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758
Internet Advertising and the Generalized Second Price Auction: Selling Billions of Dollars Worth of Keywords
 AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
, 2007
"... We investigate the “generalized secondprice” (GSP) auction, a new mechanism used by search engines to sell online advertising. Although GSP looks similar to the VickreyClarkeGroves (VCG) mechanism, its properties are very different. Unlike the VCG mechanism, GSP generally does not have an equilib ..."
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Cited by 555 (18 self)
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an equilibrium in dominant strategies, and truthtelling is not an equilibrium of GSP. To analyze the properties of GSP, we describe the generalized English auction that corresponds to GSP and show that it has a unique equilibrium. This is an ex post equilibrium, with the same payoffs to all players
Randomized truthful auctions of digital goods are randomizations over truthful auctions
 In Proc. of 5th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
, 2004
"... In the digital goods setting we prove that for any randomized auction which is truthful in expectation, there exists an equivalent randomized auction which randomizes over truthful deterministic auctions. By equivalent auctions we mean auctions in which the probability of winning and the expected pr ..."
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Cited by 14 (1 self)
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In the digital goods setting we prove that for any randomized auction which is truthful in expectation, there exists an equivalent randomized auction which randomizes over truthful deterministic auctions. By equivalent auctions we mean auctions in which the probability of winning and the expected
Competitive auctions and digital goods
 IN PROC. 12TH SYMP. ON DISCRETE ALG
, 2001
"... We study a class of single round, sealed bid auctions for items in unlimited supply such as digital goods. We focus on auctions that are truthful and competitive. Truthful auctions encourage bidders to bid their utility; competitive auctions yield revenue within a constant factor of the revenue fo ..."
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Cited by 139 (29 self)
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auctions are truthful and competitive under certain assumptions, and that no truthful deterministic auction is competitive. We present simulation results which confirm that our auctions compare favorably to fixed pricing. Some of our results extend to bounded supply markets, for which we also get truthful
NonDeterministic Exponential Time has TwoProver Interactive Protocols
"... We determine the exact power of twoprover interactive proof systems introduced by BenOr, Goldwasser, Kilian, and Wigderson (1988). In this system, two allpowerful noncommunicating provers convince a randomizing polynomial time verifier in polynomial time that the input z belongs to the language ..."
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Cited by 416 (37 self)
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, linking more standard concepts of structural complexity, states that if EX P has polynomial size circuits then EXP = Cg = MA. The first part of the proof of the main result extends recent techniques of polynomial extrapolation of truth values used in the single prover case. The second part is a
Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions
 Journal of the ACM
, 2002
"... Abstract. Some important classical mechanisms considered in Microeconomics and Game Theory require the solution of a difficult optimization problem. This is true of mechanisms for combinatorial auctions, which have in recent years assumed practical importance, and in particular of the gold standard ..."
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Cited by 230 (1 self)
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for combinatorial auctions, the Generalized Vickrey Auction (GVA). Traditional analysis of these mechanisms—in particular, their truth revelation properties—assumes that the optimization problems are solved precisely. In reality, these optimization problems can usually be solved only in an approximate fashion. We
Competitive Auctions
"... We study a class of singleround, sealedbid auctions for an item in unlimited supply, such as adigital good. We introduce the notion of competitive auctions. A competitive auction is truthful (i.e., encourages bidders to bid their true valuations) and on all inputs yields profit that is withina co ..."
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Cited by 113 (11 self)
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We study a class of singleround, sealedbid auctions for an item in unlimited supply, such as adigital good. We introduce the notion of competitive auctions. A competitive auction is truthful (i.e., encourages bidders to bid their true valuations) and on all inputs yields profit that is withina
Truthful Auctions for Pricing Search Keywords
, 2006
"... We present a truthful auction for pricing advertising slots on a webpage assuming that advertisements for different merchants must be ranked in decreasing order of their (weighted) bids. This captures both the Overture model where bidders are ranked in order of the submitted bids, and the Google mo ..."
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Cited by 137 (5 self)
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We present a truthful auction for pricing advertising slots on a webpage assuming that advertisements for different merchants must be ranked in decreasing order of their (weighted) bids. This captures both the Overture model where bidders are ranked in order of the submitted bids, and the Google
The Computational Complexity of Truthfulness in Combinatorial Auctions
"... One of the fundamental questions of Algorithmic Mechanism Design is whether there exists an inherent clash between truthfulness and computational tractability: in particular, whether polynomialtime truthful mechanisms for combinatorial auctions are provably weaker in terms of approximation ratio th ..."
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Cited by 13 (1 self)
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One of the fundamental questions of Algorithmic Mechanism Design is whether there exists an inherent clash between truthfulness and computational tractability: in particular, whether polynomialtime truthful mechanisms for combinatorial auctions are provably weaker in terms of approximation ratio
Towards a characterization of truthful combinatorial auctions
, 2003
"... This paper analyzes implementable social choice functions (in dominant strategies) over restricted domains of preferences, the leading example being combinatorial auctions. Our work generalizes the characterization of Roberts (1979) who showed that truthful mechanisms over unrestricted domains with ..."
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Cited by 135 (20 self)
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This paper analyzes implementable social choice functions (in dominant strategies) over restricted domains of preferences, the leading example being combinatorial auctions. Our work generalizes the characterization of Roberts (1979) who showed that truthful mechanisms over unrestricted domains
Ad hocVCG: A truthful and costefficient routing protocol for mobile ad hoc networks with selfish agents
, 2003
"... We introduce a gametheoretic setting for routing in a mobile ad hoc network that consists of greedy, selfish agents who accept payments for forwarding data for other agents if the payments cover their individual costs incurred by forwarding data. In this setting, we propose Ad hocVCG, a reactive r ..."
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Cited by 234 (8 self)
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known mechanism by Vickrey, Clarke, and Groves in a mobile network setting. Finally, we analyze a very natural routing protocol that is an adaptation of the Packet Purse Model [8] with auctions in our setting and show that, unfortunately, it does not achieve costefficiency or truthfulness
Results 1  10
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758