Abstract not found

on these groups (e.g., economic disadvantage, gender roles) can frustrate this identification; and that in school domains where these groups are negatively stereotyped, those who have become domain identified face the further barrier of stereotype threat, the threat that others ' judgments or their own

We describe Bro, a stand-alone system for detecting network intruders in real-time by passively monitoring a network link over which the intruder's traffic transits. We give an overview of the system's design, which emphasizes highspeed (FDDI-rate) monitoring, real-time notification

Large-scale peer-to-peer systems face security threats from faulty or hostile remote computing elements. To resist these threats, many such systems employ redundancy. However, if a single faulty entity can present multiple identities, it can control a substantial fraction of the system, thereby

definitions are given first. They are then commented upon, and supplemented by additional definitions, which address the threats to dependability and security (faults, errors, failures), their attributes, and the means for their achievement (fault prevention, fault tolerance, fault removal, fault forecasting

such regulation is then sketched lo provide elemenls of a theory of supply of regulation. A variety of empirical evidence and illustration is also presented. W The state—the machinery and power of the state—is a potential resource or threat to every industry in the society. With its power to prohibit or compel

The rising abuse of computers and increasing threat to personal privacy through data banks have stimulated much interest m the techmcal safeguards for data. There are four kinds of safeguards, each related to but distract from the others. Access controls regulate which users may enter the system

with agitation-related emotions (e.g., fear, threat, restlessness). Differences in both the relative magnitude and the accessibility of individu-als ' available types of self-discrepancies are predicted to be related to differences in the kinds of discomfort people are likely to experience. Correlational

. Traditional demand deposit contracts which provide liquidity have multiple equilibria, one of which is a bank run. Bank runs in the model cause real economic damage, rather than simply reflecting other problems. Contracts which can prevent runs are studied, and the analysis shows

for costly punishment causes a large increase in cooperation levels because potential free riders face a credible threat. We show, in particular, that in the presence of a costly punishment opportunity almost complete cooperation can be achieved and maintained although, under the standard assumptions