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Introduction. One of the major debts that economists, legal scholars, and other social scientists owe Ronald Coase is that his work drew attention to the institutional structure of production. 1 Through the late 1970s at least, the dominant neoclassical paradigm in economics focused on the behavior of firms in different market settings under the assumption that the underlying institutions were well-defined and operational. If they were not, market-like forces would generate pressures for institutional change; in other words, the market continually disciplined institutions so that they could not stray far from what would be considered optimal. Hence, institutions, as such, were neglected, deemed undeserving of serious scholarly concern. The wide exposure of Coase's work; his winning of the Nobel prize in economics in 1991; Douglass North's similar award in 1993; and the provocative questions raised by other scholars, such as Oliver Williamson, Harold Demsetz, a

of the threat of imitation is needed. Departing from prior studies concentrating on patenting and copy-prevention, or taking the relationship between intellectual property right (IPR) protection and internationalization as given premises, this study addresses the features and effects of IPRs

and the National Council for Soviet and East European Research for funding the surveys in

This paper analyzes how property rights affect the allocation of firms' available resources among different types of assets. In particular, we investigate emp irically for a large number of countries whether firms in environments with more secure property rights allocate available resources

This chapter develops a unified analytical framework, drawing on and extending the existing literature on the subject, for studying the role of property rights in economic development. It addresses two fundamental and related questions concerning the relationship between property rights

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A global perspective on intellectual

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This document incorporates by reference the CalConnect Intellectual Property Rights,