### Table 3. Succinct ow logic for the functional fragment.

1998

"... In PAGE 6: ... We express this as follows: (Rd F ; Rc F ; MF ; SF ; WF ) satis es R; M e : S1 ! S2 amp; W Here the proposed solution consists of the ve caches of Table 2 and the entities R; M; S1; S2 and W: R 2 d Env is the environment in which e is to be analysed, M 2 P(Mem) is the set of contexts in which e is to be analysed, S1 2 d Store is the store that is possible immediately before e, S2 2 d Store is the store that is possible immediately after e, and W 2 c Val is the value that e can evaluate to. Since the ve caches of Table 2 remain \constant quot; throughout the veri cation we shall dispense with listing them when de ning the \ quot; relation in Table3 . Note that the clauses are de ned compositionally and hence clearly are well-de ned.... In PAGE 6: ... Given the caches of Example 4 we may verify the following formula for the program of Example 1 [ ]; f g program : [ ] ! [ ] amp; f( ; (y; 3))g re ecting that the initial environment is empty, that the initial context is the empty call string, that the program does not manipulate the store (which hence is empty) and that the nal value is described by f( ; (y; 3))g. The veri cation will amount to a proof using the clauses of Table3 as rules and axioms; if successful, the proof and the caches constitute the analysis of the program. 2 The clause for variables merely demands that the store after x equals the store possible before x and that the value associated with x in the environment equals... In PAGE 8: ... Containments versus equalities. Since the speci cation in Table3 is concerned with verifying whether or not a proposed solution is acceptable it is sensible that the clause for function application employs a containment like takek(l; M) MF ( ) rather than an equality like takek(l; M) = MF ( ). The reason is that there might be other instances of the clause where the label of the application... In PAGE 9: ... In fact it would be incorrect to replace the containment by an equality: if M 6 = ;, k gt; 0 and li1 6 = li2 then it is impossible to obtain takek(li; M) = MF ( ) for all i. Although the clauses in Table3 contain no explicit equalities they do contain a lot of implicit equalities because the same ow variable is used more than once in the same clause. One can avoid this by introducing new variables and then linking them explicitly by containments as illustrated below.... In PAGE 10: ...F ( )dXl dc(M; W1; )e v Rc F( ) ^ takek(l; M) MF( ) for some R1; M1; S11; S12; W1; R2; M2; S21; S22; W2 Clearly there will be proposed solutions that are acceptable according to the modi ed speci cation but that are not acceptable according to Table3 . This motivates being explicit about what we mean by the best solution.... In PAGE 10: ... In other words, we can change containments to equalities if we \collect quot; all terms de ning the same entity. 3 Attribute Grammar Formulations The ow logic of Table3 can be transformed into an attribute grammar. The basic idea behind attribute grammars is as follows.... In PAGE 10: ... We shall now proceed in two stages. First we show that a minor transformation will turn the speci cation of Table3 into an extended attribute grammar with global attributes and side conditions. The second stage will then transform the extended attribute grammar into an attribute grammar using global attributes and de ning the attributes by containments (rather than equalities).... In PAGE 11: ... The global attributes can be used as constants in the construction of terms for the attributes and their values can be further constrained by explicit conditions associated with the syntactic rules. It is now easy to see that Table 4 can be obtained from Table3 and vice versa by simply changing the notation. Hence it should be clear that the two speci cations admit the same acceptable solutions and therefore that the best solution for one equals the best solution for the other.... In PAGE 15: ... In doing so we shall exploit the presence of labels on all subexpressions. We shall write the analysis of an expression tl as (Rd F ; Rc F ; MF ; SF ; WF ; RL; ML; WL; SL) satis es tl and (as in Table3 ) we shall be explicit about the analysis of subexpressions. Allowing minor changes in notation this results in the speci cation of Table 8.... ..."

Cited by 9

### Table 9: DES encryption and decryption times (ms).

"... In PAGE 20: ...) Table 8 shows the computation times of two message digest functions, MD5 [28] and SHS [24]. Table9 shows the encryption and decryption times of DES symmetric cryptosystem [23]. Table 10 shows the signing and veri cation times of RSA [29] and DSA [25] digital signature schemes.... ..."

### Table 3. A KEM derived from a OW-CPA secure encryption scheme

2003

"... In PAGE 9: ... In this section, we present a method to con- struct a KEM from a OW-CPA encryption scheme (for which there exists a plaintext-ciphertext checking oracle); this generalises the ideas used in PSEC-KEM [12]. Table3 gives a construction for a KEM from a (deterministic or prob- abilistic) asymmetric encryption scheme (G; E; D). In the construction Hash is a hash function and MGF is a mask generating function.... ..."

Cited by 13

### Table 3. A KEM derived from a OW-CPA secure encryption scheme

"... In PAGE 9: ... In this section, we present a method to con- struct a KEM from a OW-CPA encryption scheme (for which there exists a plaintext-ciphertext checking oracle); this generalises the ideas used in PSEC-KEM [12]. Table3 gives a construction for a KEM from a (deterministic or prob- abilistic) asymmetric encryption scheme (G, E, D). In the construction Hash is a hash function and MGF is a mask generating function.... ..."

### Table 17: Estimated Performance of Asymmetric Encryption Schemes

2003

"... In PAGE 42: ...The results of our performance test for asymmetric encryption schemes are given in Ta- bles 36 and 49 where the top part lists results of (not necessarily optimized) codes of the NESSIE test suite, and the bottom part list results based on the submitters codes (without all the extra features and tests of the suite). Table17 shows estimations of performance for encryption and decryption on a Pentium III desktop, based on the theoretical analysis of Section 4. RSA-KEM has performance similar to RSA-OAEP.... ..."

### Table I: Interleaved Encryption Scheme (1)

### Table III. Additively Homomorphic Encryption Scheme

### Table 3: E ciency of encryption schemes using pairings Scheme Encryption Decryption

2004

Cited by 3