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Results 1 - 10
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1,005
Secure Commitment Against A Powerful Adversary - A security primitive based on average intractability (Extended Abstract)
, 1992
"... Secure commitment is a primitive enabling information hiding, which is one of the most basic tools in cryptography. Specifically, it is a two-party partial-information game between a "committer" and a "receiver", in which a secure envelope is first implemented and later opened. T ..."
Abstract
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Cited by 14 (6 self)
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Secure commitment is a primitive enabling information hiding, which is one of the most basic tools in cryptography. Specifically, it is a two-party partial-information game between a "committer" and a "receiver", in which a secure envelope is first implemented and later opened
Macroeconomic Policy in a Two-Party System as a Repeated Game”, The Quarterly
- Journal of Economics, CII
, 1987
"... This paper considers the interaction of two parties with different objectives concerning inflation and unemployment and rational and forward-looking wage-setters. If discretionary policies are followed, an economic cycle related to the political cycle results in equilibrium. This cycle is significan ..."
Abstract
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Cited by 301 (7 self)
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This paper considers the interaction of two parties with different objectives concerning inflation and unemployment and rational and forward-looking wage-setters. If discretionary policies are followed, an economic cycle related to the political cycle results in equilibrium. This cycle
Nash equilibria in partial-information games on Markov chains
- Proc. of the 40th Conf. on Decision and Control
, 2001
"... We consider a two-player partial-information game on a Markov chain, where each player attempts to minimize its own cost over a finite time horizon. We show that this game has always a Nash equilibrium in stochastic behavioral policies. The technique used to prove this result is constructive but has ..."
Abstract
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Cited by 9 (3 self)
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We consider a two-player partial-information game on a Markov chain, where each player attempts to minimize its own cost over a finite time horizon. We show that this game has always a Nash equilibrium in stochastic behavioral policies. The technique used to prove this result is constructive
Solving Partial-Information Stochastic Parity Games
"... We study one-sided partial-information 2-player concurrent stochastic games with parity objectives. In such a game, one of the players has only partial visibility of the state of the game, while the other player has complete knowledge. In general, such games are known to be undecidable, even for the ..."
Abstract
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Cited by 4 (1 self)
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We study one-sided partial-information 2-player concurrent stochastic games with parity objectives. In such a game, one of the players has only partial visibility of the state of the game, while the other player has complete knowledge. In general, such games are known to be undecidable, even
Nash Equilibria in Partial-Information Games on Markov Chains †
, 2001
"... In this paper we consider two-player partial-information games on Markov chains. These are games in which two players are able to influence the state transitions in a Markov chain by taking appropriate actions. Each player attempts to minimize its own cost that is additive over time with the increme ..."
Abstract
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In this paper we consider two-player partial-information games on Markov chains. These are games in which two players are able to influence the state transitions in a Markov chain by taking appropriate actions. Each player attempts to minimize its own cost that is additive over time
Generalized privacy amplification
- IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
, 1995
"... Abstract- This paper provides a general treatment of pri-vacy amplification by public discussion, a concept introduced by Bennett, Brassard, and Robert for a special scenario. Privacy amplification is a process that allows two parties to distill a secret key from a common random variable about which ..."
Abstract
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Cited by 325 (19 self)
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which an eavesdropper has partial information. The two parties generally know nothing about the eavesdropper’s information except that it satisfies a certain constraint. The results have applications to unconditionally secure secret-key agreement protocols and quantum cryptography, and they yield
Two-Party Competition with Persistent Policies
, 2009
"... This paper studies the Markov perfect equilibrium outcomes of a dynamic game of elec-toral competition between two policy-motivated parties. I model incumbent policy persistence: parties commit to implement a policy for their full tenure in office, and hence in any election only the opposition party ..."
Abstract
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Cited by 7 (1 self)
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This paper studies the Markov perfect equilibrium outcomes of a dynamic game of elec-toral competition between two policy-motivated parties. I model incumbent policy persistence: parties commit to implement a policy for their full tenure in office, and hence in any election only the opposition
The parti-game algorithm for variable resolution reinforcement learning in multidimensional state-spaces
- MACHINE LEARNING
, 1995
"... Parti-game is a new algorithm for learning feasible trajectories to goal regions in high dimensional continuous state-spaces. In high dimensions it is essential that learning does not plan uniformly over a state-space. Parti-game maintains a decision-tree partitioning of state-space and applies tec ..."
Abstract
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Cited by 255 (9 self)
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Parti-game is a new algorithm for learning feasible trajectories to goal regions in high dimensional continuous state-spaces. In high dimensions it is essential that learning does not plan uniformly over a state-space. Parti-game maintains a decision-tree partitioning of state-space and applies
Two-Party Competition with Persistent Policies ∗
, 2009
"... This paper studies the Markov perfect equilibrium outcomes of a dynamic game of electoral competition between two policy-motivated parties. I model incumbent policy persistence: parties commit to implement a policy for their full tenure in office, and hence in any election only the opposition party ..."
Abstract
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This paper studies the Markov perfect equilibrium outcomes of a dynamic game of electoral competition between two policy-motivated parties. I model incumbent policy persistence: parties commit to implement a policy for their full tenure in office, and hence in any election only the opposition party
Linear conic formulations for two-party correlations and values of nonlocal games
"... Abstract In this work we study the sets of two-party correlations generated from a Bell scenario involving two spatially separated systems with respect to various physical models. We show that the sets of classical, quantum, no-signaling and unrestricted correlations can be expressed as projections ..."
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Abstract In this work we study the sets of two-party correlations generated from a Bell scenario involving two spatially separated systems with respect to various physical models. We show that the sets of classical, quantum, no-signaling and unrestricted correlations can be expressed
Results 1 - 10
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