) to subjectively evaluate the employee’s performance; and (ii), to delegate the performance evaluation to a supervisor as a neutral party. Supervision gener-ates contractible information about the employee’s performance, but could result in vertical collusion. This paper demonstrates that supervision can

the weight placed on subjective performance appraisal are examined. Subsequently, we discuss the drawbacks of subjective performance appraisal. We distinguish between situations in which the principal is also the residual claimant and situations in which he is not. When the principal is the residual claimant

Personality and conflict in principal-agent

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Many scholars have emphasized the importance of subjective performance evaluations in employment relationships to provide employees with appropriate effort incentives. While the previous literature has focused on subjective evaluations conducted directly by the firm owner (principal), we

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In many organizations the measurement of job performance can not rely on easily quantifiable information. In such cases, supervising managers often use subjective performance evaluations. We use laboratory experiments to study whether the way employees are assigned to a manager affects managers

their performance depends on the interest region detector. The descriptors should be distinctive and at the same time robust to changes in viewing conditions as well as to errors of the detector. Our evaluation uses as criterion recall with respect to precision and is carried out for different image transformations