This paper characterizes the preferences of a pessimistic social planner concerned with the potential costs of extreme, low-probability climate events. This pessimistic attitude is represented by a recursive optimization criterion a ̀ la Hansen and Sargent (1995) that introduces supplementary

Abstract not found

the procrastination? ∗

In this research note, we investigate segmentation opportunities for social planners such as government agencies, nonprofits, and public organizations. These opportunities arise when the potential products are vertically (quality) differentiated and the consumers are heterogeneous

’, as distinct from the population size. Emphasis is given to the difference between a framework involving a representative agent and one in which plans are made by a social planner. The precise conditions under which consumption growth paths are the same under the representative agent and the social planner

to reduce the rate at which the ancillary service is needed. We show that the firm unbundles and sets the fee for the ancillary service at the same level the social planner would. Profit maximization thus results in social efficiency. The second rationale for unbundling is segmentation. We assume

Doctor oeconomiae publicae (Dr. oec. publ.) an der Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München 2009

for wealth redistribution by changing the social planner’s preferences

tion Suppose a social planner maximizes

of the model in its HP-filtered version without resorting to simulations. Since the method is an Euler-equation based approach rather than an approach based on solving a social planners problem, models with externalities or distortionary taxation do not pose additional problems. MATLAB programs to carry out