### TABLE I. Numerical values of several fundamental quantities in radiative transfer theory for typical values of the index ratio n.

1999

Cited by 3

### Table 4. Diagonal Born-Oppenheimer Correction for H216O Computed with aug-cc-pVDZ Basis Set at Several Levels of Theory

"... In PAGE 6: ... The DBOC must therefore be accounted for in high-accuracy thermochemistry, high-resolution rovibrational spectroscopy, etc. PSI3 can compute the DBOC using Hartree-Fock, full CI, or gen- eral RAS CI wave function, with or without orbital optimization ( Table4 ). To our knowledge, PSI3 was the first publicly available package able to compute the DBOC with highly correlated wave functions.... ..."

### Table 2.3: The sensitivity of a at a level of 0:35 ppm accuracy for e ects which occur in several speculative theories is in many cases comparable or better than in the best ongoing or proposed measurements in high energy collision experiments.

### Table 2. Accuracies and theory complexities for several methods method MAE Accuracy # conditions LinearRegression 0.22 77.43% 117.6

2003

### Table 1. Complexity of Equational Matching Problems Theory Decision Counting Theory Decision Counting

"... In PAGE 18: ... Using the theory of #P-completeness, we identi ed the complexity of #E-Matching problems for several equational theories E. Table1 summarizes our ndings and compares the complexity of counting problems in equational matching with the complexity of the corresponding decision problems. Although in most cases the NP-completeness of the decision problem is accompanied by the #P-completeness of the associated counting problem, it should be emphasized that in general there is no relation between the complexities of these two problems.... ..."

### Table 2. Process and Variance Theory Characteristics of the Five Models

1995

Cited by 24

### Table 2. Negative theory N: pattern description.

2002

"... In PAGE 6: ... Since polymers with an NMA value above the range 70 - 80 can be viewed as having a very good cellular response and those with an NMA values below the range 50 - 60 can be viewed as having a poor cellular response, we experimented with several models corresponding to several threshold values t and t apos; in these ranges. The positive theory P for t = 77 (Table 1) and the negative theory N for t apos; = 55 ( Table2 ) provided t he best combinatorial separation of the strong class from the weak one and therefore, the chosen model was based on these thresholds. The polymers with intermediary NMA values (above 55 and below 77) may display properties specific for both weak and strong classes, and consequently, they are considered as a quot;buffer quot; of medium value.... ..."

### Table 2. Game theory in negotiation

2001

"... In PAGE 6: ... More complex negotiations may arise when domains have competing or even conflicting objectives. For example, consider the setting illustrated in Table2 . Here we have two are two domains, each of... In PAGE 7: ...We assume that each domain starts with a limited number of routes of each type (see Table2 (c)). The domains are unable to share routes, and can only trade some of their routes with each other in order to increase their profits.... In PAGE 7: ... Game theory [2] provides a mathematical framework for studying situations where individual rational decision makers are working towards competing or conflicting objectives. We can use game theory to find a solution for the problem in Table2... In PAGE 8: ...omain D1). Thus this alternative is not a stable outcome. This observation is intuitively satisfying, since from a security point of view we can see that this alternative solution violates the least privilege principle (defined in the previous example). In light of this second example, let us reexamine our four questions for the general case of any negotiation that can be cast in terms of objective values and resources, as in Table2 . (Note that our previous example (in Table 1) can also be recast in this form.... In PAGE 9: ... Detecting success or failure becomes part of the negotiating strategy, and a decision as to whether to continue negotiating must be made at each step of the negotiation. For example, consider the prob- lem in Table2 , and assume that the contents of Table 2(a) are known only to Domain 1 and the contents of Table 2(b) are known only to Domain 2. This would constitute a negotiation with local constraints.... In PAGE 9: ... Detecting success or failure becomes part of the negotiating strategy, and a decision as to whether to continue negotiating must be made at each step of the negotiation. For example, consider the prob- lem in Table 2, and assume that the contents of Table 2(a) are known only to Domain 1 and the contents of Table2 (b) are known only to Domain 2. This would constitute a negotiation with local constraints.... In PAGE 11: ... Thus the information required to assign a numeric value to any given common state must be specified by the system administrator. This was the case in Table2 , where preferences were quantified as the value associated with each objective. This discussion and attempts to provide answers to our four questions for the case of negotiation with local constraints opens several avenues of further research: a.... ..."

Cited by 9

### Table 2. Game theory in negotiation

2001

"... In PAGE 6: ... More complex negotiations may arise when domains have competing or even conflicting objectives. For example, consider the setting illustrated in Table2 . Here we have two are two domains, each of... In PAGE 7: ...We assume that each domain starts with a limited number of routes of each type (see Table2 (c)). The domains are unable to share routes, and can only trade some of their routes with each other in order to increase their profits.... In PAGE 7: ... Game theory [2] provides a mathematical framework for studying situations where individual rational decision makers are working towards competing or conflicting objectives. We can use game theory to find a solution for the problem in Table2... In PAGE 8: ...omain D1). Thus this alternative is not a stable outcome. This observation is intuitively satisfying, since from a security point of view we can see that this alternative solution violates the least privilege principle (defined in the previous example). In light of this second example, let us reexamine our four questions for the general case of any negotiation that can be cast in terms of objective values and resources, as in Table2 . (Note that our previous example (in Table 1) can also be recast in this form.... In PAGE 9: ... Detecting success or failure becomes part of the negotiating strategy, and a decision as to whether to continue negotiating must be made at each step of the negotiation. For example, consider the prob- lem in Table2 , and assume that the contents of Table 2(a) are known only to Domain 1 and the contents of Table 2(b) are known only to Domain 2. This would constitute a negotiation with local constraints.... In PAGE 9: ... Detecting success or failure becomes part of the negotiating strategy, and a decision as to whether to continue negotiating must be made at each step of the negotiation. For example, consider the prob- lem in Table 2, and assume that the contents of Table 2(a) are known only to Domain 1 and the contents of Table2 (b) are known only to Domain 2. This would constitute a negotiation with local constraints.... In PAGE 11: ... Thus the information required to assign a numeric value to any given common state must be specified by the system administrator. This was the case in Table2 , where preferences were quantified as the value associated with each objective. This discussion and attempts to provide answers to our four questions for the case of negotiation with local constraints opens several avenues of further research: a.... ..."

Cited by 9

### Table 2: Postulates Supported The above postulates involve several important theorems and non-theorems of our theory. They help distinguish between the di erent senses of intentions and help relate our models to the reasoning that they support. Table 2 summarizes our results for the three variants of team intentions that we formalized. + indicates support, ? indicates failure, and indicates support when we make the assumption that commitments to one apos;s team are intended. For WN and SN, we also assume S = ; and R = ;.

1998

Cited by 15