### Table I. Cooperation Rates Key: Non-Terminal Periods, Terminal Periodsa

### Table 1 : Frequency of acceptance at the three stages of the game

Cited by 2

### Table 3. Generalized payoff matrix for the stage game of the EFPD.

"... In PAGE 5: ... However, other humans are able to learn to exploit FP2 by basically alternating between playing c and d while FP2 cooperate. FP2 allows this since the average of S and R (see Table3 ) is 16, whereas the payoff of mutual defec- tion is 15. Thus, FP2 makes mutual cooperation with hu- mans easy but is exposed to exploitation.... ..."

### Table 1: Inform stage of the Dialogue Game Theory

"... In PAGE 7: ...Table 1: Inform stage of the Dialogue Game Theory Table1 is an example of the Dialogue ReSpecT reaction rules. The two reac- tions state that the inform stage is accessible from the open stage with an assert or a propose performed by the agents.... ..."

### Table 1: First-stage Game, Based on the Candidates apos; Payo s in the Second-stage Subgames

1998

"... In PAGE 13: ... For h = 0, a frequent outcome is p = 1 and contributions to the incumbent increasing exponentially with time. ***** Figure 1 about here ***** Table1 shows payo s to the incumbent and challenger from the system (1) subgame for several local maximum and e ective boundary pairs (g; h), arrayed so as to de ne the strategic form of the rst-stage game. A (g; h) pair is a local maximum if small increases and small decreases in g both produce a worse payo for the incumbent, or if small increases and small decreases in h both produce a worse payo for the challenger.... In PAGE 14: ...while the challenger receives the maximum possible payo , Jmax. Table1 also includes the payo s from all the (g; h) pairs produced by crossing the g and h values from the local maximum and e ective boundary pairs. The maximum payo s, denoted Imax and Jmax, can each be arbitrarily large, depending on the length of time the system is imagined to run before the election.... In PAGE 14: ... The maximum payo s, denoted Imax and Jmax, can each be arbitrarily large, depending on the length of time the system is imagined to run before the election. For the runs of about two time units used to construct Table1 , reasonable valuations are Imax; Jmax 3. ***** Table 1 about here ***** The game of Table 1 does not have a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.... In PAGE 14: ... For the runs of about two time units used to construct Table 1, reasonable valuations are Imax; Jmax 3. ***** Table1 about here ***** The game of Table 1 does not have a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. The mixing probabil- ities for a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium are shown in Table 2.... In PAGE 14: ... For the runs of about two time units used to construct Table 1, reasonable valuations are Imax; Jmax 3. ***** Table 1 about here ***** The game of Table1 does not have a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. The mixing probabil- ities for a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium are shown in Table 2.... In PAGE 37: ...ircuit (Guckenheimer and Holmes 1986, 45). The cycles in region V include three saddle points. 10. One may verify by direct calculation that neither the incumbent nor the challenger can gain by unilaterally switching to one of the pure strategies of Table1 , as long as Imax gt; :41 and Jmax gt; 1:54. As noted in the text, reasonable valuations are Imax; Jmax 3.... ..."

Cited by 4

### Table 2. The payoffs of the 2 stage game for 3 strategies (AB BPBF,AR BC

2001

Cited by 2