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Standard Auction Revisited1
, 2009
"... This paper tries to find out a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a symmetric and increasing equilibrium bidding strategy for buyers in a standard auction. The paper considers a standard auction with one seller (whose valuation of the object is zero) and shows that an increasing ..."
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that an increasing bidding strategy constitutes a symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium if and only if the bidding strategy, derived from the first order condition of expected payoff maximization, is increasing in valuations. We also provide two examples to illustrate our results.
Beliefs Revealed in BayesianNash Equilibrium
, 2008
"... Standard belief hierarchies are an insufficient description of uncertainty for the BayesianNash Equilibrium (BNE) solution concept. Two states with the same belief hierarchy profile may have different sets of BNE action profiles, for many games. We construct new hierarchy profiles with explicit bel ..."
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Standard belief hierarchies are an insufficient description of uncertainty for the BayesianNash Equilibrium (BNE) solution concept. Two states with the same belief hierarchy profile may have different sets of BNE action profiles, for many games. We construct new hierarchy profiles with explicit
StepbyStep Explanation of Hendricks and Kovenock (1989)’s Model of Social Learning
, 2012
"... We explain the Hendricks and Kovenock (1989) framework by studying the behavior of two strategic firms under an informational externality. The informational externality arises when each firm of a social network is endowed with private information regarding the profitability of the investment. In su ..."
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’ future payoffs through the learning process. We describe the model and we show that there exists a unique symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium. The informational externality increases the likelihood for a firm to refrain from investing immediately in order to make a more informed decision in the future.
Computing Pure BayesianNash Equilibria in Games with Finite Actions and Continuous Types
, 2013
"... We extend the wellknown fictitious play (FP) algorithm to compute purestrategy BayesianNash equilibria in privatevalue games of incomplete information with finite actions and continuous types (GFACTs). We prove that, if the frequency distribution of actions (fictitious play beliefs) converges, ..."
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We extend the wellknown fictitious play (FP) algorithm to compute purestrategy BayesianNash equilibria in privatevalue games of incomplete information with finite actions and continuous types (GFACTs). We prove that, if the frequency distribution of actions (fictitious play beliefs) converges
The Condorcet Jury Theorem under Cognitive Hierarchies: Theory and Experiments
, 2014
"... Abstract. Cognitive hierarchy models have been developed to explain systematic deviations from the equilibrium behavior in certain classes of games. This paper introduces an endogenous cognitive hierarchy model, which better explains the behavioral heterogeneity of the strategies in games for whic ..."
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Bayesian Nash equilibrium and the previous cognitive hierarchy models in explaining the observed behavior of voters. 1.
ACTA UNIVERSITATIS APULENSIS No 18/2009 INFORMATION AND THE BAYESIANNASH EQUILIBRIUM IN A GAME WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION
"... Abstract. This paper presents a new model of finding the Bayesian – Nash equilibrium in a game with incomplete information. New information is modeled with information sources. The proposed model shows a new way of estimating the predictive distribution of the Bayesian Nash equilibrium. The informa ..."
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Abstract. This paper presents a new model of finding the Bayesian – Nash equilibrium in a game with incomplete information. New information is modeled with information sources. The proposed model shows a new way of estimating the predictive distribution of the Bayesian Nash equilibrium
Bayesian Nash equilibrium; a statistical test of the hypothesis
, 2003
"... Many economic environments are modeled as games under incomplete information. A fundamental concept in these models is the hypothesis of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. However, in spite of the common use of this hypothesis in economic theory and econometric estimation models, no statistical methods ha ..."
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Many economic environments are modeled as games under incomplete information. A fundamental concept in these models is the hypothesis of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. However, in spite of the common use of this hypothesis in economic theory and econometric estimation models, no statistical methods
Approximation of Nash Equilibria in Bayesian Games
 Journal of Applied Econometrics
, 2008
"... We de
ne a new concept of Constrained Strategic Equilibrium (CSE) for Bayesian games. We show that a sequence of CSEs approximates an equilibrium under standard conditions. We also provide an algorithm to implement the CSE approximation method numerically in a broad class of Bayesian games, includin ..."
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Cited by 3 (0 self)
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We de
ne a new concept of Constrained Strategic Equilibrium (CSE) for Bayesian games. We show that a sequence of CSEs approximates an equilibrium under standard conditions. We also provide an algorithm to implement the CSE approximation method numerically in a broad class of Bayesian games
An incomplete information justification of symmetric equilibrium in symmetric games
, 2010
"... Consider a symmetric 2player game of complete information. Consider an arbitrary Bayesian extension of that game with payoffirrelevant types, independent random matching, and anonymity (private types). We show that, in this setting, while strategies in a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of that game can ..."
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Consider a symmetric 2player game of complete information. Consider an arbitrary Bayesian extension of that game with payoffirrelevant types, independent random matching, and anonymity (private types). We show that, in this setting, while strategies in a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of that game can
Results 1  10
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204,995