"... In PAGE 8: ... Procedure and design. Table3 shows the design summary for this experiment. Three groups were exposed to a trial-by-trial response mode and one group was exposed to a global response mode.... ..."

"... In PAGE 5: ...roups. This resulted in 20 participants per group. Procedure and design. Table2 depicts the design summary of this experiment. Two groups received trial-by-trial training; the two other groups received global training.... ..."

"... In PAGE 5: ... Agreeableness was the strongest pre- dictor of contingent reward (H9267 H11005 .17; see Table5 ), but the credibility interval showed a great deal of variability across stud- ies. Although the mean correlation was positive, more than 10% of the correlations between agreeableness and contingent reward were negative.... ..."

"... In PAGE 3: ...wo rewarded conditions: ADR and 1DR (Fig. 1). As shown in a previous study (Kawagoe et al., 1998), saccade parameters changed depending on the reward condition ( Table1 ). In 1DR, the saccade velocities were higher in the rewarded trials than in the nonrewarded trials; this was true for all three monkeys (paired t test, p H11021 0.... In PAGE 3: ... In 1DR, the saccade velocities were higher in the rewarded trials than in the nonrewarded trials; this was true for all three monkeys (paired t test, p H11021 0.0001) ( Table1 A). The saccade velocities in the 1DR rewarded trials were also higher than in the ADR trials, again for the three monkeys, but less obviously (Table 1A).... In PAGE 3: ...0001) (Table 1A). The saccade velocities in the 1DR rewarded trials were also higher than in the ADR trials, again for the three monkeys, but less obviously ( Table1 A). The saccade latencies in the rewarded trials of 1DR were shorter than those in the nonrewarded trials of 1DR [in two monkeys (Table 1B)] and were shorter than those in ADR in one monkey (Table 1B)].... ..."

"... In PAGE 5: ... Therefore, the entries in the quot;reward quot; and quot;punish quot; columns for equilibria E4- E6 are the same. Equilibria E1, E2, and E3 in Table1 involve contingent strategies. Equilibrium E1 is composed of the cooperative outcome R1/C1 in the first stage, a quot;reward quot; R3/C4 in the second stage, and a quot;punishment quot; R4/C3 to any first-stage deviation.... In PAGE 6: ...The four columns on the right side of Table1 present four independent measures of contingent behavior in the second stage, given that row makes the cooperative R1 choice in the first stage.... In PAGE 7: ... The propensities to punish (R p), or accept punishment (Cap) are measured on the horizontal axis, while propensities to reward (R r) or accept reward (Car) are measured on the vertical axis. The equilibria E1-E6 are plotted as ordered pairs of punish/reward propensities for row (from the R p and R r columns of Table1 ), and accept-punishment/accept-reward propensities for column (from the Cap and Car columns of Table 1). Equilibrium E1 appears in the upper right hand corner of Figure 2, because both row and column always engage in pure-strategy punish/reward behavior, so all propensities are equal to 1.... In PAGE 7: ... The propensities to punish (R p), or accept punishment (Cap) are measured on the horizontal axis, while propensities to reward (R r) or accept reward (Car) are measured on the vertical axis. The equilibria E1-E6 are plotted as ordered pairs of punish/reward propensities for row (from the R p and R r columns of Table 1), and accept-punishment/accept-reward propensities for column (from the Cap and Car columns of Table1 ). Equilibrium E1 appears in the upper right hand corner of Figure 2, because both row and column always engage in pure-strategy punish/reward behavior, so all propensities are equal to 1.... ..."

"... In PAGE 4: ... 3.1 Reward based on Action and Delay The reward is given in Table1 below. For Action=takes taxi the reward is independent of the delay.... ..."

"... In PAGE 5: ... For each case, the cost per unit time is multiplied with the expected number of tokens in the corresponding places and the total cost is computed. The reward functions used to obtain these measures are shown in Table6 . It is assumed that the cost incurred due to rejuvenation is much less than the cost of anodeorsystemfailure.... In PAGE 6: ... Therefore, there is a tradeo involved here and it is up to the user/operator on what he/she considers important. All the costs shown in Table6 are costs per unit time. In our analysis, we x the value for cost nodefail at $5,000/hr and vary the ratio cost nodefail =cost rejuv .... ..."

"... In PAGE 13: ... It was found of interest to see how these two compare. Results are summarized in Table3 . Again, the scale went from 1 (1=To a little extent, 6=To a great extent).... In PAGE 14: ...Table 3 Reward perceptions The highest score in Table3 is achieved for the item that promotion of a lawyer in the firm is based on ability and how well he/she does his/her work. Hunter et al.... In PAGE 14: ... The same calculation was applied in this research to enable comparison of results. There are some interesting differences as listed in Table3 . For example, lawyers in Australian law firms seem more fairly rewarded for the amount of effort they put in than lawyers in Scottish law firms.... In PAGE 14: ...nowledge sharing attitudes and reward attitudes in law firms (Hunter et al. 2002). Relationships between attitudes can be explored by correlation analysis. In Table 4, all correlation coefficients between six knowledge-sharing attitudes from Table 2 and reward attitudes from Table3 are listed. K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 K1 -.... ..."

"... In PAGE 7: ... We will refer to a stable population norm as a stable strategy. The matrix of rewards per period to a focal individual, using a given row strat- egy against a population using a given column strategy, can now be determined from (1)-(3), (5) and (8), and is shown in Table2 . We will denoted this matrix by A, so that aIJ is the reward to an individual using strategy I against n individuals us- ing strategy J.... In PAGE 7: ... Note that the bene ts of monitoring to the focal individual are independent of the number of monitors if no one else is poaching, as indicated by the subscripted dots in columns 5 and 6 of the payoff matrix. A population strategy is stable if its diagonal element in Table2 is the largest in its column. In other words, strategy J is stable if aJJ exceeds aIJ for all I 6 = J; or equivalently, if the only non-positive term in column J of the population stability... In PAGE 11: ... The strategy NM that supports the agreement is a cooperative strategy when the reward to each individual from not hunting and monitoring exceeds the bene t to each individual from hunting (with the higher-value technology) but not moni- toring, or strategy HX. In other words, and in terms of the payoff matrix A de ned by Table2 , NM is a cooperative strategy if a55 exceeds both a22 and a44 or f ? c0 + B n + 1 gt; VH: (19) The higher the value of cH, or the lower the value of RH, the greater the sig- ni cance of whether NM is a cooperative strategy. In general, if a strategy is the only stable one, then it will ultimately emerge as the community norm; whereas if a second strategy is also stable, then the rst will emerge only if it yields a higher com- munity reward.... ..."