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Worstcase equilibria
 IN PROCEEDINGS OF THE 16TH ANNUAL SYMPOSIUM ON THEORETICAL ASPECTS OF COMPUTER SCIENCE
, 1999
"... In a system in which noncooperative agents share a common resource, we propose the ratio between the worst possible Nash equilibrium and the social optimum as a measure of the effectiveness of the system. Deriving upper and lower bounds for this ratio in a model in which several agents share a ver ..."
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Cited by 847 (17 self)
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In a system in which noncooperative agents share a common resource, we propose the ratio between the worst possible Nash equilibrium and the social optimum as a measure of the effectiveness of the system. Deriving upper and lower bounds for this ratio in a model in which several agents share a
The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modeling
 Rand Journal of Economics
, 1986
"... This article establishes the relationship between the static axiomatic theory of bargaining and the sequential strategic approach to bargaining. We consider two strategic models of alternating offers. The models differ in the source of the incentive of the bargaining parties to reach agreement: the ..."
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Cited by 563 (1 self)
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: the bargainers ' time preference and the risk of breakdown of negotiation. Each of the models has a unique perfect equilibrium. When the motivation to reach agreement is made negligible, in each model the unique perfect equilibrium outcome approaches the Nash bargaining solution, with utilities that reflect
The Cyclical Behavior of Equilibrium Unemployment and Vacancies
 American Economic Review
, 2005
"... This paper argues that a broad class of search models cannot generate the observed businesscyclefrequency fluctuations in unemployment and job vacancies in response to shocks of a plausible magnitude. In the U.S., the vacancyunemployment ratio is 20 times as volatile as average labor productivity ..."
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Cited by 871 (23 self)
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that wages are determined by Nash bargaining. ∗ This is a major revision of ‘Equilibrium Unemployment Fluctuations’. I thank Daron Acemoglu, Olivier
On the Private Provision of Public Goods
 Journal of Public Economics
, 1986
"... We consider a general model of the noncooperative provision of a public good. Under very weak assumptions there will always exist a unique Nash equilibrium in our model. A small redistribution of wealth among the contributing consumers will not change the equilibrium amount of the public good. Howe ..."
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Cited by 564 (9 self)
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We consider a general model of the noncooperative provision of a public good. Under very weak assumptions there will always exist a unique Nash equilibrium in our model. A small redistribution of wealth among the contributing consumers will not change the equilibrium amount of the public good
Quantal Response Equilibria For Normal Form Games
 NORMAL FORM GAMES, GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
, 1995
"... We investigate the use of standard statistical models for quantal choice in a game theoretic setting. Players choose strategies based on relative expected utility, and assume other players do so as well. We define a Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE) as a fixed point of this process, and establish e ..."
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Cited by 647 (28 self)
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We investigate the use of standard statistical models for quantal choice in a game theoretic setting. Players choose strategies based on relative expected utility, and assume other players do so as well. We define a Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE) as a fixed point of this process, and establish
The complexity of computing a Nash equilibrium
, 2006
"... We resolve the question of the complexity of Nash equilibrium by showing that the problem of computing a Nash equilibrium in a game with 4 or more players is complete for the complexity class PPAD. Our proof uses ideas from the recentlyestablished equivalence between polynomialtime solvability of n ..."
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Cited by 329 (23 self)
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We resolve the question of the complexity of Nash equilibrium by showing that the problem of computing a Nash equilibrium in a game with 4 or more players is complete for the complexity class PPAD. Our proof uses ideas from the recentlyestablished equivalence between polynomialtime solvability
Rules, discretion, and reputation in a model of monetary policy
 JOURNAL OF MONETARY ECONOMICS
, 1983
"... In a discretionary regime the monetary authority can print more money and create more inflation than people expect. But, although these inflation surprises can have some benefits, they cannot arise systematically in equilibrium when people understand the policymakor's incentives and form their ..."
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Cited by 812 (9 self)
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the policymaker and the private agents, it is possible that reputational forces can substitute for formal rules. Here, we develop an example of a reputational equilibrium where the outcomes turn out to be weighted averages of those from discretion and those from the ideal rule. In particular, the rates
National debt in a neoclassical growth model.'
 American Economic Review,
"... This paper contains a model designed to serve two purposes, to examine longrun competitive equilibrium in a growth model and then to explore the effects on this equilibrium of government debt. Samuelson [8] has examined the determination of interest rates in a singlecommodity world without durable ..."
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Cited by 698 (0 self)
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This paper contains a model designed to serve two purposes, to examine longrun competitive equilibrium in a growth model and then to explore the effects on this equilibrium of government debt. Samuelson [8] has examined the determination of interest rates in a singlecommodity world without
Fusion, Propagation, and Structuring in Belief Networks
 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
, 1986
"... Belief networks are directed acyclic graphs in which the nodes represent propositions (or variables), the arcs signify direct dependencies between the linked propositions, and the strengths of these dependencies are quantified by conditional probabilities. A network of this sort can be used to repre ..."
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Cited by 484 (8 self)
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with the task of fusing and propagating the impacts of new information through the networks in such a way that, when equilibrium is reached, each proposition will be assigned a measure of belief consistent with the axioms of probability theory. It is shown that if the network is singly connected (e.g. tree
Results 1  10
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