This paper reports results of an experiment designed to investigate the nature of cooperation and punishment. Subjects are matched in a series of two-person, two-stage games with a sequential equilibrium that supports first-stage cooperation with a credible threat of subsequent punishment

I am grateful to an associate editor and to two referees for valuable suggestions. Financial support from

Any stage-game with infinite choice sets can be approximated by finite games obtained as increasingly finer discretizations of the infinite game. The subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes of the finite games converge to a limit distribution. We prove that (i) if the limit distribution is feasible

We introduce a compact graph-theoretic representation for multi-party game theory. Our main result is a provably correct and efficient algorithm for computing approximate Nash equilibria in one-stage games represented by trees or sparse graphs.

, but programming is still necessary. Other systems require less programming, but they are narrowly focused. To enable faster, simpler, and more expressive tools for professionals and amateurs, we have explored the processes and tools used in the early stages of game and simulation design. Interviews with educators

This article focuses on how games unfold as transferential dramas in the consulting room theater. The author explores how the therapist’s countertransference can become an avenue for under-standing the client’s unspoken communication. Eric Berne’s idea that games can be played in three degrees

developed in our work on the chain-store paradox (Kreps and Wilson [2], Milgrom and Roberts [4]). We refer the reader to those papers for motivation, formal definitions, and interpretation. The basic game that we consider consists of N repetitions of the following two person. bimatrix, stage game:

We analyze evolutionary games with replicator dynamics that have frequency dependent stage games. In such an evolutionary game, the payoffs of a strategy at any point in time are functions of the strategy shares given by the players’ strategy choices at that time. This framework is suited to model

– Data sources + assumptions

Abstract. We introduce the first near-optimal polynomial algorithm for obtaining the mixed safety level value of an initially unknown multi-stage game, played in a hostile environment, under imperfect monitoring. In an imperfect monitoring setting all that an agent can observe is the current state