This paper describes proof-carrying code (PCC), a mechanism by which a host system can determine with certainty that it is safe to execute a program supplied (possibly in binary form) by an untrusted source. For this to be possible, the untrusted code producer must supply with the code a safety

Proof-carrying code is a framework for the mechanical verification of safety properties of machine language programs, but the problem arises of quis custodiat ipsos custodes---who will verify the verifier itself? Foundational proof-carrying code is verification from the smallest possible set

types are inherently propositional. You can code around this (see DTAL), but it’s awkward. Furthermore, the resulting type system is complicated and thus not exactly trustworthy. Following Necula and Lee, we’re going to apply the ideas behind Hoare Logic to try to avoid these short-comings. Proof-Carrying

We introduce a generic framework for proof carrying code, developed and mechanically verified in Isabelle/HOL. The framework defines and proves sound a verification condition generator with minimal assumptions on the underlying programming language, safety policy, and safety logic. We demonstrate

In diese Schriftliche Ausarbeitung, es wird Proof-Carrying Code (PCC verkürzt) dargestellt. Proof-Carrying Code ist eine Technik, wo ein Code Konsument kann sicher sein dass das Code eines unzuverlässige Produzent erfüllt eine Sicherheitspolitik. Die Sicherheitspolitik ist veröffentlich bei den

Dependent session types allow us to describe not only properties of the I/O behavior of processes but also of the exchanged data. In this paper we show how to exploit dependent session types to express proof-carrying communication. We further introduce two modal operators into the type theory

Efficient Java bytecode verification by the means of

Abstract- Proof-Carrying Code (PCC) is a technique that can be used for safe execution of untrusted code. In a typical instance of PCC, a code receiver establishes a set of safety rules that guarantee safe behavior of programs, and the code producer creates a formal safety proof that proves

. Proof-Carrying Code (PCC) enables a computer system to determine, automatically and with certainty, that program code provided by another system is safe to install and execute without requiring interpretation or run-time checking. PCC has applications in any computing system in which the safe

Proof-Carrying Code (PCC) is a general framework for verifying the safety properties of machine-language programs. PCC proofs are usually written in a logic extended with language-specific typing rules. In Foundational Proof-Carrying Code (FPCC), on the other hand, proofs are constructed