Modelling misuse cases as a means of capturing security requirements

the Unidirectional Lightweight Encapsulation (ULE) Protocol

Most requirements engineers are poorly trained to elicit, analyze, and specify security requirements, often confusing them with the architectural security mechanisms that are traditionally used to fulfill them. They thus end up specifying architecture and design constraints rather than true

involve hundreds of processes that must be able to acquire resources dynamically and communicate e#ciently. This paper analyzes the unique security requirements of large-scale distributed (grid) computing and develops a security policy and a corresponding security architecture. An implementation

Alargely neglected area in requirements engineering is that of elicitation methods for security requirements. Many organizations, if they use an elicitation method at all for security requirements, use one that they have previously used for ordinary, functional (end-user) requirements

This paper investigates mechanisms that guarantee secure information flow in a computer system. These mechanisms are examined within a mathematical framework suitable for formulating the requirements of secure information flow among security classes. The central component of the model is a lattice

of statistical queries and correlating the responses. Statlstmal data banks are much less secure than most people beheve. Data encryption attempts to prevent unauthorized disclosure of confidential information in transit or m storage. This paper describes the general nature of controls of each type, the kinds

with distinct security requirements. We propose a solution to one, the managed-open scenario where no network infrastructure is pre-deployed, but a small amount of prior security coordination is expected. Our protocol, ARAN, is based on certificates and successfully defeats all identified attacks.

. This paper investigates safety and security requirements specification methods, and proposed techniques for the integration of contrasting methodologies. The nature of interaction between safety and security requirements, and problems relating to their independent development, are discussed

We present a general framework for representing cryptographic protocols and analyzing their security. The framework allows specifying the security requirements of practically any cryptographic task in a unified and systematic way. Furthermore, in this framework the security of protocols