium in our model. A small redistribution of wealth among the contributing consumers will not change the equilibrium amount of the public good

an equilibrium in dominant strategies, and truth-telling is not an equilibrium of GSP. To analyze the properties of GSP, we describe the generalized English auction that corresponds to GSP and show that it has a unique equilibrium. This is an ex post equilibrium, with the same payoffs to all players

This paper provides a simple example of an economy in which equi-librium prices and quantities exhibit what may be the central feature of the modern business cycle: a systematic relation between the rate of change in nominal prices and the level of real output. The relationship,