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Sequential Equilibrium in Computational Games
, 2013
"... We examine sequential equilibrium in the context of computational games [Halpern and Pass 2011a], where agents are charged for computation. In such games, an agent can rationally choose to forget, so issues of imperfect recall arise. In this setting, we consider two notions of sequential equilibrium ..."
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Cited by 2 (2 self)
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We examine sequential equilibrium in the context of computational games [Halpern and Pass 2011a], where agents are charged for computation. In such games, an agent can rationally choose to forget, so issues of imperfect recall arise. In this setting, we consider two notions of sequential
Sequential equilibrium and perfect equilibrium in games of imperfect recall
, 2008
"... Definitions of sequential equilibrium and perfect equilibrium are given in games of imperfect recall. ..."
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Cited by 4 (4 self)
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Definitions of sequential equilibrium and perfect equilibrium are given in games of imperfect recall.
How Proper is Sequential Equilibrium?
, 1997
"... A strategy profile of a normal form game is proper if and only if it is quasiperfect in every extensive form Ž with that normal form.. Thus, properness requires optimality along a sequence of supporting trembles, while sequentiality only requires optimality in the limit. A decisiontheoretic implem ..."
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Cited by 3 (0 self)
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theoretic implementation of sequential rationality, strategic independence respecting equilibrium (SIRE), is defined and compared to proper equilibrium, using lexicographic probability systems. Finally, we give tremblebased characterizations, which do not involve structural features of the game, of the rankings
Experimental Tests of a Sequential Equilibrium Reputation Model
 Econometrica
, 1988
"... Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at ..."
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Cited by 189 (16 self)
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Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at
Complete sequential equilibrium and its alternative
, 2009
"... We propose a complete version of the sequential equilibrium (CSE) and its alternative solution concept (WCSE) for general
niteperiod games with observed actions. The sequential equilibrium (SE) is not a complete solution concept in that it might not be a Nash equilibrium in the general games that ..."
Abstract

Cited by 2 (1 self)
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We propose a complete version of the sequential equilibrium (CSE) and its alternative solution concept (WCSE) for general
niteperiod games with observed actions. The sequential equilibrium (SE) is not a complete solution concept in that it might not be a Nash equilibrium in the general games
RATIONALITY ON FINAL DECISIONS LEADS TO SEQUENTIAL EQUILIBRIUM∗
, 2002
"... The purpose of this article is to investigate epistemic conditions for a sequential equilibrium in an extensive form game with imperfect information: If players mutually know that all players maximize their own expected payoffs at any information sets in their final decisions then their behaviors w ..."
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The purpose of this article is to investigate epistemic conditions for a sequential equilibrium in an extensive form game with imperfect information: If players mutually know that all players maximize their own expected payoffs at any information sets in their final decisions then their behaviors
Specialization, Information, and Growth: a Sequential Equilibrium Analysis
 Review of Development Economics
, 1997
"... Pricing costs and information problems are introduced into a framework with consumerproducers, economies of specialization, and transaction costs to predict the endogenous and concurrent evolution in division of labor and in the information of organization acquired by society. The concurrent evolut ..."
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Cited by 8 (3 self)
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. The concept of Walras sequential equilibrium is developed to analyze the social learning process which is featured with uncertainties of the direction of the evolution as well as a certain trend of the evolution.
On the invariance of sequential equilibrium and quasiperfect equilibrium under isomorphism of extensive games
, 2008
"... Sequential equilibrium and quasiperfect equilibrium are not invariant under isomorphism of the standard form. We introduce two relaxations of super weak isomorphism which reflect those features of extensive games which determine sequential equilibrium or quasiperfect equilibrium, respectively. Th ..."
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Sequential equilibrium and quasiperfect equilibrium are not invariant under isomorphism of the standard form. We introduce two relaxations of super weak isomorphism which reflect those features of extensive games which determine sequential equilibrium or quasiperfect equilibrium, respectively
ON THE EXISTENCE OF SEQUENTIAL EQUILIBRIUM: THE BACKWARD INDUCTION APPROACHF
"... Abstract. We generalize the wellknown backward induction procedure to the case of extensive games with perfect recall having certain information structure (called simple information structure). We prove that the backward induction assessments are precisely sequential equilibria, and show that the ..."
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Abstract. We generalize the wellknown backward induction procedure to the case of extensive games with perfect recall having certain information structure (called simple information structure). We prove that the backward induction assessments are precisely sequential equilibria, and show
Complete Sequential Equilibrium and Its Alternative (Job Market Paper)
, 2009
"... We propose a complete version of the sequential equilibrium (CSE) and its alternative solution concept (WCSE) for general
niteperiod games with observed actions. The sequential equilibrium (SE) is not a complete solution concept in that it might not be a Nash equilibrium in the general games that ..."
Abstract
 Add to MetaCart
We propose a complete version of the sequential equilibrium (CSE) and its alternative solution concept (WCSE) for general
niteperiod games with observed actions. The sequential equilibrium (SE) is not a complete solution concept in that it might not be a Nash equilibrium in the general games
Results 1  10
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1,191