programmability of the network adapters, the temptation to tamper with the software or firmware is likely to grow; by doing so, a user could obtain a much larger share of the available bandwidth at the expense of other users. We use a game-theoretic approach to investigate the problem of the selfish behavior

. This phenomenon, often refered to as the “Tragedy of the Commons”, can explain the underlying cause of many diverse problems, including industrial over-pollution, nuclear proliferation, and over-fishing. In all these settings, decentralized and selfish behavior leads to suboptiml outcomes in which all parties

Peer to peer networks are distributed data-sharing systems without a centralized infrastructure.

Abstract—The 802.11e standard enables user configuration of several MAC parameters, making WLANs vulnerable to users that selfishly configure these parameters to gain throughput. In this paper we propose a novel distributed algorithm to thwart such selfish behavior. The key idea of the algorithm

of the cooperative commons is that as more devices join, total communication capacity increases. These advantages are possible when devices are willing to cooperate and use their own resources to carry traffic of others, but are undermined by selfish behavior, where a device’s actions increases benefit

of the cooperative commons is that as more devices join, total communication capacity increases. These advantages are possible when devices are willing to cooperate and use their own resources to carry traffic of others, but are undermined by selfish behavior, where a device’s actions increases benefit

Computer systems increasingly involve the interaction of multiple self-interested agents. The designers of these systems have objectives they wish to optimize, but by allowing selfish agents to interact in the system, they lose the ability to directly control behavior. What is lost by this lack

Given a collection of selfish agents who wish to establish links to route traffic among themselves, the set of equilibrium network topologies may appear quite different from the centrally enforced optimum. We study the quality (price of anarchy) of equilib-rium networks in a game where links

that making a distinction between creative talent and business talent explains systematic differences in selfish behavior. Generally, both the less business talented and the more creative are more willing to forego private payoffs to avoid losses to others. A moderator analysis reveals that less creative

for other nodes in order to conserve their scarce resources. Furthermore, recent studies on the impact of selfish behavior in DTNs show that the performance metrics (i.e., delivery ratio, delivery overhead, and delivery latency) are severely influenced if a major portion of the nodes is selfish. A number