implementations rather than specifications. Additionally, we briefly describe our symbolic security protocol verifier ProVerif and situate it among these approaches.

Informal arguments that cryptographic protocols are secure can be made rigorous using inductive definitions. The approach is based on ordinary predicate calculus and copes with infinite-state systems. Proofs are generated using Isabelle/HOL. The human effort required to analyze a protocol can

We present an architecture and tools for verifying implementations of security protocols. Our implementations can run with both concrete and symbolic implementations of cryptographic algorithms. The concrete implementation is for production and interoperability testing. The symbolic implementation

the verifier that the n users did indeed sign the n original messages (i.e., user i signed message M i for i = 1; : : : ; n). In this paper we introduce the concept of an aggregate signature scheme, present security models for such signatures, and give several applications for aggregate signatures. We

overflows and zero division) and there are verifiers for cryptographic protocols that work on fairly abstract descriptions, but so far very few attempts have been done to verify cryptographic security directly on the code, especially for low-level languages like C. We attempt to verify the protocol code

The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), which is used to distribute routing information between autonomous systems, is an important component of the Internet’s routing infrastructure. Secure BGP (S-BGP) addresses critical BGP vulnerabilities by providing a scalable means of verifying the authenticity

We present an architecture and tools for verifying implementations of security protocols. Our implementations can run with both concrete and symbolic implementations of cryptographic algorithms. The concrete implementation is for production and interoperability testing. The symbolic implementation

We consider the problem of automatically verifying infinite-state cryptographic protocols. Specifically, we present an algorithm that given a finite process describing a protocol in a hostile environment (trying to force the system into a "bad" state) computes a model of traces on which

Abstract—Resistance of denial of service attacks is a key security requirement in voting protocols. Acquisti protocol plays an important role in development of internet voting protocols and claims its security without strong physical assumptions. In this study firstly Acquisti protocol is modeled

the server, which drastically reduces I/O costs. The client maintains a constant amount of metadata to verify the proof. The challenge/response protocol transmits a small, constant amount of data, which minimizes network communication. Thus, the PDP model for remote data checking supports large data sets