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The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modeling

by Ken Binmore, Ariel Rubinstein, Asher Wolinsky - Rand Journal of Economics , 1986
"... This article establishes the relationship between the static axiomatic theory of bargaining and the sequential strategic approach to bargaining. We consider two strategic models of alternating offers. The models differ in the source of the incentive of the bargaining parties to reach agreement: the ..."
Abstract - Cited by 563 (1 self) - Add to MetaCart
: the bargainers ' time preference and the risk of breakdown of negotiation. Each of the models has a unique perfect equilibrium. When the motivation to reach agreement is made negligible, in each model the unique perfect equilibrium outcome approaches the Nash bargaining solution, with utilities that reflect

Perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model

by Ariel Rubinstein - ECONOMETRICA , 1982
"... ..."
Abstract - Cited by 1336 (11 self) - Add to MetaCart
Abstract not found

A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games.

by References Harsanyi , J C Seleten , R , 1988
"... Abstract This paper presents a Downsian model of political competition in which parties have incomplete but richer information than voters on policy effects. Each party can observe a private signal of the policy effects, while voters cannot. In this setting, voters infer the policy effects from the ..."
Abstract - Cited by 734 (4 self) - Add to MetaCart
of the Median Voter Theorem in the classical Downsian model. Our equilibrium analysis suggests similarity between the set of WPBEs in this model and the set of uniformly perfect equilibria of Harsanyi and Selten (1988) in the model with completely informed parties which we studied in a previous paper

Internet Advertising and the Generalized Second Price Auction: Selling Billions of Dollars Worth of Keywords

by Benjamin Edelman, Michael Ostrovsky, Michael Schwarz - AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW , 2007
"... We investigate the “generalized second-price” (GSP) auction, a new mechanism used by search engines to sell online advertising. Although GSP looks similar to the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism, its properties are very different. Unlike the VCG mechanism, GSP generally does not have an equilib ..."
Abstract - Cited by 555 (18 self) - Add to MetaCart
an equilibrium in dominant strategies, and truth-telling is not an equilibrium of GSP. To analyze the properties of GSP, we describe the generalized English auction that corresponds to GSP and show that it has a unique equilibrium. This is an ex post equilibrium, with the same payoffs to all players

On the Private Provision of Public Goods

by Theodore Bergstrom, Lawrence Blume, Hal Varian - Journal of Public Economics , 1986
"... We consider a general model of the non-cooperative provision of a public good. Under very weak assumptions there will always exist a unique Nash equilibrium in our model. A small redistribution of wealth among the contributing consumers will not change the equilibrium amount of the public good. Howe ..."
Abstract - Cited by 564 (9 self) - Add to MetaCart
We consider a general model of the non-cooperative provision of a public good. Under very weak assumptions there will always exist a unique Nash equilibrium in our model. A small redistribution of wealth among the contributing consumers will not change the equilibrium amount of the public good

Quantal Response Equilibria For Normal Form Games

by Richard D. McKelvey, Thomas R. Palfrey - NORMAL FORM GAMES, GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR , 1995
"... We investigate the use of standard statistical models for quantal choice in a game theoretic setting. Players choose strategies based on relative expected utility, and assume other players do so as well. We define a Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE) as a fixed point of this process, and establish e ..."
Abstract - Cited by 647 (28 self) - Add to MetaCart
We investigate the use of standard statistical models for quantal choice in a game theoretic setting. Players choose strategies based on relative expected utility, and assume other players do so as well. We define a Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE) as a fixed point of this process, and establish

Income and Wealth Heterogeneity in the Macroeconomy,

by Per Krusell , Anthony A Smith Jr , Mark Huggett , Robert Lucas , Víctor Ríos-Rull , Tom Sargent , José Scheinkman , Chris Telmer , Stan Zin - Journal of Political Economy , 1998
"... How do movements in the distribution of income and wealth affect the macroeconomy? We analyze this question using a calibrated version of the stochastic growth model with partially uninsurable idiosyncratic risk and movements in aggregate productivity. Our main finding is that, in the stationary st ..."
Abstract - Cited by 678 (11 self) - Add to MetaCart
stochastic equilibrium, the behavior of the macroeconomic aggregates can be almost perfectly described using only the mean of the wealth distribution. This result is robust to substantial changes in both parameter values and model specification. Our benchmark model, whose only difference from

A model of growth through creative destruction

by Philippe Aghion, Peter Howitt , 1990
"... This paper develops a model based on Schumpeter's process of creative destruction. It departs from existing models of endogeneous growth in emphasizing obsolescence of old technologies induced by the accumulation of knowledge and the resulting process or industrial innovations. This has both ..."
Abstract - Cited by 1941 (27 self) - Add to MetaCart
a tendency for laissez-faire economies to generate too many innovations, i.e too much growth. This "business-stealing" effect is partly compensated by the fact that innovations tend to be too small under laissez-faire. The model possesses a unique balanced growth equilibrium in which

Fusion, Propagation, and Structuring in Belief Networks

by Judea Pearl - ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE , 1986
"... Belief networks are directed acyclic graphs in which the nodes represent propositions (or variables), the arcs signify direct dependencies between the linked propositions, and the strengths of these dependencies are quantified by conditional probabilities. A network of this sort can be used to repre ..."
Abstract - Cited by 484 (8 self) - Add to MetaCart
with the task of fusing and propagating the impacts of new information through the networks in such a way that, when equilibrium is reached, each proposition will be assigned a measure of belief consistent with the axioms of probability theory. It is shown that if the network is singly connected (e.g. tree

Equilibrium uniqueness with perfect complements ⋆

by Eilon Solan, Nicolas Vieille , 2005
"... Summary. We study a model in which each of finitely many agent cares about a given subset of finitely many goods. We provide minimal conditions that ensure the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium price vector – a price vector for which supply meets demand. ..."
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Summary. We study a model in which each of finitely many agent cares about a given subset of finitely many goods. We provide minimal conditions that ensure the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium price vector – a price vector for which supply meets demand.
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