, that an improperly designed protocol could be vulnerable to an active saboteur, one who may impersonate another user or alter the message being transmitted. Several models are formulated in which the security of protocols can be discussed precisely. Algorithms and characteri-zations that can be used to determine

Under the assumption that each pair of participants em communieatc secretly, we show that any reasonable multiparty protwol can be achieved if at least Q of the Participants am honest. The secrecy achieved is unconditional, It does not rely on any assumption about computational intractability. 1.

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As sensor networks edge closer towards wide-spread deployment, security issues become a central concern. So far, the main research focus has been on making sensor networks feasible and useful, and less emphasis was placed on security. We design a suite of security building blocks that are optimized

Most recent ad hoc network research has focused on providing routing services without considering security. In this paper, we detail security threats against ad hoc routing protocols, specifically examining AODV and DSR. In light of these threats, we identify three different environments

We present a general framework for representing cryptographic protocols and analyzing their security. The framework allows specifying the security requirements of practically any cryptographic task in a unified and systematic way. Furthermore, in this framework the security of protocols

Two parties, A and B, want to sign a contract C over a communication network. To do so, they must “simultaneously” exchange their commitments to C. Since simultaneous exchange is usually impossible in practice, protocols are needed to approximate simultaneity by exchanging partial commitments

that are timestamped using the local clocks on the nodes. Therefore, time synchronization becomes an indispensable piece of infrastructure in such systems. For years, protocols such as NTP have kept the clocks of networked systems in perfect synchrony. However, this new class of networks has a large density of nodes

problem in a non-adversarial setting, assuming a trusted environment. In this paper, we present attacks against routing in ad hoc networks, and we present the design and performance evaluation of a new secure on-demand ad hoc network routing protocol, called Ariadne. Ariadne prevents attackers

; the spi calculus enables us to consider cryptographic issues in more detail. We represent protocols as processes in the spi calculus and state their security properties in terms of coarsegrained notions of protocol equivalence.