Results 1  10
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1,633
RandomPlayer Games
, 2003
"... This paper introduces general games with incomplete information in which the number, as well as the types or identities, of the participating players are determined by chance and might not be known to the players when they make their choices of actions. In these games, the selection of the number an ..."
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Cited by 11 (3 self)
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and types of players is modeled as a finite point process on a suitable type space. Definitions of purestrategy, mixedstrategy, and correlated equilibria in randomplayer games are given, extending the corresponding ones for finite games, Bayesian games, and games with population uncertainty, which may
Trading Group Theory for Randomness
, 1985
"... In a previous paper [BS] we proved, using the elements of the Clwory of nilyotenf yroupu, that some of the /undamcnla1 computational problems in mat & proup, belong to NP. These problems were also ahown to belong to CONP, assuming an unproven hypofhedi.9 concerning finilc simple Q ’ oup,. The a ..."
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Cited by 353 (9 self)
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prove th:rt. in spite of their analogy with the polynomial time hierarchy, the finite levrls of this hierarchy collapse t,o Afsf=Ah42). Using a combinatorial lemma on finite groups [IIE], we construct a game by whirh t.he nondeterministic player (Merlin) is able to coavlnre the random player (Arthur
Randomized rumor spreading
 In IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
, 2000
"... We investigate the class of socalled epidemic algorithms that are commonly used for the lazy transmission of updates to distributed copies of a database. These algorithms use a simple randomized communication mechanism to ensure robustness. Suppose players communicate in parallel rounds in each of ..."
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Cited by 287 (2 self)
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We investigate the class of socalled epidemic algorithms that are commonly used for the lazy transmission of updates to distributed copies of a database. These algorithms use a simple randomized communication mechanism to ensure robustness. Suppose players communicate in parallel rounds in each
Automated Whitebox Fuzz Testing
"... Fuzz testing is an effective technique for finding security vulnerabilities in software. Traditionally, fuzz testing tools apply random mutations to wellformed inputs of a program and test the resulting values. We present an alternative whitebox fuzz testing approach inspired by recent advances in ..."
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Cited by 311 (25 self)
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Fuzz testing is an effective technique for finding security vulnerabilities in software. Traditionally, fuzz testing tools apply random mutations to wellformed inputs of a program and test the resulting values. We present an alternative whitebox fuzz testing approach inspired by recent advances
The Social Cost of Cheap Pseudonyms
 Journal of Economics and Management Strategy
, 2000
"... We consider the problems of societal norms for cooperation and reputation when it is possible to obtain "cheap pseudonyms", something which is becoming quite common in a wide variety of interactions on the Internet. This introduces opportunities to misbehave without paying reputational con ..."
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Cited by 273 (10 self)
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social cost in making the spread of reputations optional. We prove that no equilibrium can sustain significantly more cooperation than the duespaying equilibrium in a repeated random matching game with a large number of players in which players have finite lives and the ability to change
The hot hand in basketball: On the misperception of random sequences
 Cognitive Psychology
, 1985
"... We investigate the origin and the validity of common beliefs regarding “the hot hand ” and “streak shooting ” in the game of basketball. Basketball players and fans alike tend to believe that a player’s chance of hitting a shot are greater following a hit than following a miss on the previous shot. ..."
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Cited by 197 (1 self)
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and women of Cornell’s varsity teams. The outcomes of previous shots influenced Cornell players ’ predictions but not their performance. The belief in the hot hand and the “detection ” of streaks in random sequences is attributed to a general misconception of chance according to which even short random
Epistemic conditions for Nash equilibrium
, 1991
"... According to conventional wisdom, Nash equilibrium in a game “involves” common knowledge of the payoff functions, of the rationality of the players, and of the strategies played. The basis for this wisdom is explored, and it turns out that considerably weaker conditions suffice. First, note that if ..."
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Cited by 236 (6 self)
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that if each player is rational and knows his own payoff function, and the strategy choices of the players are mutually known, then these choices form a Nash equilibrium. The other two results treat the mixed strategies of a player not as conscious randomization of that player, but as conjectures of the other
Settling the Complexity of Computing TwoPlayer Nash Equilibria
"... We prove that Bimatrix, the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium in a twoplayer game, is complete for the complexity class PPAD (Polynomial Parity Argument, Directed version) introduced by Papadimitriou in 1991. Our result, building upon the work of Daskalakis, Goldberg, and Papadimitriou on the c ..."
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Cited by 88 (5 self)
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We prove that Bimatrix, the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium in a twoplayer game, is complete for the complexity class PPAD (Polynomial Parity Argument, Directed version) introduced by Papadimitriou in 1991. Our result, building upon the work of Daskalakis, Goldberg, and Papadimitriou
Fast Algorithms for Finding Randomized Strategies in Game Trees
, 1994
"... Interactions among agents can be conveniently described by game trees. In order to analyze a game, it is important to derive optimal (or equilibrium) strategies for the different players. The standard approach to finding such strategies in games with imperfect information is, in general, computation ..."
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Cited by 116 (11 self)
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Interactions among agents can be conveniently described by game trees. In order to analyze a game, it is important to derive optimal (or equilibrium) strategies for the different players. The standard approach to finding such strategies in games with imperfect information is, in general
A ThreePlayer Dynamic Majoritarian Bargaining Game
 JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
, 2004
"... We analyze an infinitely repeated dividethedollar bargaining game with an endogenous reversion point. In each period a new dollar is divided among three legislators according to the proposal of a randomly recognized member—if a majority prefer so—or according to previous period’s allocation otherw ..."
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Cited by 61 (6 self)
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We analyze an infinitely repeated dividethedollar bargaining game with an endogenous reversion point. In each period a new dollar is divided among three legislators according to the proposal of a randomly recognized member—if a majority prefer so—or according to previous period’s allocation
Results 1  10
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1,633