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Capacity of a Shared Secret Key
"... Abstract—Shannon theoretic shared secret key generation by multiple terminals is considered for a source model in which the components of a discrete memoryless multiple source and a noiseless public channel of unlimited capacity are available for accomplishing this goal. A shared secret key is gener ..."
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Abstract—Shannon theoretic shared secret key generation by multiple terminals is considered for a source model in which the components of a discrete memoryless multiple source and a noiseless public channel of unlimited capacity are available for accomplishing this goal. A shared secret key
How to share secrets simultaneously
"... Each member of a team consisting of n person has a secret. The k out of n simultaneous threshold secret sharing requires that any group of k members should be able to recover the secret of the other n − k members, while any group of k − 1 or less members should have no information on the secret of o ..."
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Each member of a team consisting of n person has a secret. The k out of n simultaneous threshold secret sharing requires that any group of k members should be able to recover the secret of the other n − k members, while any group of k − 1 or less members should have no information on the secret
Anonymous Authentication with Shared Secrets
"... Abstract. Anonymity and authenticity are both important yet often conflicting security goals in a wide range of applications. On the one hand for many applications (say for access control) it is crucial to be able to verify the identity of a given legitimate party (a.k.a. entity authentication). Al ..."
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Abstract. Anonymity and authenticity are both important yet often conflicting security goals in a wide range of applications. On the one hand for many applications (say for access control) it is crucial to be able to verify the identity of a given legitimate party (a.k.a. entity authentication). Alternatively an application might require that no one but a party can communicate on its behalf (a.k.a. message authentication). Yet, on the other hand privacy concerns also dictate that anonymity of a legitimate party should be preserved; that is no information concerning the identity of parties should be leaked to an outside entity eavesdropping on the communication. This conflict becomes even more acute when considering anonymity with respect to an active entity that may attempt to impersonate other parties in the system. In this work we resolve this conflict in two steps. First we formalize what it means for a system to provide both authenticity and anonymity even in the presence of an active maninthemiddle adversary for various specific applications such as message and entity authentication using the constructive cryptography framework of [Mau11]. Our approach inherits the composability statement of constructive cryptography and can therefore be directly used in any higherlevel context. Next we demonstrate several simple protocols for realizing these systems, at times relying on a new type of (probabilistic) Message Authentication Code (MAC) called key indistinguishable (KI) MACs. Similar to the key hiding encryption schemes of [BBDP01] they guarantee that tags leak no discernible information about the keys used to generate them.
Secure Multiplication of Shared Secrets In The Exponent
, 2003
"... We present a new protocol for the following task. Given tow secrets a, b shared among n players, compute the value g ab. The protocol uses the generic BGW approach for multiplication of shared secrets, but we show that if one is computing “multiplications in the exponent ” the polynomial randomizati ..."
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We present a new protocol for the following task. Given tow secrets a, b shared among n players, compute the value g ab. The protocol uses the generic BGW approach for multiplication of shared secrets, but we show that if one is computing “multiplications in the exponent ” the polynomial
Computing Functions Of A Shared Secret
, 2000
"... In this work we introduce and study threshold (toutofn) secret sharing schemes for families of functions F . Such schemes allow any set of at least t parties to compute privately the value f(s) of a (previously distributed) secret s, for any f 2 F . Smaller sets of players get no more information ..."
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Cited by 2 (1 self)
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In this work we introduce and study threshold (toutofn) secret sharing schemes for families of functions F . Such schemes allow any set of at least t parties to compute privately the value f(s) of a (previously distributed) secret s, for any f 2 F . Smaller sets of players get no more
Secret Key Agreement by Public Discussion From Common Information
 IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
, 1993
"... . The problem of generating a shared secret key S by two parties knowing dependent random variables X and Y , respectively, but not sharing a secret key initially, is considered. An enemy who knows the random variable Z, jointly distributed with X and Y according to some probability distribution PX ..."
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Cited by 440 (18 self)
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. The problem of generating a shared secret key S by two parties knowing dependent random variables X and Y , respectively, but not sharing a secret key initially, is considered. An enemy who knows the random variable Z, jointly distributed with X and Y according to some probability distribution
Computing inverses over a shared secret modulus
, 2000
"... Abstract. We discuss the following problem: Given an integer φ shared secretly among n players and a prime number e, how can the players efficiently compute a sharing of e −1 mod φ. The most interesting case is when φ is the Euler function of a known RSA modulus N, φ = φ(N). The problem has several ..."
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Cited by 28 (0 self)
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Abstract. We discuss the following problem: Given an integer φ shared secretly among n players and a prime number e, how can the players efficiently compute a sharing of e −1 mod φ. The most interesting case is when φ is the Euler function of a known RSA modulus N, φ = φ(N). The problem has several
Creating Shared Secrets out of Thin Air
"... Current security systems typically rely on the adversary’s computational limitations (e.g., the fact that it cannot invert a hash function or perform largeinteger factorization). Wireless networks offer the opportunity for a different, complementary kind of security, which relies not on the adversa ..."
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Cited by 4 (2 self)
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the problem where a group of n nodes, connected to the same broadcast wireless network, want to agree on a shared secret (e.g., an encryption key), in the presence of an adversary Eve who tries to listen in and steal the secret. We propose a secretagreement protocol, where the n nodes of the group keep
Jam resistant communications without shared secrets
 in Proceedings of the 3 rd International Conference on Information Warfare and Security
, 2008
"... Distribution A, Approved for public release, distribution unlimited Abstract. We consider the problem of establishing jamresistant, wireless, omnidirectional communication channels when there is no initial shared secret. No existing system achieves this. We propose a general algorithm for this prob ..."
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Cited by 11 (1 self)
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Distribution A, Approved for public release, distribution unlimited Abstract. We consider the problem of establishing jamresistant, wireless, omnidirectional communication channels when there is no initial shared secret. No existing system achieves this. We propose a general algorithm
LanguageBased InformationFlow Security
 IEEE JOURNAL ON SELECTED AREAS IN COMMUNICATIONS
, 2003
"... Current standard security practices do not provide substantial assurance that the endtoend behavior of a computing system satisfies important security policies such as confidentiality. An endtoend confidentiality policy might assert that secret input data cannot be inferred by an attacker throug ..."
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Cited by 821 (57 self)
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Current standard security practices do not provide substantial assurance that the endtoend behavior of a computing system satisfies important security policies such as confidentiality. An endtoend confidentiality policy might assert that secret input data cannot be inferred by an attacker
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