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592
How bad is selfish routing?
 JOURNAL OF THE ACM
, 2002
"... We consider the problem of routing traffic to optimize the performance of a congested network. We are given a network, a rate of traffic between each pair of nodes, and a latency function for each edge specifying the time needed to traverse the edge given its congestion; the objective is to route t ..."
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Cited by 657 (27 self)
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. In this article, we quantify the degradation in network performance due to unregulated traffic. We prove that if the latency of each edge is a linear function of its congestion, then the total latency of the routes chosen by selfish network users is at most 4/3 times the minimum possible total latency (subject
Selfish Routing and the Price of Anarchy
 MATHEMATICAL PROGRAMMING SOCIETY NEWSLETTER
, 2007
"... Selfish routing is a classical mathematical model of how selfinterested users might route traffic through a congested network. The outcome of selfish routing is generally inefficient, in that it fails to optimize natural objective functions. The price of anarchy is a quantitative measure of this in ..."
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Cited by 255 (11 self)
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Selfish routing is a classical mathematical model of how selfinterested users might route traffic through a congested network. The outcome of selfish routing is generally inefficient, in that it fails to optimize natural objective functions. The price of anarchy is a quantitative measure
The Price of Selfish Routing
, 2007
"... We study the problem of routing traffic through a congested network. We focus on the simplest case of a network consisting of m parallel links. We assume a collection of n network users; each user employs a mixed strategy, which is a probability distribution over links, to control the shipping of ..."
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Cited by 132 (26 self)
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is necessary due to the absence of some central authority to regulate network traffic and implement an optimal assignment of traffic to links? We investigate this fundamental question in the context of Nash equilibria for such a system, where each network user selfishly routes its traffic only on those links
Selfish Routing with Atomic Players
 In Proc. of the Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA) 2005
, 2005
"... Introduction. One of the most successflfl applications of the price of anarchythe worstcase ratio between the objective function values of noncooperative equilibria and optimais to "selfish routing", a classical model of how independent network users route traffic in a congested ..."
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Cited by 36 (3 self)
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Introduction. One of the most successflfl applications of the price of anarchythe worstcase ratio between the objective function values of noncooperative equilibria and optimais to "selfish routing", a classical model of how independent network users route traffic in a congested
On Selfish Routing in InternetLike Environments
, 2004
"... A recent trend in routing research is to avoid inefficiencies in networklevel routing by allowing hosts to either choose routes themselves (e.g., source routing) or use overlay routing networks (e.g., Detour or RON). Such approaches result in selfish routing, because routing decisions are no longe ..."
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Cited by 160 (10 self)
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A recent trend in routing research is to avoid inefficiencies in networklevel routing by allowing hosts to either choose routes themselves (e.g., source routing) or use overlay routing networks (e.g., Detour or RON). Such approaches result in selfish routing, because routing decisions
Selfish Routing In Capacitated Networks
 MATHEMATICS OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH
, 2003
"... According to Wardrop's first principle, agents in a congested network choose their routes selfishly, a behavior that is captured by the Nash equilibrium of the underlying noncooperative game. A Nash equilibrium does not optimize any global criterion per se, and so there is no apparent reason wh ..."
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Cited by 100 (6 self)
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According to Wardrop's first principle, agents in a congested network choose their routes selfishly, a behavior that is captured by the Nash equilibrium of the underlying noncooperative game. A Nash equilibrium does not optimize any global criterion per se, and so there is no apparent reason
Selfish Routing in Social Networks
, 2004
"... I investigate the intersection of selfish routing and the preferential attachment social network. In particular, through the use of a stochastic generative preferential attachment model, a collection abstract network patterns are created for the transfer of flow from one distinct source destination ..."
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I investigate the intersection of selfish routing and the preferential attachment social network. In particular, through the use of a stochastic generative preferential attachment model, a collection abstract network patterns are created for the transfer of flow from one distinct source destination
Selfish Routing with Incomplete Information
 Theory of Computing Systems
"... In his seminal work, Harsanyi [19] introduced an elegant approach to study noncooperative games with incomplete information. In our work, we use this approach to define a new selfish routing game with incomplete information that we call Bayesian routing game. Here, each of n selfish users wishes to ..."
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Cited by 31 (5 self)
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In his seminal work, Harsanyi [19] introduced an elegant approach to study noncooperative games with incomplete information. In our work, we use this approach to define a new selfish routing game with incomplete information that we call Bayesian routing game. Here, each of n selfish users wishes
Selfish Routing with Oblivious Users
 LECTURE NOTES IN COMPUTER SCIENCE
"... Abstract. We consider the problem of characterizing user equilibria and optimal solutions for selfish routing in a given network. We extend the known models by considering users oblivious to congestion. While in the typical selfish routing setting the users follow a strategy that minimizes their ind ..."
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Cited by 3 (0 self)
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Abstract. We consider the problem of characterizing user equilibria and optimal solutions for selfish routing in a given network. We extend the known models by considering users oblivious to congestion. While in the typical selfish routing setting the users follow a strategy that minimizes
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